Slaughter, J.
Before us are two certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. We answer question two in the affirmative, holding that the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act applies when a plaintiff alleges that a qualified health-care provider treated someone else negligently and that the negligent treatment injured the plaintiff. Because our answer resolves this case, we decline to answer question one.
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We begin with the second question, which asks whether the Act applies to a third party who did not receive medical care from a qualified health-care provider but who was injured by the provider’s negligence in treating someone else. Based on the Act’s definition of “patient”, we answer this question in the affirmative.
The Act defines both what kind of claim and what kind of claimant are subject to the Act. The Act covers malpractice claims brought by a patient or a patient’s representative. See I.C. §§ 34-18-1-1, 34-18-8-1. Here, it is undisputed that Cutchin is suing for malpractice because his claim is based on allegations that Physician and Clinic treated their patient, Watson, negligently. The key issue is whether Cutchin (in addition to Watson) also is a “patient”, i.e., a claimant covered by the Act.
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Based on this provision’s text and structure, we hold that a statutory “patient”—an eligible claimant under the Act—falls into either of two categories. The first category is a traditional patient, i.e., one with a physician-patient relationship with a health-care provider: “an individual who receives or should have received health care from a health care provider, under a contract, express or implied”. Id. The other category is a third party with a claim against a health-care provider under state law: “a person having a claim of any kind, whether derivative or otherwise, as a result of alleged malpractice on the part of a health care provider.” Id. This latter category refers to a third party whose claim results from a provider’s malpractice to someone in the first category, namely, a traditional patient. Here, Cutchin is not a traditional patient because he has no patient-provider relationship with either Physician or Clinic. But he is nevertheless a statutory “patient” because he has a wrongful-death claim resulting from Physician’s and Clinic’s alleged malpractice to Watson, who is their traditional patient.
Our precedent supports this interpretation…
In more recent cases, we have expressly noted the broader class of eligible claimants under the Act…
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Section 34-18-2-22 says that a third party who did not receive medical care from a provider but who has a claim due to the provider’s medical malpractice to a traditional patient also is a “patient” under the Act. We thus answer the second certified question in the affirmative. In doing so, we reject the Fund’s argument that the legislature intended that a third party injured by a provider’s malpractice to a traditional patient has only a generic negligence claim not subject to the Act. Such a claim would not be subject to any cap on damages recoverable from the provider and would afford no relief from the Fund. But the Fund’s view ignores the structure and text of the statute. We will not ignore the statute’s language in favor of what the Fund perceives to be the legislature’s intent.
For these reasons, we hold that the Act applies where a plaintiff alleges that a qualified health-care provider’s negligent treatment of someone else caused the plaintiff to suffer an injury. Having answered the second certified question in the affirmative, we leave the first question for another day.
Rush, C.J., and Massa and Goff, JJ., concur. David, J., concurs in result with separate opinion.
David, J., concurring in result.
I concur in the result of the majority opinion given the unique factual background and procedural posture of the case, but I write separately to express my concerns about the expansion of the Medical Malpractice Act.
I think it’s important to note that the Act is to be construed narrowly. The Act is not all-inclusive for claims against healthcare providers, nor is it intended to be extended to cases of ordinary negligence. Peters v. Cummins Mental Health, Inc., 790 N.E.2d 572, 576 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Instead, the Act was designed to curtail, not expand, liability for medical malpractice. See generally Atterholt v. Herbst, 902 N.E.2d 220, 223 (Ind. 2009).
I believe the statutory definition of “patient” is ambiguous and I do not interpret it the way the majority here does. While the majority makes much of the language “claim of any kind,” and “and,” I believe the opinion’s broad definition of “patient” renders the whole opening clause of its definition meaningless…
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I remain concerned with continued expansion of the Act and believe that this expansion may have unintended consequences. While it may help this particular plaintiff, it may hurt future litigants who would be better served filing their claims not through the Medical Review Panel, but directly and initially through the court.
For the above reasons, I concur in the result.