Slaughter, J.
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 establishes minimum federal standards governing employee-benefit plans. Under ERISA, the responsibility for regulating this system of benefit plans is exclusively a federal concern. To further the goal of uniform federal standards, ERISA contains two preemption provisions. These provisions’ preemptive effect on state laws is far-reaching but not absolute. Some state laws—and hence the claims arising under such laws—survive ERISA preemption, such as those not requiring interpretation of benefit-plan documents. A claim withstands preemption to the extent its validity turns not on the meaning of the plan documents but on a separate legal duty independent of the plan.
Here, a health-care provider sued defendant health-insurance plans, which are governed by ERISA, alleging they failed to pay agreed reimbursement rates for covered services under their plans. On this record, we hold that the trial court erred by entering summary judgment for the defendant plans based on ERISA preemption. A key factual dispute exists concerning a central issue in this case. Contrary to the defendants’ arguments, the designated summary-judgment evidence does not establish either that the provider’s claims were denied coverage under the plans or that the provider’s claims necessitate interpreting the plan documents. We grant transfer, vacate the entry of summary judgment for the defendants, and remand with instructions.
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At issue is whether FMS can proceed with its claims, all brought under state law, or whether ERISA preempts those claims. Two forms of ERISA preemption are before us: complete preemption and conflict preemption. The courts below determined that FMS’s claims were foreclosed by ERISA’s conflict-preemption provision. But we consider both that provision and the alternative ground—complete preemption—urged for affirming the trial court’s judgment.
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We have previously held that ERISA expressly preempts claims concerning coverage under an ERISA-governed plan. The issue in such cases is whether there is a right to coverage under an ERISA plan. In Stroup, 730 N.E.2d 163, the plaintiffs were beneficiaries of an employee-benefit plan subject to ERISA who challenged the plan’s denial of healthcare coverage. We found it “clear” that the Stroups’ state-law claims for breach of contract and the tort of bad faith were expressly preempted because the claims were based on the plan’s “failure to pay benefits due under an ERISA-governed” plan. Id. at 166–67. These claims thus had a “connection with” the plan because they arose from the plan’s “denial of coverage”. Id. at 167.
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The mere fact that a court may have to consider or consult the terms of an ERISA-governed plan while adjudicating a state-law claim does not mean the claim is preempted. As the Seventh Circuit held in Kolbe & Kolbe Health & Welfare Benefit Plan v. Medical College of Wisconsin, Inc., 657 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2011), there is no express preemption “merely because [a state-law claim] requires a cursory examination of ERISA plan provisions.” Id. at 504 (citation omitted). There, the court held the plaintiff’s claim was not preempted because resolving the breach-ofcontract claims required interpreting “only the member or service agreements and the provider agreements”. Id. at 504–05. See also Blue Cross of Cal.. v. Anesthesia Care Assocs. Med. Grp., Inc., 187 F.3d 1045, 1053 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding no preemption because provider’s claims “do not involve construction of the terms of ERISA-covered benefit plans”).
The record does not establish why the Notre Dame and Beacon Health plans did not pay FMS’s disputed claims. If the reason is that there is no right to payment under the plans, then the claims are expressly preempted. But to the extent a court must determine not whether a claim for services was covered but whether the plan paid less than the agreed provider rate for covered services based on an agreement separate from the plan, then the claim is not preempted. Based on our review of the EOBs and the other evidence designated on summary judgment, we cannot tell how these disputed claims were adjudicated under the plans. Given these disputes of material fact over whether FMS’s claims were denied based on the terms of the plans, we conclude that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment on this basis.
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Summary judgment was improper because the Notre Dame and Beacon Health defendants did not establish as a matter of law that FMS’s claims “enter[] a fundamental area of ERISA regulation”, Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 946, or that its claims are “substantially dependent upon interpretation” of the defendants’ plan documents, Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 395. Specifically, these defendants did not establish either (1) that FMS’s claims were adjudicated as covered under the defendants’ plans or (2) that a court would have to consult the various plans’ documents to determine whether FMS was underpaid and, if so, by how much.
Conclusion
For these reasons, we grant transfer, vacate the trial court’s entry of judgment in favor of the Notre Dame and Beacon Health defendants and against FMS, and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Rush, C.J., and Massa and Goff, JJ., concur. David, J., concurs in result.