Slaughter, J.
Kevin Charles Isom faces the death penalty for the murders of his wife and her two children. We affirmed his convictions and death sentence on direct appeal. Isom then sought post-conviction relief, raising many challenges to the effectiveness of his trial and appellate counsel. Although he refused to verify his petition as our post-conviction rules require, we eventually allowed him to proceed. Then, after lengthy proceedings, the post-conviction court denied his petition. We affirm.
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Most of Isom’s post-conviction claims are that his trial counsel were constitutionally ineffective “at all phases of Isom’s trial”, including during jury selection and at the guilt and penalty phases. Because we find that Isom fails to meet his burden on review, he is not entitled to relief on these grounds.
Isom’s challenges to the jury-selection process are that counsel were deficient in screening and selecting jurors, thus forcing him to “accept jurors who should have been stricken [sic] for cause” and denying him the right to be tried by an impartial jury. Because Isom either waives his arguments, or fails to meet his burden, or both, we agree with the postconviction court that he is not entitled to relief.
… Isom cannot prevail on his post-conviction argument that counsel should have sought the return of this peremptory challenge and was deficient for not doing so. Isom does not argue that the prevailing professional norm is for counsel to make gratuitous requests that the trial court will deny. Without this critical link, he cannot show deficient performance under Strickland because the “proper measure of attorney performance remains . . . reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” 466 U.S. at 688.
As for prejudice, Isom does not argue that he was prejudiced by the individual error alleged here: counsel’s failure to request the return of the peremptory strike used against prospective juror 8. He thus waives this argument, Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a), and cannot meet his burden under Strickland. But even had Isom raised this argument, he would still have to show that a seated juror was biased. Cf. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988) (“So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.”); Oswalt v. State, 19 N.E.3d 241, 246 (Ind. 2014) (“[A]n appellate court will find reversible error only where the defendant eventually exhausts all peremptories and is forced to accept either an incompetent or an objectionable juror.”) (cleaned up). But here, the post-conviction court found that the seated jurors were not tainted—a finding Isom does not dispute.
Because Isom shows neither deficient performance nor prejudice, he is not entitled to relief on this ground.
Isom also claims his trial counsel were ineffective during jury selection because they did not ask the trial court to strike the entire panel after discovering that prospective jurors had discussed the case. The postconviction court found that Isom did not show deficient performance. We agree and add that he did not show prejudice either.
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Isom also argues that his trial counsel were ineffective for using a jury questionnaire that did not identify which prospective jurors would be able to consider the mitigation evidence that counsel expected to present. Below, Isom made two claims relevant to the juror questionnaire. First, he argued that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to hire a jury consultant, resulting in counsel’s undue reliance on the questionnaire. Second, he argued that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to adequately question prospective jurors based on their responses to the questionnaire. Isom did not, however, argue that trial counsel were ineffective for using a faulty questionnaire. Having failed to raise this claim below, he cannot raise it here. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(8).
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Isom raises two guilt-phase challenges. He argues first his trial counsel were ineffective during the guilt phase because counsel “implicitly but certainly” conceded that Isom was guilty via Dr. Parker’s testimony. Second, where below Isom argued in his post-conviction petition that counsel were ineffective in handling the State’s plea offer to Isom, he argues here that the Court should revisit its holding in Harshman v. State, 232 Ind. 618, 115 N.E.2d 501 (1953), in light of McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018). The post-conviction court denied Isom relief on both grounds, and so do we.
Isom’s first claim—that trial counsel called a witness who implicitly conceded Isom’s guilt—is both waived and meritless. It is waived because Isom claims for the first time in this Court that trial counsel were ineffective because they conceded Isom’s guilt. Below, although Isom referenced that Dr. Parker “essentially conceded Isom’s guilt”, he did not do so as a discrete claim. Instead, he mentioned Dr. Parker’s testimony only to dispute trial counsel’s testimony during the post-conviction hearing that their strategies for the guilt and mitigation phases were reasonable. Isom did not even identify what Dr. Parker said. And Isom’s operative petition for post-conviction relief lists fifty-five grounds for relief—but none that mentions Dr. Parker’s “concession”. Having failed to raise this issue in any recognizable way below, he cannot now repackage it as a preserved claim. P-C.R. 1(8).
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Below Isom argued that “[c]ounsel refused to properly present to Isom the State’s plea offer.” The post-conviction court found the claim waived because Isom failed to address it in his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The post-conviction court went on to say that even if it reached the merits, Isom would not be entitled to relief under McCoy. We agree that Isom waived his claim below; he is thus prohibited from raising it here. PCR 1(8).
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Isom argues that his trial counsel failed to fully investigate and present a mitigation case at the penalty phase of Isom’s trial. According to Isom, trial counsel’s investigation and use of Dr. Durak’s data and expertise and Lake County’s jail records amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Under Strickland, counsel has the duty to act reasonably under prevailing professional norms, including conducting reasonable investigations. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). In determining whether an investigation was reasonable, courts ask whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further. Id. at 527. And like all performance under Strickland, decisions about what and how much to investigate are given a “heavy measure of deference”. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 381 (2005) (cleaned up). Because evidence in the record shows that counsel’s investigation and use of both sets of records were part of a reasonable trial strategy, Isom does not carry his burden on review, and he is not entitled to relief under Strickland.
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Isom also claims that appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to raise fundamental-error challenges on direct appeal concerning instructions 17, 18, and 23. We review claims that appellate counsel were ineffective as we do such claims against trial counsel, asking whether counsel’s performance was substandard and caused prejudice under Strickland.
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On review, Isom must show that as to each instruction, the evidence points only to the following conclusions:
• that trial counsel’s decision not to object to instructions 17, 18, and 23 was a significant and obvious error on the face of the record;
• that these unraised issues were clearly stronger than the issues appellate counsel raised; and
• that but for appellate counsel’s decision not to raise these issues, there is a reasonable probability that Isom’s appeal would have led to resentencing.
Because Isom did not make these showings, he is not entitled to relief on his claim that appellate counsel were ineffective concerning the challenged instructions. The post-conviction court found that Isom failed to show constitutionally deficient performance. We agree and likewise find that Isom did not show prejudice.
Isom argues that instructions 17 and 18 wrongly prevented the jury from considering his mitigating evidence during sentencing and that instruction 23 unconstitutionally informed the jury that its sentencing decision must be unanimous. But, as we held above, supra, at 24–25, 30, Isom did not make either showing. Thus, he cannot establish significant, obvious, or evident errors on the face of the record. This shortcoming alone provides an adequate basis for affirming the post-conviction court’s denial of relief on these grounds.
Moreover, Isom does not argue that the unraised instructional issues were clearly stronger than the raised issues. He thus waives this argument. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). Nor does Isom overcome the presumption of competent representation under Strickland, a presumption especially strong in waiver-of-issue cases. Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710, 724 (Ind. 2013). Isom does not address this presumption and therefore waives this argument. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). And even had he not waived it, reviewing courts should defer to appellate counsel’s strategic decision not to raise an issue unless it was “unquestionably unreasonable”. Bieghler, 690 N.E.2d at 194. On this record, we decline to find that appellate counsel’s decision not to challenge trial counsel’s failure to object to instructions 17, 18, and 23 was “unquestionably unreasonable.”
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Isom also raises five freestanding challenges to the post-conviction court’s rulings: (1) denying Isom’s renewed motion for a competency hearing; (2) denying Isom’s discovery request for the State’s lethal-injection protocol and finding his execution-validity challenge waived; (3) denying Isom’s discovery request for juror-contact information and finding issue waived; (4) limiting the testimony of two expert witnesses; and (5) finding Isom’s challenge to his petition’s filing date waived. Because Isom does not establish that the post-conviction court erred, he is not entitled to relief.
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After Isom refused to sign his petition for post-conviction relief, a requirement under our post-conviction rules, see P-C.R. 1(3)(b), his counsel raised the issue of Isom’s competency. The post-conviction court found Isom competent and dismissed his petition. After this Court reinstated Isom’s petition for post-conviction relief, counsel renewed its earlier challenge to Isom’s competency and again sought hearing from the post-conviction court. The post-conviction court denied Isom’s motion, and subsequent renewed motion, finding that he “d[id] not assert any change in circumstances”, and that Indiana Code section 35-36-3-1 does not apply in post-conviction cases. Isom argues that the post-conviction court was wrong on both points and erred by denying his renewed request for a competency hearing. While we decline to address whether section 35-36-3-1 applies to post-conviction proceedings, we hold that Isom is not entitled to relief because he does not argue and cannot show that the evidence before the post-conviction court was without conflict and led only to the conclusion that he was incompetent.
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During Isom’s post-conviction proceeding, he sought the State’s lethal-injection protocol through a discovery request. The post-conviction court denied Isom’s request based on the State’s objection that it had no execution date set for Isom and did not know which substances or method would be used to execute him. Isom then included in his operative postconviction petition the following challenge to the validity of the State’s lethal-injection protocol: “9(D) As of the mandatory deadline for submitting this pleading, Indiana has no valid method of execution. The State has declined to provide Isom any information about how it plans to complete his execution.” Isom included no other reasoning or citations in support of his challenge. In its findings, the post-conviction court denied Isom’s challenge to the validity of Indiana’s method of execution and found it waived due to Isom’s failure to present a cogent legal argument or include his reasoning and evidence in his proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law.
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Early in the post-conviction proceedings, the parties agreed to send a letter to the jurors, through the court, informing them that the attorneys might wish to talk to them and listing the attorneys’ contact information. The post-conviction court notified the parties that if they did not hear from any jurors and wished to communicate with them further, they could draft another letter and petition the court to send it. Neither the State nor Isom opted to do so. Instead, Isom asked the post-conviction court to provide him with the jurors’ phone numbers and addresses so that he could contact them directly. The post-conviction court declined to do so, a decision Isom now challenges. Because the post-conviction court was well within its discretion to deny Isom’s motion, his challenge fails.
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Isom argues only that our law does not preclude a court from sharing juror-contact information. But not prohibiting direct juror contact is different than requiring direct juror contact. Isom cites no case law requiring a post-conviction court to share juror-contact information to facilitate direct contact, and we decline to so hold today.
Our case law instead makes clear that post-trial investigations of jurors should be used only in extraordinary cases and that deference to a juror’s privacy should govern a court’s inquiry. State v. Dye, 784 N.E.2d 469, 477 (Ind. 2003). To disturb a juror’s privacy, a party must show “manifest indications of material discrepancies appearing in the record”. Ibid. For instance, in Dye, material discrepancies appeared on the face of the record because the juror’s questionnaire responses differed from her voir dire responses. Ibid. But here Isom merely alleged that three jurors provided incomplete questionnaire answers as to their criminal history with no evidentiary support from the record. Only later, months after the postconviction court denied Isom’s motion, did Isom submit exhibits containing jury questionnaires, chronological case summaries, and Bureau of Motor Vehicle records for one seated juror and two alternate jurors. Isom thus did not establish “manifest indications of material discrepancies appearing in the record” and is not entitled to relief.
Isom next raises an unspecified challenge to what he styles as the postconviction court’s waiver ruling. We find this argument waived because he does not develop it. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). Isom’s clearest statement of the challenge is that: “The post-conviction court erred in denying Isom’s attorneys the opportunity to contact Isom’s former jurors. The court compounded that error by finding the issue waived.” But it is unclear which issue is “the issue waived” because the first sentence discusses Isom’s opportunity to contact former jurors, but the post-conviction court does not rule that Isom’s opportunity to contact former jurors is waived. Because Isom has not presented a reviewable claim, we have no grounds on which to revisit the post-conviction court’s ruling.
During the hearing on Isom’s post-conviction petition, he proposed two capital-litigation experts as witnesses. The post-conviction court permitted the experts to testify but limited their testimony to topics that were addressed in death-penalty training seminars. The post-conviction court did not allow the witnesses to give their opinions on trial counsel’s performance. Isom argues that the post-conviction court erred by not permitting two expert witnesses to give their opinions on whether Isom’s trial counsel were ineffective. Because the post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the witnesses’ testimony to factual issues that were helpful to the court, Isom’s argument fails.
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After the post-conviction court found Isom’s initial petition for postconviction relief waived due to his refusal to sign the petition, he appealed to our Court. He asked us to provide relief in one of two ways: either accept the post-conviction petition that Isom tendered in January 2016, or order the post-conviction court to accept the petition as of any date outside the case management schedule. In response, we granted Isom relief and ordered the post-conviction court to deem Isom’s petition filed as of the date of our order, January 13, 2017. Although Isom sought this alternative relief and did not seek rehearing from our Court, he argued in his post-conviction petition that we erroneously ordered the postconviction court to file Isom’s petition as of the date of our order. According to Isom, he raised the issue in his petition to preserve the claim, even though he conceded that the post-conviction court could not decide the claim.
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Isom has not established that the post-conviction court erred in: (1) denying his renewed motion for a competency hearing; (2) denying his discovery request for the State’s lethal-injection protocol and finding execution-validity challenge waived; (3) denying his discovery request for juror contact information and finding issue waived; (4) limiting the testimony of two expert witnesses; (5) finding his challenge to his petition’s filing date waived. Thus, Isom’s claims fail, and he is not entitled to relief.
For all of these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Goff, JJ., concur.