Massa, J.
Michael Johnson offered to sell a substance he called “white girl” to a stranger at Hoosier Park Casino in Anderson. After the solicited patron reported the incident to security, and the account was verified by video surveillance, a Gaming Enforcement Agent led Johnson back to an interview room. Once they entered the room, the agent told Johnson that he would need to pat him down. Upon this pat-down, the agent immediately felt what he deemed a “giant ball” in Johnson’s pocket. Consistent with his training, the agent immediately believed this lump was packaged drugs, and after removing the baggie containing white powder from Johnson’s pocket, placed him under arrest.
At his trial, the court admitted, over Johnson’s objection, the evidence stemming from the pat-down. Because we find that the agent had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot (so he could stop Johnson), that Johnson could be armed and dangerous (so he could pat Johnson down after entering a confined space), and the lump in Johnson’s pocket was immediately apparent as contraband (so it could be seized), we affirm the admission of the evidence because the search and seizure proceeded within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment.
…
Although the parties and the courts below largely focused on whether there was probable cause to arrest Johnson at the time of the search (potentially bringing the seizure within the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment), there is a clearer path to sustaining the evidence’s admission: “the encounter was along the lines of a Terry stop.” Appellant’s Br. at 10. To determine, then, whether the evidence here should be suppressed, we must resolve three issues: (1) whether Agent Wilkinson had justification to stop Johnson under Terry; (2) whether Agent Wilkinson could perform a Terry frisk of Johnson; and (3) whether Agent Wilkinson could seize the baggie felt in Johnson’s pocket. Answering yes to each in turn, we hold the evidence admissible.
…
An officer can stop a person if the officer “observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
…
Agent Wilkinson knew that Eversole, a disinterested third-party, informed security officers that Johnson had tried to sell him “white girl,” which he believed to be cocaine and believed was offered because the stimulating effect of the drug could perk him up when he was nearly asleep. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (“The informant here came forward personally to give information that was immediately verifiable at the scene.”). Eversole stayed at the scene, and confirmed this account with Agent Wilkinson, subjecting himself to false informing if he concocted the story. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233–34 (1983) (“[I]f an unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with a report of criminal activity—which if fabricated would subject him to criminal liability—we have found rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary.”); Kellems v. State, 842 N.E.2d 352, 355 (Ind. 2006) (“[T]he prospect of prosecution for making a false report heightens the likelihood of the report’s reliability.”), rev’d on reh’g on other grounds; Ind. Code § 35- 44.1-2-3(d) (2015) (“A person who . . . gives a false report of the commission of a crime or gives false information in the official investigation of the commission of a crime, knowing the report or information to be false . . . commits false informing.”). Because “informants who come forward voluntarily are ordinarily motivated by good citizenship or a genuine effort to aid law enforcement officers in solving a crime,” Duran v. State, 930 N.E.2d 10, 17 (Ind. 2010), there is scant reason to doubt the veracity of Eversole’s account.
And ensuing police work bolstered the impartial tip. Surveillance video confirmed Eversole’s narrative, and the man in the video matched his earlier description of Johnson. See McGrath v. State, 95 N.E.3d 522, 528 (Ind. 2018) (holding that an “independent investigation to confirm the street address, the color of the house, the names of the occupants, and the bright light” sufficiently augmented an anonymous tip to form probable cause that a house was being used to grow marijuana). Relatively few patrons populated the casino, narrowing the field of suspects who could match the specific description and depiction of Johnson…When “a tip from an identified informant or concerned citizen [is] coupled with some corroborative police investigation,” an officer has “reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop.” Kellems, 842 N.E.2d at 353. Agent Wilkinson had reasonable suspicion to stop Johnson under Terry.
…
On appeal, Johnson asserted that even if reasonable suspicion supported a Terry stop, “the pat down search that revealed the substance exceeded the allowable legal scope” because “there was no evidence in the record that would have led officers to believe that Johnson was either armed or dangerous.” Not so. After making a Terry stop, an officer may, if he has reasonable fear that a suspect is armed and dangerous, frisk the outer clothing of that suspect to try to find weapons. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. The purpose of this protective search “is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993) (quotation omitted)…To determine whether an officer acted reasonably, we consider the specific, reasonable inferences that the officer, in light of his experience, can draw from the facts. Id. Here, the facts supported the reasonableness of the pat-down: Agent Wilkinson suspected Johnson of trying to sell drugs and was about to interview him one-on-one in a small windowless room early in the morning.
“[C]ourts have often considered evidence of drug involvement as part of the totality of the circumstances contributing to an officer’s reasonable belief that a subject is armed and dangerous.”
Based on the facts of this case, a reasonably prudent officer in Agent Wilkinson’s position would believe that his safety was potentially in danger. All information available to Agent Wilkinson suggested that Johnson [] was trying to sell drugs—a crime for which Johnson could possibly be armed—to strangers on a casino floor. As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, officers know that it is “common for there to be weapons in the near vicinity of narcotics transactions.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 122 (2000); see also Parker v. State, 662 N.E.2d 994, 999 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (“Based on the informant’s tip, he believed that narcotics would be present. . . . [The officer] knew . . . that firearms were frequently present in drug transactions.”), trans. denied. “[F]irearms are ‘tools of the trade.’” United States v. Gilliard, 847 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Trullo, 809 F.2d 108, 113 (1st Cir. 1987)); see also Swanson v. State, 730 N.E.2d 205, 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (acknowledging that “it is not uncommon for drug dealers to carry weapons”), trans. denied. Agent Wilkinson’s suspicion that Johnson attempted to sell drugs—supported by Eversole’s statements and surveillance footage—helped justify the pat-down.
Whether a Terry stop occurs in a confined space can impact the reasonableness of the subsequent pat-down…Here, Agent Wilkinson spoke with Johnson alone in the “pretty small” windowless interview room. Tr. Vol. 1, p.77. Given his “close proximity” to Johnson as they were about to discuss the attempted drug sale, it was reasonable for Agent Wilkinson to pat down Johnson.
…
Courts also consider “the time of day” to evaluate the reasonableness of a Terry frisk… Here, the attempted sale took place a little before 7:00 A.M., and Agent Wilkinson first learned of it at 7:15 A.M. Because Agent Wilkinson had limited, if any, knowledge about Johnson’s activities earlier that morning and the previous evening, it was reasonable for him to believe Johnson may have been armed and dangerous. Of course, not every act—nor every suspected crime—that occurs at an early hour automatically allows for a pat-down. But here, when combined with the suspected crime of selling drugs and the small interview room, the time furthers the pat-down’s reasonableness.
“[T]o pursue his investigation without fear of violence,” Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 373 (quotation omitted), Agent Wilkinson patted down Johnson after they entered the interview room. Johnson’s suspected crime, the small interview room, and the early morning hour all support finding Agent Wilkinson’s decision to pat down Johnson was reasonable.
…
Johnson urged that the “pat down exceeded the scope of a pat down [u]nder Terry” when Agent “Wilkinson testified that upon feeling the item in Johnson’s pocket he knew that it was not a weapon.” Appellant’s Br. at 11–12. But this argument ignores later Supreme Court development of Terry, notably Dickerson. “If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent”—even if that item is not a weapon— “there has been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search for weapons.” Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 376.
…
On the other hand, if an officer must manipulate or further examine an object before its nature as contraband becomes apparent, the search exceeds Terry’s scope.
…
During the pat-down in the interview room, Agent Wilkinson quickly encountered something that “felt like a giant ball” in Johnson’s pocket. Tr. Vol. 2, p.113. Agent Wilkinson immediately recognized, consistent with his training and knowledge of the situation at hand, all the apparent hallmarks of narcotics packaged for sale: the lump felt “like a ball of drugs.” Id. Once the contour or mass is at once identified as contraband, as here, “its warrantless seizure [is] justified.” Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375–76. Because Agent Wilkinson discerned the lump to be contraband as soon as he felt it without further manipulation, he was justified in seizing the powder-filled baggie from Johnson’s pocket. This “patdown search did not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence obtained as a result.” O’Keefe v. State, 139 N.E.3d 263, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
Agent Wilkinson lawfully removed the baggie from Johnson’s pocket after immediately identifying it as contraband during the reasonable patdown search. Because this seized evidence was properly admitted under the Fourth Amendment, we need not entertain any alternative explanations that could theoretically foreclose the baggie’s admission. We affirm.
Rush, C.J., and David and Goff, JJ., concur.
Slaughter, J., dissents with separate opinion.
Slaughter, J., dissenting.
The Court holds that the officer’s frisk of defendant, Michael Johnson, did not violate the Fourth Amendment. I agree with the Court that this is a close case. But I cannot join the Court’s careful analysis and write briefly to explain why.
The issue here is when a law-enforcement officer can search a person’s outer clothing for weapons during an investigative stop—commonly known as a Terry stop and frisk. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court struck a fragile balance between a person’s rights under the Fourth Amendment and legitimate law-enforcement needs. Balancing these interests, Terry mandates that law enforcement may use a “self-protective search for weapons”—a frisk—only if an officer can “point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous.” Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968).
…
Unlike the Court, I do not find that Johnson’s suspected drug activity, in combination with the time of the encounter and the fact that the officer was alone in a room with Johnson, gives rise to the crucial inference Terry requires. These facts do not suggest that Johnson was armed and dangerous. As to the timing, nothing in the record connects the early morning with any likelihood that Johnson (or any other casino patron) was armed. For instance, there is no evidence that 7 a.m. is a unique time when casino patrons, or even drug dealers in casinos, are more likely to be armed. As to the location, while a weapon may be more dangerous in a small, closed-off space, this location does not suggest that Johnson was armed in the first place. Yet that is the necessary inference. Because neither the time nor the location gives rise to the inference that Johnson was armed, Terry’s critical link is missing, and this protective weapons search was unconstitutional.
Admittedly, this is a fine point on which to disagree. But Terry draws an intentionally fine line—one I do not wish to see eroded. After all, a frisk is not merely a “petty indignity . . . [but] a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person,” and one that can “inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 17. Because law enforcement provides a vital service, this intrusion will often be worth the cost. But to protect rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment, we must respect Terry’s limitation. For these reasons,
I respectfully dissent