Slaughter, J.
A jury found Dylan Tate guilty of molesting and murdering an eighteen-month-old boy. During sentencing, the jury found three statutory aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt and recommended life imprisonment without parole for the murder conviction, which the trial court adopted. In this direct appeal, Tate argues that the trial court committed fundamental error by admitting improper character evidence and medical-personnel testimony and that the jury had insufficient evidence of two of the aggravators. We affirm.
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There are two issues here. The first is whether the trial court committed fundamental error during the guilt phase by admitting certain testimony. We hold that Tate showed no error, let alone fundamental error. The second issue is whether the State introduced enough evidence during sentencing to support the torture and child-molest aggravators. We find sufficient evidence supporting these two aggravators and reject Tate’s invitation to reweigh the evidence. We hold that any error was harmless and that the remaining, undisputed aggravator outweighed any mitigators. Thus, we affirm his convictions and sentence.
Tate argues that the trial court committed fundamental error by admitting inadmissible testimony from Detective Cliff Cole and H.H.’s medical providers. Tate also styles these same claims as prosecutorial misconduct. Because Tate did not object to the admissibility of the testimony, request an admonishment to the jury, or move for a mistrial, he waived his claims.
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Tate claims Detective Cole’s testimony violates Rule 404(a)(1) because the “only logical purpose” for this testimony was to solicit prejudicial character evidence. Taken out of context, the statements could sound as if the detective did not think Tate had committed the crimes he was charged with. Critically, Rule 404(a)(1) does not prohibit all references to an accused’s character; it prohibits only references used to show the accused acted according to his propensity for bad character on a specific occasion. Tate’s assertion that the term “monster” falls into this category does not make it so. His view ignores that the most obvious purpose for this testimony was to contextualize the detective’s statements during his interview with Tate. The record itself belies Tate’s characterization. Once the State put the detective’s statement in context as part of his typical interview technique, the State immediately passed the witness without referencing “monster” in any follow-up questions to Detective Cole or any other witness.
As to Nurse Birge and Dr. Short, Tate takes issue with their testimony about his behavior at the hospital. In particular, Tate challenges Dr. Short’s testimony that his original impression of Tate was that he “seem[ed] like a threat” when he was banging on the hospital door and shouting. And Tate takes issue with both Nurse Birge’s and Dr. Short’s testimony that he slept on a cot in a hospital hallway while H.H. was being treated.
According to Tate, the purpose of this testimony was to convict him based on his propensity to be “a scary monster” instead of any actual evidence of the charged conduct. Neither the record nor the law supports this view. To suppose that the jury relied on an insinuation about Tate’s character instead of evidence that Tate committed the charged conduct belies the ample, unchallenged evidence in the record. To this, Tate offers no response. And his argument does not explain how this testimony was character evidence or how it was used impermissibly to establish his propensity to molest and kill children. We thus find his fundamental-error argument waived. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). But even had Tate developed this argument, Rule 404(a)(1) does not prohibit eyewitnesses from describing their perceptions of a defendant’s demeanor and behavior during events giving rise to the charged conduct.
Because Tate does not establish error under Rule 404(a)(1), and no such error is obvious on the face of the record, the trial court did not commit fundamental error in allowing Detective Cole’s, Nurse Birge’s, or Dr. Short’s testimony. And we reject any suggestion that the probative value of such testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Tate. Thus, we decline to grant Tate relief on these grounds.
Tate also argues that the trial court committed fundamental error by allowing the following testimony from H.H.’s medical providers in violation of Indiana Rule of Evidence 702(b):
• Nurse Birge’s testimony about the stages of H.H.’s bruising and her opinion of the injuries’ source.
• Dr. Short’s testimony about H.H.’s injuries and his opinion of their source.
• Nurse Kyra Zylo’s testimony about the stages of H.H.’s bruising and her opinion of the injuries’ source.
• Dr. Nathaniel Swinger’s testimony about the source of H.H.’s injuries.
• Dr. Shannon Thompson’s testimony about her opinion of the source of H.H.’s injuries.
Tate argues that these witnesses were unqualified to give expert testimony and that their testimony did not rest on reliable scientific data. But Tate does not provide specific citations to the purportedly inadmissible testimony, explain how their testimony about H.H.’s bruising and other injuries violates Rule 702(b), or provide cases that support his view. We find this undeveloped argument waived. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a).
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Next, Tate argues that the State impermissibly referred to Dr. Thompson as an “expert” during her direct examination. But Tate’s argument mischaracterizes both the facts and the law. First, the State did not call Dr. Thompson an expert; it asked whether she had ever testified as an expert witness in other cases. Second, the case Tate relies on, Farmer v. State, 908 N.E.2d 1192, 1199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), said only that the trial judge should not call witnesses “experts” in front of the jury lest the court seem to bolster their testimony. Farmer does not address the situation where, as here, the State asked a witness about her history testifying as an expert witness. And we are aware of no rule prohibiting such testimony. Lastly, even if Tate could show that this testimony was inadmissible, he does not establish that such an error would have deprived him of the possibility of a fair trial. We thus decline to vacate his convictions on this ground.
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Tate further argues that the State failed to introduce enough evidence to support the jury’s finding of the torture and child-molest aggravators. Under Indiana law, the State can seek a sentence of life imprisonment without parole by alleging a statutory aggravator under Indiana Code subsection 35-50-2-9(a). Such a sentence requires at least one aggravating circumstance that outweighs any mitigating circumstances. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(l). When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of an aggravator, we review only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict to determine whether there is substantial evidence on which a reasonable trier of fact could find the aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. Schuler v. State, 112 N.E.3d 180, 188 (Ind. 2018). A reviewing court must not reweigh the evidence; it can look only at the evidence, along with its reasonable inferences, tending to support the verdict. Id…Tate claims the State provided insufficient evidence of the torture and child-molest aggravators, but he does not challenge the jury’s finding that he intentionally killed a child younger than twelve. As shown below, we find that there was substantial evidence of both the torture and child molest aggravators on which the jury could reasonably rely. And we are convinced the jury would have found, as do we, that the remaining unchallenged aggravator outweighed any mitigators. Thus, we uphold Tate’s life-without-parole sentence.
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Here, the medical records alone provide significant support for the jury’s finding of torture. Recall that H.H. arrived at the hospital bruised all over, and the doctors and nurses found myriad injuries, including a paper towel stuffed down his throat and significant brain damage from blunt force trauma. H.H.’s anus was torn, bleeding, and bruised, and there were scrapes from his anus to his genitals. His scrotum had been cut and doctors could see what looked like bite marks on his arm and leg and a cigarette burn on his back.
Like the “torture” aggravator discussed above, Subsection 35-50-2- 9(b)(1)(C) allows the State to seek an enhanced sentence if “the defendant committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit . . . child molesting.”
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Here, there is uncontroverted evidence that when H.H. went to bed that night, he was nearly injury free. In addition to H.H.’s fatal injuries, he also sustained injuries to his anus and scrotum. And three doctors testified that the cause of the injuries to H.H.’s anus was trauma from penetration. The jury also heard evidence that H.H.’s injuries, including those to his anus and scrotum, occurred that night while Tate was alone with H.H. The record shows that injuries to the rectum can heal quickly and even disappear within twenty-four hours. H.H.’s mother testified that he was okay when she and Tate changed his diaper and onesie to get him ready for bed. She testified that she fell asleep around midnight while Tate was still awake. And she said that the next day, she found H.H.’s bloody onesie and his bloody diaper. Finally, the jury heard from Basey, Tate’s fellow inmate, that Tate acknowledged he was with H.H. when the boy became “all bloody” and that Tate removed H.H.’s clothes and diaper.
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Because there was evidence of both the torture and child-molest aggravators on which the jury could reasonably rely, Tate’s insufficiency arguments fail, and he is not entitled to resentencing.
Finally, even if Tate had not waived his arguments and were correct that no reasonable jury could find as this jury did, the unchallenged aggravator—that he intentionally killed a child less than twelve years old—is enough here to affirm his life-without-parole sentence.
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The record contains substantial evidence of both the torture and child-molest aggravators on which the jury could reasonably rely. Excluding the torture and child-molest aggravators would not have altered the jury’s recommendation or the trial court’s decision. And the murder-of-a-child aggravator, proved beyond a reasonable doubt, outweighs Tate’s intoxication. Thus, we decline to grant Tate relief based on his challenged aggravators.
For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Goff, JJ., concur.