Rush, C.J.
A jury convicted Ryan Ramirez of murdering twenty-three-month-old P.H. and neglecting three-year-old R.H., resulting in serious bodily injury. After finding two statutory aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury recommended life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction; and the trial court adopted that recommendation. In this direct appeal, Ramirez now argues multiple trial-court errors in admitting certain evidence, excluding other evidence, and giving a supplemental jury instruction. He also challenges his life without parole sentence. We conclude that none of the alleged errors warrant reversal and affirm in all respects.
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Ramirez raises multiple issues on appeal. Regarding admission of the surveillance system footage, we hold that seizing the recorder did not violate the federal or state constitutions. And we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of Hudson’s prior bad acts involving her children, nor were Ramirez’s substantial rights affected.
As to the supplemental jury instruction the trial court gave during deliberations, we emphasize that the decision to give a supplemental instruction should be made with great caution. But consistent with Indiana Code section 34-36-1-6, we no longer require an error or legal lacuna—a gap—for a trial court to supplement final instructions in response to a jury’s question on a point of law. Thus, the instruction’s flawed wording is not reversible error. And Ramirez waived any argument about how the instruction was given.
Finally, we conclude that the statutory LWOP aggravators were sufficiently supported; the sentence did not violate Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution; and revision is not warranted under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).
Ramirez first argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence footage obtained from the home-security-system recorder detectives seized while executing a warrant to “photograph and/or videotape” his parents’ home.
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We conclude the exigent-circumstances exception justified the warrantless seizure of the recorder under the Fourth Amendment, and that under the Indiana Constitution, the seizure was likewise reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. And even if the trial court had abused its discretion, admitting the footage was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, given the strength and quality of other, independent evidence of Ramirez’s guilt.
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Here, under the totality of the circumstances, the detective’s belief that the recorder’s contents were in danger of being imminently destroyed was objectively reasonable. When the recorder was seized, law enforcement officers were still establishing a timeline of events leading up to P.H.’s death and had reason to believe Ramirez brought P.H. to his parents’ house the night before she died. Detective Stanton, who installs security systems, was familiar with the recorder’s brand and model. And he testified at trial that, when officers notice a surveillance system that they believe contains evidence, they “try to secure that video as soon as possible to keep somebody from writing over it or erasing it.” Officers feared such destruction of evidence could happen here. While executing a warrant to photograph and videotape Ramirez’s parents’ home, Detective Stanton noticed the surveillance system, which was displaying live video of the home’s driveway. Believing the recorder contained “potentially fleeting evidence” that was “clearly critical” to the investigation, the detective secured it while he applied for a search warrant to prevent its contents from being tampered with or destroyed.
Importantly, Ramirez had already left the recorder in his parents’ care, so the intrusion into his possessory interests here was slight. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 705 (1983) (noting that the “intrusion on possessory interests occasioned by a seizure of one’s personal effects can vary both in its nature and extent,” such as when a seizure is “made after the owner has relinquished control of the property to a third party”). And Ramirez’s privacy interests were not adversely affected, as law enforcement obtained a search warrant before reviewing the recorder’s footage. In sum, the State has shown that law enforcement had a compelling need to secure the recorder before obtaining a warrant to search it—making the seizure objectively reasonable and thus justified under the exigent-circumstances exception. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222.
We now move on to Ramirez’s state constitutional claim.
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All three Litchfield factors weigh in the State’s favor. We thus conclude that seizing the recorder was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances and did not violate Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
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Ramirez further argues that, if the recorder was improperly seized, the footage’s admission was reversible error because “the footage was key to the State’s case.” The State responds that, even if the recorder’s seizure were unconstitutional, any error in the admission of the recorder’s footage was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The State claims that, because Ramirez’s convictions were supported by “strong independent evidence,” the surveillance footage was “merely cumulative of the other properly admitted evidence of Ramirez’s guilt.” We agree—even if the recorder had been improperly seized, the admission of its footage was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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But the surveillance footage, while disturbing, was far from the only evidence supporting Ramirez’s convictions. Klarissa Manuel, the children’s babysitter, testified that their physical and emotional state changed significantly after Ramirez’s arrival. They started showing up with unusual bruises, which became progressively worse. And Manuel said the toddlers were afraid of Ramirez, who she once saw hit R.H. in the head with a wiffle ball bat. That summer, Hudson also noticed that her children feared Ramirez and observed a negative change in their condition. P.H. had bruises that looked like fingerprints, “like somebody had grabbed her leg.” And R.H. “would always have black eyes” or bruising on an arm or leg.
As the children’s primary caregiver, Ramirez was solely charged with watching them while Hudson worked; and Ramirez—not Hudson— watched them during the hours surrounding P.H.’s death. The State’s evidence showed that P.H. was alive and alert before Hudson left for work, and Hudson did not check on her daughter after she returned. Detective Carroll testified that he was able to independently verify Hudson’s timeline and whereabouts that evening. The following morning, when Hudson found P.H. dead, she panicked and told Ramirez she was taking her unresponsive daughter to the hospital. But Ramirez told Hudson to be quiet, “that it was okay,” and that they needed to get their “story straight.”
The State also presented expert testimony that R.H. could not have caused P.H.’s extensive injuries, as Ramirez initially suggested; and R.H.’s injuries were caused by a “[s]ignificant amount of force” and not self-inflicted.
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When R.H. was taken to the hospital, he presented with bruising across his entire body, raccoon eyes, elevated liver enzymes, muscle damage from blunt force trauma, and a distended abdomen. R.H. had petechiae in both eyes, indicating he had undergone significant head trauma or had been strangled. He also had lacerations on his lip and right eyebrow, injuries on the inside of his ear, and abrasions caused by trauma to his testicles and scrotum. X-rays showed R.H. had four fractures in various stages of healing. And, like P.H., he was missing patches of hair. Multiple doctors concluded R.H.’s injuries were caused by child abuse.
Given the strength and overwhelming quantity of other, independent evidence supporting Ramirez’s guilt, we conclude that, even if the recorder’s seizure had been improper, the footage’s admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Ramirez argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it barred him from introducing evidence of Hudson’s prior bad acts involving her children, depriving him of a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. We conclude there was no abuse of discretion in excluding the evidence, and any error would have been harmless.
Before trial, Ramirez asked the trial court to allow him to present three pieces of evidence: (1) evidence of three interactions with DCS; (2) “bruising, poor appearance, and injuries” the children showed before he began dating Hudson; and (3) the fact that Hudson made conflicting statements explaining these injuries. One such injury was a buckle fracture P.H. suffered in 2017—a year before her death. Ramirez specifically argued that this evidence tended to negate his guilt because R.H. had suffered the same type of fracture here. The court preliminarily ruled that the evidence was inadmissible under Evidence Rule 404(b) because no evidence “establishes these are signature crimes or other bad acts that really establish identity in the way that’s important.” It also concluded that there was not “enough evidence of another appropriate purpose” under the Rule.
We first note that much of the evidence Ramirez wanted to introduce was in fact admitted at trial. Manuel testified that she called DCS three times in the past with concerns about Hudson’s parenting. And she described seeing some bruises on the children before Ramirez entered their lives. Ramirez also cross-examined Hudson about her statements to the police explaining her children’s injuries, and she admitted to telling a detective that she had “spank[ed] them so hard to leave a mark” and had spanked R.H. “excessively.”
But Ramirez was not allowed to present evidence at trial about P.H.’s 2017 buckle fracture, which the trial court deemed “too remote”—and it did not abuse its discretion by excluding this evidence…The standard for a defendant to introduce evidence of identity spelled out in Garland was not satisfied because Ramirez did not demonstrate that the 2017 buckle fracture was evidence of a crime or was caused by Hudson specifically. And the trial court properly concluded that Ramirez failed to show “enough evidence of another appropriate purpose” under Rule 404(b).
We further conclude that, even if this evidence should have been admitted under Rule 404(b), its exclusion was harmless because its probable impact on the jury in light of the other evidence was so minor that Ramirez’s substantial rights were not prejudiced.
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Ramirez next argues the trial court committed reversible error by supplementing the jury’s instructions on what the State had to prove to find him guilty of murder.
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…[A]fter a few hours of deliberation, the jury sent the trial court a question:
Is knowingly or intentionally causing harm that results in death constitute [sic] murder, the same as Instruction Number 4, “A person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being commits murder, a felony[?]”
The State wanted the court to respond in the affirmative, and Ramirez objected. The trial court, unclear on what the jury was asking, requested clarification. The jury responded:
Is intentionally causing harm, that leads to death, the same as intentionally killing?
The State then argued there was a lacuna in the instructions that required a supplemental instruction. The trial court proposed one:
The State does not have to prove that a defendant specifically intended to kill another person for that defendant to be guilty of murder. It is enough for the State to show that a defendant knowingly inflicted an injury that resulted in the other person’s death, and at the time he inflicted that injury, the defendant was aware of a high probability that said injury could cause the death of the other person.
Ramirez objected, arguing the instruction “watered down the definition of murder” and used the word “could” instead of “would.” The court overruled his objection, and Ramirez then agreed that if the instruction were to be given, it should be formatted like the other instructions and simply sent back to the jury. With no objection from Ramirez, the court then numbered it the last instruction and sent it to the jurors.
Ramirez now challenges the supplemental instruction on three grounds: (1) giving it was an abuse of discretion because there was no legal lacuna in the original instructions; (2) its numbering and presentation made it stand out, which improperly influenced the jury; and (3) it misstated the law.
Each argument lacks merit. As the State points out, because the jury asked a question about a relevant point of law, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in providing the supplemental instruction. Ramirez waived any argument about how the instruction was given. And, while the supplemental instruction may not have been carefully crafted, its flaws do not amount to instructional error and do not warrant reversal.
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Accordingly, regardless of whether there was a legal lacuna, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving the supplemental instruction. The jury specifically asked whether “intentionally causing harm, that leads to death [is] the same as intentionally killing?” This question clearly seeks clarification on a “point of law arising in the case.” I.C. § 34-36-1- 6(2). Murder is a results-based crime; and the lay jury sought guidance on how “intentionally” and “knowingly” apply to a defendant, like Ramirez, who didn’t simply shoot his victim in the head but rather inflicted an injury that resulted in death. The jury thus asked the trial court whether it was enough for the State to show Ramirez intentionally injured P.H. or whether it had to prove more, and the trial court was required to answer the question. The court did so by incorporating into its supplemental instruction bracketed language from Indiana’s pattern jury instruction on culpability that can be included when a defendant has been charged with causing a result by his conduct. See Ind. Pattern Crim. Jury Inst. 9.0120.
While supplemental jury instructions should be given cautiously due to their prejudicial potential, we recognize the greater flexibility trial courts have under Indiana Code section 34-36-1-6(2) when responding to jury questions.
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Ramirez asserts that the manner in which the instruction was given was improper. The State counters that Ramirez waived this argument by raising it for the first time on appeal. We agree with the State.
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Here, the trial court asked the parties if they had “[a]ny preferences” for how the supplemental instruction would be given. The trial judge offered to either send it back to the jury room as a written instruction, or bring the jury and Ramirez back, read it in open court, and provide it in writing with the other closing instructions. The State indicated its preference that the instruction be put in writing and sent to the jury, and Ramirez’s counsel replied, “We would agree.” The trial court confirmed this procedure and indicated it would give the supplemental instruction the next consecutive instruction number. Ramirez did not object.
Ramirez asserted at oral argument that he agreed only to put the instruction in writing—not to send it back to the jury by itself. Still, at the very least, Ramirez did not object to this procedure; and so the issue is waived on appeal. Downs v. State, 656 N.E.2d 849, 853 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). Finally, Ramirez also conceded at oral argument that he did not assert a fundamental error argument in his appellate brief.
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Here, the supplemental jury instruction did not impact Ramirez’s substantial rights. Although the State was required to prove that Ramirez possessed the required level of culpability for murder, Ramirez’s defense focused on identity—that Hudson or R.H. inflicted P.H.’s injuries—not whether P.H.’s injuries were inflicted with the requisite scienter. And considering all the evidence, including the nature and severity of P.H.’s injuries, a reasonable jury would have found the intent element satisfied. Because we can say with complete confidence that a reasonable jury would have otherwise rendered a guilty verdict, any errors in the supplemental jury instruction would not warrant reversal.
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We finally address Ramirez’s claim under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which allows us to revise a sentence if it is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Our principal task is “to attempt to leaven the outliers”—not to achieve a “correct” result in every case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). And the defendant bears the burden to persuade us that the sentence imposed is inappropriate. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). Ramirez asks us to exercise this constitutional power to revise his LWOP sentence but does not argue that we should reduce his sentence for his neglect of a dependent conviction.
Regarding the nature of the offense, Ramirez recognizes that P.H.’s murder was a “severe crime.” Yet Ramirez claims the jury found him to have killed P.H. “knowingly” but not “intentionally,” and his LWOP sentence is inappropriate in light of that lesser degree of culpability. But even assuming Ramirez did not “intentionally” kill P.H., he has not presented any compelling evidence portraying the nature of the offense in a positive light. See Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).
Ramirez likewise has failed to show that his LWOP sentence is an outlier in light of his character. Although Ramirez had no prior criminal history, he was entrusted with caring for two young and defenseless children; and he violated that position of trust, which paints his character in a negative light. See Gauvin v. State, 883 N.E.2d 99, 105 (Ind. 2008). Overall, considering the extent of the pain and suffering Ramirez inflicted on P.H. and R.H., his LWOP sentence is not an outlier in need of leavening.
For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court.
David, Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.