Massa, J.
James Combs was driving his company van when he swerved off the road and demolished a utility box. He then drove to his nearby home. The responding officer found Combs just as he parked in his front driveway. The officer ultimately took Combs to the hospital for a blood test. After they left, other officers towed the van as evidence of leaving the scene of an accident. Before the tow, they conducted an inventory search, which revealed pills in a bag under the driver’s seat.
Combs was charged with several offenses, including four based on the pills. After he unsuccessfully moved to suppress the pills, a jury convicted him of all but one charge. On appeal, a panel concluded the pills should have been suppressed. Finding the van’s seizure and search lawful, we affirm the trial court.
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Combs asserts that the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights by seizing and searching his van without a warrant.
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The plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement allows police to warrantlessly seize an object if they “are lawfully in a position from which to view the object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if [police] have a lawful right of access to the object.” Warner v. State, 773 N.E.2d 239, 245 (Ind. 2002) (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135–37 (1990)). It “stands for the premise that objects which are in plain view of an officer who rightfully occupies a particular location can be seized without a warrant and are admissible as evidence.” Sloane v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1287, 1291 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied, 690 N.E.2d 1189. Seizures under this exception are “scrupulously subjected to Fourth Amendment inquiry.” Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 66 (1992). Here, the exception’s three requirements were satisfied, so police lawfully seized Combs’ van.
Under the plain view exception, police must have lawfully viewed the object. Warner, 773 N.E.2d at 245. In other words, they must not have engaged in an “unlawful trespass” to discover it. Soldal, 506 U.S. at 66. Here, Officer Koontz was on Combs’ front driveway when he fully saw the van and realized it had crashed into the utility box and then left the scene.
“[W]hen it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013). This special status extends beyond the home’s physical frame to the curtilage, “the area ‘immediately surrounding and associated’” with it. Id. (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)). However, the curtilage is not impenetrable. See id. at 8. So long as police “do no more than any private citizen,” their presence generally does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469–70 (2011); Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596, 1599 (2021). They must “limit their entry to places visitors would be expected to go, such as walkways, driveways, and porches.” Trimble v. State, 842 N.E.2d 798, 802 (Ind. 2006); see also United States v. Contreras, 820 F.3d 255, 261 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[Police] may walk up to any part of private property that is otherwise open to visitors or delivery people.”). And “there is no Fourth Amendment protection for activities or items that, even if within the curtilage, are knowingly exposed to the public.” Trimble, 842 N.E.2d at 802; see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (“That the area is within the curtilage does not itself bar all police observation.”).
Assuming Combs’ front driveway was curtilage, Officer Koontz’s presence was lawful. When he arrived, Officer Koontz pulled into Combs’ driveway and stepped out of his car, which allowed him to fully view the van. He then began speaking with Combs, who had just exited the van. Officer Koontz, like anyone seeking to speak with the van’s driver, pulled into the front driveway. And when he saw Combs in the driveway, he reasonably spoke with Combs there. Officer Koontz used “the ordinary means of access” to view the van. Trimble, 842 N.E.2d at 802. Officer Koontz’s “legitimate investigatory purpose,” id., for being on the driveway did not make his presence unlawful. He was not unreasonably conducting a search by looking for evidence in a manner that exceeded his “implied license” to enter the driveway like a private citizen. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 9–10; cf. Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1668, 1670–71 (2018) (officer went off the main route to the front door to examine a partially enclosed portion of the driveway, where he pulled a tarp off a motorcycle). Because he confined his actions to those of a private citizen, Officer Koontz was lawfully on Combs’ driveway when he viewed the van.
When police lawfully view the object, its “incriminating character” must be “immediately apparent,” Warner, 773 N.E.2d at 245, so there is no uncertainty about its “probative value,” Horton, 496 U.S. at 137. Police must have probable cause to believe the object is contraband or evidence of a crime without conducting a further search of the object. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323, 326 (1987); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993).
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The van’s incriminating character was immediately apparent. As soon as Officer Koontz exited his vehicle, he saw the van’s damaged front and confirmed it had left the fluid trail, objective signs of a recent head-on collision. The fact that Officer Koontz had to exit his vehicle to fully see the van and its damage is inconsequential. While he could not have moved or otherwise manipulated it, Hicks, 480 U.S. at 324–25, he could lawfully change his position to better view it, United States v. Sanchez, 955 F.3d 669, 676–77 (8th Cir. 2020) (“[O]fficers may . . . change position when conducting an exterior examination.”), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 930.
He also realized the van matched the witness’ description, which included the van’s color and “Combs” marking. The witness was “a disinterested third-party,” Johnson, 157 N.E.3d at 1204, who saw the collision and remained at the scene to speak with the responding officer. Officer Koontz had little reason to doubt the veracity of the description. See id.; Duran v. State, 930 N.E.2d 10, 17 (Ind. 2010).
Given the totality of the circumstances—the obvious damage, the fluid trail, the disinterested witness’ description, and the van’s distinct design— we have little trouble concluding any reasonable officer would have immediately developed probable cause that the van crashed into the utility box and left the scene, a criminal offense. As such, it was evidence of that offense.
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As previously discussed, Officer Koontz was lawfully present on Combs’ driveway. He did not have to trespass or take any other prohibited action to access the van.
The incriminating nature of Combs’ van was immediately apparent, and Officer Koontz lawfully viewed and could lawfully access the van. It is inconsequential that Officer Koontz did not order the tow. Although he could have towed the van, he was also investigating Combs’ possible intoxication and was not required to put this investigation on hold. It was permissible for him to continue it and allow the other officers on the scene to handle the van.
Once seized, the police lawfully inventoried Combs’ van.
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At the time of the seizure, the Lebanon Police Department’s written, three-page tow policy allowed officers to impound vehicles “needed for evidence.” Ex. Vol. VI, p.5.10 When this occurred, officers were required to complete “a vehicle impound and inventory form” with “a complete inventory” before “releasing the vehicle to the towing service.” Id., p.6. And officers were required to open and inventory unlocked containers. This policy sufficiently regulated the towing and search of Combs’ van. Its plain language made clear that the officers had to provide thorough information about impounded vehicles and all their contents, including unlocked containers like bags. And it did not leave their discretion unchecked. For example, it specifically prohibited opening and inventorying locked containers without consent or a warrant.
The officers followed the written policy. They conducted a thorough inventory and detailed their discoveries, including the pills, on the necessary form before towing the van. Cf. Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 436 (noting inventory was conducted by investigating officer who only focused on contraband, there was no evidence of completed formal inventory sheets, it was unclear the vehicle was actually impounded, and the policy was not sufficiently established). While the inventory was conducted on Combs’ driveway, see id. (search conducted at crime scene was one indicia of pretext), the policy required an inventory before the van was released to the towing service, and it was reasonable for it to occur there.
The need to “guard against claims of theft, vandalism, or negligence,” Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372–73 (1987), was heightened, as the van prominently advertised its use by a gold-buying business, indicating it might have contained valuables. And Combs had even informed the officers there was “a substantial amount of gold” in it. Tr. Vol. II, p.16. It is inconsequential that the officers turned over the black bag and its other contents—including gold jewelry—to Combs’ wife. Their policy did not prevent them from ensuring these smaller, valuable items did not remain in the van. Their decision to take extra precautions was reasonable.
Although the officers anticipated finding contraband in the van, they did not search “in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation.” Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372 (emphasis added). Their decision to impound the van as evidence, as explained above, was lawful, and their policy required an inventory. And they recognized the need to ensure the van’s contents were documented, especially given the presence of valuables. Their inevitable partial investigatory motive did not invalidate an otherwise reasonable and lawful inventory search. See Lopez, 547 F.3d at 372.
The police properly inventoried Combs’ van pursuant to their department’s thorough and reasonable policy, so the search was lawful.
The seizure and search of Combs’ van fell under recognized exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Thus, the police lawfully discovered the pills. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Rush, C.J., and David, J., concur.
Slaughter, J., concurs in the judgment with separate opinion.
Goff, J., dissents with separate opinion.
Slaughter, J., concurring in the judgment.
I agree that the trial court’s judgment for the State should be affirmed. But I do so for different reasons than the Court. Rather than reach the merits of Combs’s constitutional claims, I would hold that he waived those claims and thus did not satisfy his burden on appeal of establishing that the inventory search of his vehicle was illegal.
The Court holds, rightly, that Combs waived his state constitutional claim. Ante, at 5 n.3. I would go further and hold that he waived his Fourth Amendment claim, too. The entirety of his federal constitutional argument consisted of the following sentence: “This Court should reverse the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress based on the law and factual circumstances in this case, notwithstanding Lieutenant Mount’s rationale that requesting a warrant is ‘a pain in the ass.’”
By no plausible yardstick does this bare assertion amount to the “cogent reasoning” our rules require. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Combs’s undeveloped “argument”, such as it is, neither identifies the governing legal standard nor explains how the factual record in this case satisfies that standard and entitles him to relief. Thus, I agree with the Court that the State is entitled to judgment. Though I do not quarrel with how the Court resolved the merits, I would not treat Combs’s federal claim as preserved and worthy of merits review.
Applying waiver doctrine to parties’ arguments is not a judicial “gotcha” aimed at unfairly trapping unwary litigants. Insisting that litigants develop their arguments serves two valuable purposes: fairness to opposing counsel and efficiency in judicial decision-making. Developed arguments allow adversaries to respond meaningfully to each other and allow courts to fully address issues without undue commitment of judicial resources. There are only so many hours in the day, and the time we spend on undeveloped arguments necessarily means less time for deciding claims by parties who followed the rules. We disserve opposing parties and our system of appellate review when we indulge litigants whose claims were barely raised or not raised at all.
Goff, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
In this case, the Court finds that police may seize and inventory a van as an instrumentality of a class-B misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident. But what need is there to seize the entire van when the driver admitted to the offense and when police thoroughly documented the structural damage to the van with photographs? In my opinion, there is none. Because the State failed to show that the van itself would prove useful in solving a crime, and because the Court’s decision today will unnecessarily extend the government’s reach into our private lives, I respectfully dissent.
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In this case, the officers were investigating the crime of leaving the scene of an accident, a class-B misdemeanor. See Ind. Code § 9-26-1-1.1(b) (2017). The officers could plainly see the damage (the evidence of the crime) on the exterior of the van and took photographs of that damage. No one testified that any aspect of the van aside from its exterior condition would be useful as evidence of the crime of leaving the scene of an accident. What’s more, Combs had already admitted to the accident and to leaving the scene. When police have sufficient photographic evidence of the crime, and where the suspect himself admitted to the offense, I question whether a person of reasonable caution would find seizure of the van itself as useful in proving the crime. Cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591 (1974) (concluding that the prior impoundment of an automobile didn’t render the examination of the exterior of the car, which could have been done on the spot, unreasonable).4 As such, the need to seize the entire van was low. The degree of invasion, on the other hand, was high. Not only did the seizure lead the officers to rifle through the entire van while it was parked in Combs’s driveway, it also deprived Combs and his family of a company car that was important to their livelihood. Considering these circumstances, I don’t find the seizure reasonable.
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Beyond the consequences for Combs, the Court’s decision today has larger implications for police search-and-seizure practices—practices which, in my opinion, will likely lead to further government intrusion into private lives. Under the Court’s view, for example, a police officer could, without a warrant, seize an entire car after stopping an unlicensed eighteen-year-old who took his parent’s car on a joy ride as evidence of violating our motor-vehicle laws. See I.C. § 9-24-18-1(a) (prohibiting driving a motor vehicle without a license). After all, police could recover evidence potentially useful in solving the crime, including fingerprints and DNA evidence on the driver’s side seat, steering wheel, and gearshift. At least in that situation, the evidence would be located inside the car and would require an evidence technician to collect. Here, by contrast, all of the damage was clearly visible on the exterior of the car. And the photographs taken to document this damage were the only physical evidence admitted at trial. In fact, there’s no evidence at all that police investigated the van any further after they had seized it and found the illegal drugs. And after only two days, they returned the van to Combs’s father.
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Because I would find that the seizure of the van was unconstitutional, I would also find that the evidence obtained during the inventory search should have been excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. The exclusionary rule excludes from a criminal trial any evidence seized from the defendant in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and any fruits of such evidence. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171 (1969). “[W]hen an illegal search has come to light, [the State] has the burden of persuasion to show that its evidence is untainted.” Id. at 183.
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Finally, contrary to the Court’s assertion, the inventory search was not, in fact, conducted in accordance with the Lebanon Police Department’s Standard Operating Guidelines. Under those Guidelines, a vehicle may be towed if it “[i]s needed for evidence.” Ex. Vol. 6, p. 5 (emphasis added). Even if the police had probable cause (which, admittedly, is a flexible concept) to believe the van would prove useful in solving the crime, any argument that it was “needed” for evidence strains credulity. In addition to photographic evidence of the van’s damage, the police had multiple eyewitnesses who could identify the van by its distinctive markings. What’s more, Combs himself admitted that he had an accident and left the scene. In my view, the van simply wasn’t “needed” as evidence; rather, the photographs and the admission from Combs were more than sufficient to convict him of leaving the scene of an accident.
The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Because I believe the seizure of Combs’s van was unreasonable, and thus violated his Fourth Amendment rights, I would reverse his convictions for the three counts of possession of a narcotic drug and remand for further proceedings.