Mathias, J.
Shawn Spencer (“Spencer”) filed a petition in Vanderburgh Circuit Court asking the court to remove his designation as a sexually violent predator (“SVP”), which the trial court denied. Spencer appeals and presents one issue for our review, which we restate as whether Spencer is an SVP based on his two 1996 convictions in Florida for lewd acts upon a child.
We reverse and remand.
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I. Spencer Did Not Fail to Exhaust Available Administrative Remedies
In the present case, the State contends that Spencer failed to exhaust the administrative remedies that were available to him, specifically referring to an exhibit submitted by the State, obtained from the Department of Correction’s (“DOC”) website, titled “Indiana Registration Appeal Procedure for Non-Incarcerated Registrants” (the “DOC Appeal Procedure”). Ex. Vol., State’s Ex. A, p. 37.
The DOC Appeal Procedure sets forth the manner in which a “Local Law Enforcement Authority” may implement a “Proposed Change” to the information regarding a “Local Subject” in the Indiana Sex and Violent Offender Registry. It also sets forth the administrative procedure by which the Local Subject can protest any Proposed Change and, if necessary, appeal this decision to the DOC.
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The Local Law Enforcement Authority must notify the Local Subject of a Proposed Change “at least 7 calendar days before the Proposed Posting Date if notice is given to the Local Subject in person,” or “at least 10 calendar days before the Proposed Posting Date if notice is sent to the Local Subject by mail.” Id. at § 11.a.
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If a Local Subject disagrees with a Proposed Change, he or she may protest the change with the Local Law Enforcement Authority.
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Considering the DOC Appeal Procedure as a whole, we agree with Spencer that, before he could avail himself of the administrative remedies provided therein, the Local Law Enforcement Authority—here, the Vanderburgh County Sheriff—was required to notify him of any Proposed Change of his status in the Registry and do so in writing or in person.
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Thus, when Section 4 of the DOC Appeal Procedure states that the right of protest arises only when the Local Law Enforcement Authority notifies a Local Subject of a Proposed Change, the remaining sections of the Procedure establish that such notice must be in writing. Here, there is no evidence that the Vanderburgh County Sheriff’s office ever gave Spencer a copy of the Specimen or other written notice of its Proposed Change, i.e., that Spencer would be designated as an SVP, with the more onerous registration requirements that accompany such a designation. See note 9, supra. Under these facts and circumstances, we cannot say that Spencer failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, because such remedies were not available to him due to the failure of the Sheriff’s office to provide Spencer with written notice of its Proposed Change to the Registry.
II. Spencer is Not a Sexually Violent Predator per Statute
The main issue on appeal is whether Spencer’s two Florida convictions qualify him as an SVP in Indiana.
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Spencer claims that he does not meet the definition of an SVP as set forth in this section [IC 35-38-1-7.5]. He first claims that he is not an SVP because the crimes he committed in Florida are not substantially equivalent to Class A or Class B felony child molesting. The State does not claim otherwise, and we agree.
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Here, the victim in Spencer’s Florida conviction involving sexual intercourse was not under the age of fourteen. And the Florida conviction involving the younger girl did not involve sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct. Moreover, at the time of his Florida crimes, Spencer was not yet twenty-one years old, he did not use or threaten the use of a deadly weapon, his crimes did not result in serious bodily injury, nor is there any indication that they were facilitated by him furnishing any drug or controlled substance to the victims without their knowledge. In other words, Spencer’s Florida crimes were not substantially equivalent to the crimes of Class A or Class B felony child molesting as defined in Indiana. As noted, the State does not contend otherwise.
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Spencer does not deny that his Florida conviction for fondling the young girl is substantially equivalent to Level 4 felony child molesting. He argues, however, that because his crime was committed before July 1, 2014, he does not meet the definition of an SVP under this section. We agree.
The plain language of Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.5(b)(1)(C) clearly provides that a person is an SVP if they commit the offense of child molesting “as a . . . Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, or Level 4 felony (for a crime committed after June 30, 2014).” And subsection 7.5(b)(1)(K) states that a person is an SVP if they commit “a crime under the laws of another jurisdiction . . . that is substantially equivalent to any of the offenses listed in clauses (A) through (J)[.]” Accordingly, for Spencer to be an SVP as defined by this statute, he must have committed a crime that is substantially equivalent to the offenses listed in subsections (A) through (J), which include child molesting “as a . . . Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, or Level 4 felony (for a crime committed after June 30, 2014)[.]” Because Spencer committed his crime before June 30, 2014, he cannot be an SVP based on his commission of a crime that is substantially equivalent to Level 4 felony child molesting. In short, Spencer is not an SVP as defined in Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.5(b).
The State insists that “there is no statute that says that the date of the crime in the other State is the date to use.” Appellee’s Br. at 16. To the contrary, subsection 7.5(b)(1)(C) clearly states that to meet the definition of an SVP for having committed the crime of child molesting as a Level 4 felony, the crime must be “committed after June 30, 2014.”
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The State failed to establish its affirmative defense of Spencer’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. And Spencer does not meet the statutory definition of an SVP as it existed in 2016 when he moved to Indiana. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions that the trial court grant Spencer’s petition to remove his designation as an SVP.
Reversed and remanded.
Riley, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.