Goff, J.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a criminal trial speaks “an obvious truth.” Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). It marks the very “foundation for our adversary system,” ensures “fundamental human rights of life and liberty,” and promotes our “universal sense of justice.” Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 12 (2012); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 476 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting). But through the looking glass of Gideon stands a corollary right—a constitutional paradox—to waive the assistance of counsel and “to conduct one’s own defense in propria persona.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816 (1975). Indeed, despite their common constitutional foundation, the right to counsel and the right to self-representation serve distinct and often conflicting interests—the latter protecting a defendant’s personal autonomy, the former guarding the integrity of our criminal justice system. We confront this tension in the case before us today.
The defendant here insists that the trial court erred by denying his request to self-represent. We agree that his waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and voluntary. But because his waiver was neither unequivocal nor intelligent, we hold that the trial court properly denied his request to self-represent. And because neither his character nor the nature of his offenses dictates otherwise, we hold that the defendant’s sentence was not inappropriate. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s decision on both grounds.
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Our decision below proceeds in two parts. We first consider Wright’s claim that the trial court erred by denying his request to self-represent, ultimately concluding that, because his waiver of the right to counsel was neither unequivocal nor intelligent, the trial court properly denied his request. We then address Wright’s claim that his sentence warrants revision under Appellate Rule 7(B). Our analysis of Wright’s offenses and his character leads us to conclude that his sentence was not inappropriate.
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Under Faretta v. California, the seminal case on the right to self-representation, a state may not “constitutionally hale a person into its criminal courts and there force a lawyer upon him, even when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense.” 422 U.S. at 807. Respect for individual choice is the “lifeblood of the law,” the Court reasoned, and the state must honor that choice, even if the accused “may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment.” Id. at 834 (quotation marks omitted). Of course, few people would disagree “that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel’s guidance than by their own unskilled efforts.” Wallace v. State, 172 Ind. App. 535, 540, 361 N.E.2d 159, 162 n.3 (1977). But unless the defendant acquiesces to representation, any “advantage of a lawyer’s training and experience can be realized, if at all, only imperfectly.” Id. After all, to “force a lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to believe that the law contrives against him.” Id.
The right to self-representation, the Faretta Court concluded, is a “fundamental” right, implicit in the structure of the Sixth Amendment and supported by a long history of customary practice and legal protections. 422 U.S. at 817, 818, 831–32. But, while deeply rooted in our legal culture, the right to self-representation is not absolute.
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Aside from the shifting historical precedent on which the right to self-representation stands, Faretta and its progeny “have made clear” that this right “is not absolute.” Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 171 (2008).
To begin with, a trial court need not inform a defendant of his right to self-represent. Russell v. State, 270 Ind. 55, 60, 383 N.E.2d 309, 313 (1978). Whereas the right to counsel implements “the other constitutional rights of the accused” and ensures “the accuracy of trial outcome in our adversary system,” the right to self-represent “may actually hinder such interests.” Id. For this reason, the constitutional standards governing waiver of the right to counsel find no counterpart governing a defendant’s waiver of the right of self-representation. Id. at 59, 383 N.E.2d at 312–13. If a defendant proceeds to trial with counsel “without ever having properly asserted the right to self-representation,” a court will deem the defendant to have voluntarily waived that right. Id. at 61, 383 N.E.2d at 313.
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In short, while a defendant enjoys a right to self-represent, it “does not inevitably follow” that such right precludes the appointment of counsel over the defendant’s objection “to protect the public interest in the fairness and integrity of the proceedings.” United States v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 448, 452 (7th Cir. 1978). And this public interest, we believe, expands or contracts in direct correlation with the severity of a potential punishment a defendant faces at trial.
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As the preceding discussion makes clear, a defendant’s right to self-representation often stands in tension with the state’s obligation to ensure a fair and meaningful trial. See Sherwood v. State, 717 N.E.2d 131, 137 (Ind. 1999) (Selby, J., concurring). See also Martinez, 528 U.S. at 164 (Breyer, J., concurring) (observing that the right to self-representation often, “though not always, conflicts squarely and inherently with the right to a fair trial”). And this tension reaches its breaking point when a defendant faces death or life in prison without the possibility of parole.
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In short, without meaningful adversarial testing by professionally trained counsel, there are few, if any, safeguards to protect the state’s heightened-reliability interest when a pro se defendant proves unwilling or unable to present the necessary mitigating evidence at trial. And for this reason, a trial court exercising jurisdiction over LWOP and death penalty cases must tailor its self-representation inquiry to reflect “the state’s interest in preserving the orderly processes of criminal justice.” Russell, 270 Ind. at 59, 383 N.E.2d at 312. Accord Latta v. State, 743 N.E.2d 1121, 1130 (Ind. 2001) (concluding that trial courts, when deciding whether to reject a defendant’s waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel in the joint-representation context, may consider the “institutional interest in a fair proceeding” to justify overriding the defendant’s right to counsel of her choice). What this inquiry looks like is a question we turn to next.
In capital cases and LWOP cases, a trial court should frame its waiver inquiry with the state’s heightened reliability interests in mind.
A “defendant who is competent to stand trial and who knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily makes a timely and unequivocal waiver of counsel is entitled to exercise the right of self-representation, even in a capital case.” Sherwood, 717 N.E.2d at 135. When deciding whether a defendant meets these standards, a trial court should inquire, on the record, whether the defendant clearly understands (1) the nature of the charges against her, including any possible defenses; (2) the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se and the fact that she’s held to the same standards as a professional attorney; and (3) that a trained attorney possesses the necessary skills for preparing for and presenting a defense. Jones v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1132, 1138 (Ind. 2003).
We emphasize that, among these general directives, no single guideline controls. In fact, when deciding whether a defendant properly waives the right to counsel, both this Court and the U.S. Supreme Court “have deliberately eschewed any attempt to formulate a rigid list of required warnings, talismanic language, or formulaic checklist.” Hopper, 957 N.E.2d at 619 (citing Tovar, 541 U.S. at 88). Rather, “the extent and depth” of a trial court’s warnings will often “depend upon an array of case-specific factors.” Id. The severity of a potential punishment, we believe, presents one such factor. So, when a defendant asks to proceed without counsel in a death-penalty or LWOP case, the court—while mindful of the state’s heightened-reliability interest—should focus its inquiry on whether and to what extent the defendant has prior experience with the legal system; the scope of the defendant’s knowledge of criminal law, legal procedures, rules of evidence, and sentencing; and whether and to what extent the defendant can articulate and present any possible defenses, including lesser-included offenses and mitigating evidence. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948); Kubsch v. State, 866 N.E.2d 726, 737–38 (Ind. 2007); Jones, 783 N.E.2d at 1138; Sherwood, 717 N.E.2d. at 134.
In considering these factors, a court should “indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver” of the right to counsel. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (emphasis added). If, however, after carefully assessing the factors outlined above, a court permits a pro se defense, we strongly urge that court to appoint stand-by counsel to assist the defendant in reaching his “clearly indicated goals.” McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 184. See also Leonard v. State, 579 N.E.2d 1294, 1295 (Ind. 1991); German v. State, 268 Ind. 67, 73, 373 N.E.2d 880, 883 (1978). And when a pro se defendant fails to present mitigating evidence, a trial court may appoint amicus counsel to compile and argue that evidence. See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177 n.7. So long as appointed counsel doesn’t interfere with the defendant’s personal defense, nothing in Faretta prohibits such a course of action. See id. at 187. See also McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1505 (2018) (observing that the Sixth Amendment guarantees “the defendant’s prerogative, not counsel’s, to decide on the objective of his defense”).
With this analytical framework in mind, we now turn to Wright’s claim that the trial court erred by denying his request to self-represent.
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Because Wright “answered affirmatively that he understood all of the questions asked by the court,” he insists that “he has shown that his desire to represent himself is unequivocal, knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”
We agree with Wright that his decision was knowing. The trial court informed Wright that, unlike a pro se defendant, an attorney “is trained by education” and possesses the skills necessary to investigate a criminal case, to “pick a fair and impartial jury,” to interrogate witnesses, to file motions, to “properly present substantive defenses,” to object to evidence, to preserve the record for appeal, and to offer mitigating arguments at sentencing. Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 46–49. And, after pointing out that “death-penalty-qualified attorneys” have special training and experience, the court warned Wright that the prosecution had its own experienced lawyers and that, should Wright decide to proceed without counsel, he would not “receive any special treatment from the court” and would be held “to the same standard” as a practicing attorney. Id. at 46, 49–50. Wright consistently responded that he understood each of these points. We have no doubt that Wright knowingly waived his right to counsel.
We likewise agree with Wright that his decision was voluntary.
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At this point in our waiver analysis, we part ways with Wright’s conclusion.
To begin with, we find that Wright equivocated in his decision at trial. His shift in preference for counsel between his initial hearing and the appointment of capital-qualified attorneys five months later reveals his early wavering on the issue. In a self-described “motion” to the trial court in early December 2017, Wright insisted that he had “declared several times” his status as a “pro se” defendant. App. Vol. 2, p. 126. But in an accompanying “lawsuit” against the court for “deny[ing him] the right to go pro se,” Wright expressly “motion[ed] for new coun[s]el.” Id. at 128. This clear request for representation directly conflicts with any autonomy interest Wright may have held before trial.
To be sure, at the time of his Faretta hearing, Wright seems to have abandoned his desire for court-appointed counsel. During the colloquy, he insisted more than once that he did “not wish to have a State-appointed attorney anymore at this time.” Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 43, 44. Still, Wright seems to have wavered between dissatisfaction with his capital-qualified counsel and court-appointed counsel in general. While acknowledging that he “got along” with his first lawyer, he repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with his current attorneys. Id. at 45. And an expression of discontent with court-appointed counsel is not an unequivocal assertion of the right to self-representation. Dobbins v. State, 721 N.E.2d 867, 872 (Ind. 1999) (“Defendant’s declaration that he could not afford an attorney, when already represented by a court-appointed attorney, does not constitute a clear assertion of his right to self-representation.”). What’s more, Wright’s acknowledged preference for either private counsel or his original attorney indicates no strong autonomy interest, leading us to conclude that there’s little risk of violating his Sixth Amendment right to self-represent.
Even if we were to conclude that Wright unequivocally waived the right to counsel, his decision was not made intelligently. The “information a defendant must have to waive counsel intelligently will depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case.” Tovar, 541 U.S. at 92 (quotation marks omitted). Case-specific factors we may consider include “the defendant’s education or sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding.” Id. at 88.
Here, the frustrations Wright held toward his current lawyers clearly seem to have rested on a mistaken understanding of their professional obligations. See Lowrimore, 728 N.E.2d at 865 (noting that “the tighter Criminal Rule 4 schedules must yield to the exigencies created by the injection of the death penalty”). And while Wright represented to the court that he possessed the requisite “knowledge or skill” and “all the qualifications” to represent himself, Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 43, 51, this clearly was not the case.
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With limited experience navigating the legal system, with deficient knowledge of criminal law and procedure, and with no apparent defenses or trial strategy, Wright’s waiver of the right to counsel, we conclude, was not an intelligent one. And while these factors may not have led us to the same conclusion in a case with less at stake, the state has a much stronger interest in ensuring a fair trial in this capital-turned-LWOP case.
At the end of the day, the trial court here, after making “the proper inquiries” of Wright and conveying to him “the proper information,” made “a reasoned conclusion” about Wright’s understanding of his rights, ultimately denying his request for self-representation. See Poynter, 749 N.E.2d at 1128. After a careful review of the record on direct appeal, we affirm that ruling by holding that Wright equivocated in his decision to proceed pro se and that he lacked the requisite intelligence to properly waive the right to counsel.
Because Wright’s request to self-represent was neither unequivocal nor intelligent, we hold that the trial court properly denied his request to self-represent. And because neither the nature of Wright’s offenses nor his character dictate otherwise, we hold that Wright’s sentence was not inappropriate. We thus affirm the decision of the trial court on both grounds, remanding only for the court to correct a minor oversight in its sentencing order.
Rush, C.J., and David, J., concur.
Massa, J., concurs in result with separate opinion.
Slaughter, J., dissents with separate opinion.
Massa, J., concurring in result.
It is hard to quarrel with much of the dissenting opinion. The Court today tills new constitutional soil in suggesting the standard for waiving the right to counsel varies depending on the seriousness of the case. And it weighs Zachariah Wright’s legal skills in assessing the knowing and intelligent nature of his waiver in a way explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States in its seminal decision, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835–36 (1975). I thus cannot join much of the Court’s opinion for reasons sufficiently explained by the dissent.
However, I am convinced that the trial court sifted through all of Wright’s various assertions—both written and oral—on more than one occasion, and concluded that what he ultimately wanted was to hire his own private counsel, or at least have his old counsel back. His waiver, therefore, was not unequivocal, and the trial court should be affirmed.
Slaughter, J., dissenting.
The Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel includes the right to proceed without counsel. Here, Zachariah Wright faced the death penalty after being charged with multiple felonies, including murder. He initially sought, and was given, court-appointed counsel. But almost two years before trial, he told the court he wanted to represent himself. The court held a hearing on Wright’s request and explained the advantages of having a lawyer and the disadvantages of representing himself. Wright, though, persisted in wanting to lead his own defense. The court denied his request and, after a bench trial, found him guilty. Wright now claims the trial court violated his constitutional right to represent himself. Despite the horrific nature of Wright’s crimes, I am constrained by the record below and Supreme Court precedent to conclude that Wright was denied his right of self-representation and thus is entitled to a new trial.
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The other reason for my dissent is that today’s opinion creates a new test for analyzing a defendant’s assertion of the right to proceed pro se—a Faretta-plus test. The Court adds the need to “tailor” an application of Faretta’s factors based on the State’s interest in ensuring a fair and reliable criminal process in a capital case. Ante, at 19–20. Based on its enhanced test, the Court holds that the defendant’s right of self-representation yields to the State’s competing interest in ensuring a criminal trial’s integrity and efficiency. But Supreme Court precedent does not support such “tailoring” of competing interests when the defendant timely asserts the right to proceed pro se. The only issues here should be whether Wright invoked his right to self-representation unequivocally and waived his right to counsel knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. See Anderson, 370 N.E.2d at 320; Tovar, 541 U.S. at 88. Either he did, or he did not. These are binary questions not subject to tailoring.
No Supreme Court precedent holds that the Faretta analysis changes when a defendant’s decision could be a matter of life or death. Indeed, the Supreme Court has not once espoused today’s approach—despite addressing Faretta in the context of capital cases a number of times.
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To be sure, a defendant’s waiver may be ill-advised. But, as the Supreme Court observes, “[p]ersonal liberties are not rooted in the law of averages”, but in the law’s “respect for the individual”. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 (cleaned up). A right premised on respect for individual freedom must include the freedom to make mistakes—even those with dire consequences. It is when the stakes for the criminal defendant are most grave that the law’s “respect for the individual” should be at its highest. Yet today’s opinion finds that the facts here “may not have led us to the same conclusion in a case with less at stake.” Ante, at 26. That is because, the Court holds, “the state has a much stronger interest in ensuring fair trial in this capital-turned-LWOP case.” Ibid. But the Supreme Court does not require that a valid waiver of counsel turns on the severity of the State’s sanction. An intelligent waiver is no less intelligent when the stakes are grave. Indeed, our own precedent permits a capital defendant to plead guilty under a plea agreement calling for the death penalty. Smith v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1264, 1265 (Ind. 1997).
Because Supreme Court precedent does not permit today’s “tailoring” test, “the severity of a potential punishment” cannot authorize the State’s interests to eclipse the defendant’s. Ante, at 14. Thus, Faretta does not allow us to ignore Wright’s waiver.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.