Rush, C.J.
Decades ago, this Court declared, “The age of the offender is determinative of subject matter jurisdiction in the juvenile court . . . .” Twyman v. State, 459 N.E.2d 705, 708 (Ind. 1984). That simple jurisdictional principle holds true today.
In these consolidated appeals, the State filed juvenile delinquency petitions against two individuals for committing, when they were under eighteen, what would be felony child molesting if committed by an adult. At the time the petitions were filed, however, neither individual was a “child” as defined for purposes of juvenile law.
The State requested that each individual be waived into adult criminal court, and both of the alleged offenders moved to dismiss their respective cases for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The State responded that, while a juvenile court doesn’t have the authority to adjudicate either individual delinquent, the court could still waive its jurisdiction. We disagree. Under the plain language of the relevant statutes, a juvenile court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to waive an alleged delinquent offender into adult criminal court if the individual is no longer a “child.”
…
Here, the parties collectively agree that the juvenile court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate either D.P. or N.B. a delinquent child because of their ages. The State contends, however, that the governing statutory scheme does permit a juvenile court to determine whether to waive D.P. or N.B. into adult criminal court. D.P. and N.B. disagree, maintaining that, if the relevant statutes preclude a juvenile court from adjudicating them delinquent, those statutes must also preclude the court from conducting a waiver hearing.
To resolve this issue, we first explore the contours of a juvenile court’s subject matter jurisdiction in delinquency proceedings. We then determine whether, given these jurisdictional boundaries, a juvenile court has authority to conduct a waiver proceeding over D.P. or N.B.
I. A juvenile court may not enter a delinquency adjudication against an individual who does not meet the definition of a “child.”
As relevant here, a juvenile court has “exclusive” subject matter jurisdiction over proceedings in which a “child” is alleged to be delinquent. Ind. Code § 31-30-1-1(1) (2020).1 The term “child,” for juvenile law purposes, is defined as (1) a person less than eighteen; (2) a person eighteen, nineteen, or twenty and who either is charged with a delinquent act committed before the age of eighteen or has been adjudicated a child in need of services before eighteen; or (3) a person less than twenty-one and who has allegedly committed what would be murder when less than eighteen. I.C. § 31-9-2-13(d).
Recently, the Court of Appeals evaluated this definitional statute to address the scope of a juvenile court’s subject matter jurisdiction in delinquency proceedings. M.C. v. State, 127 N.E.3d 1178, 1180–81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In that case, a juvenile court adjudicated twenty-three-year old M.C. delinquent for committing, at seventeen, what would have been child molesting if committed by an adult. Id. at 1179, 1181. The Court of Appeals reversed, noting that under the relevant definition of “child,” a juvenile court’s subject matter jurisdiction in delinquency proceedings is “limited to cases involving those under age twenty-one.” Id. at 1181. The panel acknowledged that the alleged act occurred when M.C. was under eighteen but pointed out that he was over twenty-one when the State filed the petition—meaning the juvenile court was without subject matter jurisdiction when it “adjudicated M.C. delinquent and entered a disposition.” Id.
The State—prudently—does not claim that M.C. was decided incorrectly. After all, the language of the jurisdictional statute, Indiana Code section 31-30-1-1(1), is clear: in delinquency proceedings, a juvenile court has subject matter jurisdiction only if the alleged offender is a “child.” And because the definition of a “child” does not include individuals twenty-one or older, I.C. § 31-9-2-13(d), the M.C. panel properly reversed the juvenile court’s judgment.
In line with M.C.’s holding, the State concedes that a juvenile court could not enter a delinquency adjudication against D.P. or N.B., since neither fits the definition of a “child.” The State instead argues that M.C. is distinguishable from the current cases. Specifically, the State maintains that a juvenile court has the “limited” power to decide whether D.P. and N.B. should be waived into adult criminal court—even if the juvenile court couldn’t adjudicate either delinquent.
…
In short, the parties—and this Court—agree on one point: a juvenile court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate individuals who are twenty-one or older, like D.P. and N.B., delinquent. With that jurisdictional principle in hand, we turn to the question underlying the parties’ dispute. Does a juvenile court possess the limited authority to waive D.P. and N.B. into adult criminal court?
II. The juvenile court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to waive either D.P. or N.B. into adult criminal court.
…
In D.P.’s case, the State requested that the juvenile court waive him into adult criminal court pursuant to Section 31-30-3-5, a presumptive waiver provision. That section provides, in relevant part, that a juvenile court must waive jurisdiction if three conditions are met: (1) “the child” is charged with an act that, if committed by an adult, would be a Class B felony; (2) there’s probable cause that “the child” committed the act; and (3) “the child” was at least sixteen when the act was allegedly committed. Id. § -5. The statute includes an exception to waiver, however, if “it would be in the best interests of the child and of the safety and welfare of the community for the child to remain within the juvenile justice system.” Id.
The panel below acknowledged that the juvenile court couldn’t adjudicate D.P. delinquent, but it nevertheless held that the court had subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether he should be waived into adult criminal court. D.P., 136 N.E.3d at 623. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals looked to various juvenile-law statutes, including the waiver provision the State sought to invoke, and determined that it could not have been “the legislature’s intent for an act that would constitute child molesting as a class B felony if committed by an adult to go entirely unpunished.” Id. at 623–24.
Shortly after, in N.B.’s case, a different panel adopted D.P.’s reasoning to decide that a juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction to waive N.B. into adult criminal court. N.B., 139 N.E.3d at 288. There, the State asserted waiver of jurisdiction was mandatory pursuant to a different statute: Indiana Code section 31-30-3-6. That statute provides that a juvenile court shall waive jurisdiction if (1) “the child” is charged with an act that would be a felony, and (2) “the child” has previously been convicted of a felony or nontraffic misdemeanor. I.C. § 31-30-3-6. At the time the State filed its waiver motion, N.B. had pleaded guilty to felony criminal confinement for acts committed when he was nineteen.
…
D.P. and N.B., on the other hand, argue that the language of the jurisdictional statute is unambiguous—when an alleged offender is twenty-one or older, a juvenile court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the entire delinquency proceeding. D.P. and N.B. maintain that scheduling and conducting a waiver hearing, along with issuing a waiver order, are necessarily parts of a delinquency proceeding. And they stress what the State concedes: no statute confers upon a juvenile court “partial jurisdiction” to waive either of them into adult criminal court. We agree with D.P. and N.B.
…
The relevant jurisdictional statute, Indiana Code section 31-30-1-1(1), is unambiguous. Per its plain language, a juvenile court has subject matter jurisdiction in delinquency proceedings when the alleged offender is a “child,” a term that Section 31-9-2-13(d) specifically defines as excluding anyone aged twenty-one or older. I.C. §§ 31-30-1-1(1), 31-9-2-13(d). The jurisdictional statute makes no distinction among a delinquency proceeding’s various phases; and it does not declare that waiver hearings are disconnected, for jurisdiction purposes, from the larger proceeding. See I.C. § 31-30-1-1(1). Rather, a waiver hearing is necessarily part and parcel of a delinquency proceeding—after all, waiver can occur only after the State files a delinquency petition and the juvenile court approves it. See I.C. §§ 31-37-10-2, -11-2, -12-4.
In short, the jurisdictional statute does not give power to a juvenile court to waive D.P. and N.B. into adult criminal court, as neither individual fits the definition of a “child.” So, we now turn to the relevant waiver provisions—Indiana Code sections 31-30-3-5 and 31-30-3-6—to determine if they allow a juvenile court to waive a person who is twenty one or older, but who committed an offense before the age of eighteen, into adult criminal court.
…
The State does not point to—nor do we find—any other statute that would confer upon the juvenile court limited subject matter jurisdiction to waive an individual who is twenty-one or older into adult criminal court. The State argues, though, that finding no subject matter jurisdiction in these cases would run afoul of legislative intent by effectively shortening the child-molesting statute of limitations for D.P., N.B., and those similarly situated.
Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2(e)(1) states that prosecution for child molesting may be commenced any time before the alleged victim reaches the age of thirty-one. And here, neither D.P.’s nor N.B.’s victim had turned thirty-one at the time the respective delinquency petitions were filed. According to the State, the legislature could not have intended to disallow waiver of D.P. and N.B. into adult criminal court—and thus shorten the applicable statute of limitations—just because the alleged offenses occurred before they turned eighteen.
It’s true that, had D.P. committed the alleged offense on his eighteenth birthday and against the same victim, the State could directly file charges in adult criminal court, as the child-molesting statute of limitations has not yet expired. The same is true for N.B.2 But this does not mean that a juvenile court would have subject matter jurisdiction—even if limited—in D.P.’s and N.B.’s cases.
What’s more, the State fails to acknowledge a competing policy argument: accepting the State’s position would lead to adults being punished many years after their youthful offenses, without any opportunity for juvenile rehabilitation. By way of example, N.B.’s alleged victim does not turn thirty-one until either 2035 or 2036.3 This means that, if the juvenile court has jurisdiction over N.B. for waiver purposes, the State could file a delinquency petition against him in his late thirties for acts that allegedly occurred when he was between twelve and fifteen years old. D.P. and N.B. maintain that the legislature likely recognized this potential injustice and thus “closed the opportunity for juvenile proceedings when the offender turns 21-years old.”
Ultimately, however, we need not decide whose policy argument carries more weight. We are bound by the plain language of the relevant juvenile-law provisions. And as explained above, the language of those statutes is unambiguous—the juvenile court does not have the authority to waive D.P. and N.B. into adult criminal court. To decide differently would require this Court to rewrite clearly written statutes, violating bedrock separation-of-powers principles. See Calvin v. State, 87 N.E.3d 474, 478 (Ind. 2017). This we will not do. If today’s result was not the intent of the legislature, then it—not we—must make the necessary statutory changes. Id. at 479.
Conclusion
Under the clear and unambiguous language of several relevant statutes, a juvenile court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to waive D.P. or N.B. into adult criminal court—because neither fit the definition of a “child” at the time their respective delinquency petitions were filed. We, accordingly, reverse the juvenile court in D.P. and remand with instructions to grant the motion to dismiss; and we affirm the juvenile court’s dismissal in N.B.
David, Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.