Rush, C.J.
Weed, grass, herb, endo, chronic—despite its many nicknames, no other substance has the distinct, pungent, and pervasive odor of raw marijuana. And law enforcement officers are specifically taught to detect this odor as part of Indiana’s standard police academy training—training they frequently put into use in the field.
With those considerations in mind, we must answer a question of first impression: whether an officer who attests only that they possess the necessary training and experience to detect the smell of raw marijuana allows a warrant-issuing judicial officer to infer that the affiant is qualified to recognize this odor. Because trained and experienced law enforcement officers require no exceptional olfactory acuity to identify the distinctive scent of raw marijuana, an officer seeking a search warrant on this basis need not detail their qualifications—beyond their “training and experience”—to identify the drug’s smell. We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of Bunnell’s motion to suppress.
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The parties agree that a search warrant must be based on probable cause. They dispute, however, whether the assertions in the affidavit sufficiently detailed the deputies’ expertise in identifying the odor of raw marijuana to support the probable-cause determination. Bunnell argues the assertions were not sufficient; the State argues they were.
We agree with the State. Because the scent of raw marijuana is so distinctive, and because marijuana is one of the most ubiquitous drugs in today’s society, we hold that a trained officer seeking a search warrant on this basis need not further detail their qualifications to recognize this odor beyond their basic “training and experience.”
The Supreme Court of the United States has long held that the “presence of odors” can establish probable cause for a search warrant if the following conditions are met: (1) the issuing judicial officer “finds the affiant qualified to know the odor”; and (2) the odor “is one sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden substance.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948).
The question presented then, is this: Can a warrant-issuing judicial officer reasonably infer that a law enforcement officer is qualified to recognize the odor of raw marijuana if that officer attests, without elaboration, that they possess the requisite training and experience to detect the smell? Our answer is yes. This is because Indiana law enforcement officers receive specialized training on the detection and identification of raw marijuana—training that is frequently used in the field—and raw marijuana has its own unique smell that is ubiquitous and unlike any other substance.
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Thus, under Johnson, Indiana’s law enforcement training requirements— often coupled with officers’ frequent encounters in the field with raw marijuana—and the drug’s distinctive odor can allow even a general reference to an officer’s training and experience to provide a substantial basis for a probable-cause determination. See 333 U.S. at 13. Here, Deputy Elmore went through basic training in Indiana, including instruction on detecting the odor of raw marijuana. Deputy Anderson received his training in another state but was sufficiently trained to meet Indiana’s requirements for out-of-state officers. And to bolster their specialized training, the deputies testified to nearly ten years of combined law enforcement experience. Accordingly, the search-warrant affidavit stating that both deputies “observed through [their] training and experience the smell of raw [m]arijuana emitting from the door” was sufficient for the warrant-issuing judge to find a substantial basis to conclude that probable cause existed.
It thus follows that requiring a search-warrant affidavit to also contain a phrase like “including police academy training in detecting this odor,” is not necessary. While it is better practice to provide additional detail, the absence of such detail does not defeat probable cause under these narrow circumstances. See, e.g., Vasquez v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1214, 1216 (Ind. 2001) (holding that “[t]he opinion of someone sufficiently experienced with [a] drug may establish its identity, as may other circumstantial evidence”).
This approach is consistent with other state and federal courts, many of which have upheld probable-cause findings based on raw marijuana’s distinctive odor and trained officers’ ability to identify it. See United States v. Beard, 708 F.3d 1062, 1066 (8th Cir. 2013) (finding the search of a vehicle lawful under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement when the officer “smelled raw marijuana immediately after” the defendant rolled down his car window); United States v. Conklin, 154 F. Supp. 3d 732, 737–38 (S.D. Ill. 2016) (holding that under a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, informant’s tip and officer’s “sniff of [raw] cannabis” were sufficient to support search warrant and that “implicit in an officer’s statement that he smelled marijuana is that he knows what marijuana smells like by virtue of his law enforcement experience”); State v. Otto, 840 N.W.2d 589, 595 (N.D. 2013) (finding probable cause for warrantless sweep of camper parked in parking lot when officers observed a “very strong odor of raw marijuana” emanating from it); State v. Cuong Phu Le, 463 S.W.3d 872, 879–80 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (finding probable cause where citizen’s tip was corroborated by officer’s observations, including the odor of raw marijuana at the front door).
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Like the Court of Appeals, we reject any “categorical presumption” that every law enforcement officer can distinguish and detect the smell of raw marijuana. Bunnell, 160 N.E.3d at 1149. Instead, we find that officers—like Deputies Elmore and Anderson here—who assert their training and experience as the basis of their ability to detect the scent of raw marijuana can present a substantial basis for probable cause. This satisfies the requirement that warrant-issuing judges and magistrates consider the reasonable inferences drawn from the totality of the evidence. See Spillers, 847 N.E.2d at 953.
This holding stands in tension with some prior Court of Appeals decisions that have suggested or held that an officer’s general statement to this effect may not suffice for a probable-cause determination. See Alexander-Woods v. State, 163 N.E.3d 902, 910 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied; Bean v. State, 142 N.E.3d 456, 463–64 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied; State v. Hawkins, 766 N.E.2d 749, 751–52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. To the extent these cases conflict with today’s holding, we disapprove them.
In sum, our decision today hinges on the unique scent of raw marijuana and the experience and training officers need to identify this odor. Indeed, officers who assert their training and experience as a basis to detect drugs other than marijuana by smell and who seek a search warrant on this basis must provide enough detail to support a conclusion that they’re qualified to identify this odor and that the odor is “sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden substance.” Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13. Furthermore, defendants who wish to challenge probable cause remain free to inquire as to officers’ training and experience, though the overarching inquiry remains whether the warrant-issuing judge had a substantial basis to determine that probable cause existed.
Today we hold, as an issue of first impression, that an officer who affirms that they detect the odor of raw marijuana based on their training and experience may establish probable cause without providing further details on their qualifications to recognize this odor. We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of Bunnell’s motion to suppress.
David and Slaughter, JJ., concur.
Goff, J., concurs in result.
Massa, J., concurs with separate opinion.
Massa, J., concurring
I fully concur in the reasoning of the Court’s opinion and its result but write separately to note a cautionary tale for law enforcement.
The Court of Appeals decision we vacated might have been summarized thusly: The boilerplate magic words in a search warrant application in these circumstances require more than just “based on my training and experience.” Some further elaboration was required describing said training and experience.
Our holding today makes clear those six magic words suffice in cases involving the odor of raw marijuana. In support, we cite a neighboring federal court decision that found, “implicit in an officer’s statement that he smelled marijuana is that he knows what marijuana smells like by virtue of his law enforcement experience.” United States v. Conklin, 154 F. Supp. 3d 732, 738 (S.D. Ill. 2016) (emphasis added). In my judgment, that ought to be enough; it is “implicit.” The next case may well entail an application where an officer says, “I smelled raw marijuana,” but omits the six magic words. Suppression, then, would seem to follow from today’s holding, despite the affiant’s implicit knowledge that many would recognize. Detectives and magistrates should heed the lesson.