David, J.
In this case, the Office of the Indiana Attorney General brought two claims against a county bookkeeper for misappropriation of public funds and, under a third claim, sought additional relief under the Crime Victims Relief Act. At issue is what the applicable statutes of limitations are for these claims. We hold that as for the claims to recover public funds pursuant to Indiana Code Section 5-11-5-1(a), the limitations period begins to run only after the Office of the Indiana Attorney General receives a final, verified report from the State Board of Accounts. We further hold that claims pursuant to the Crime Victims Relief Act are governed by the discovery rule. We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss Counts I and II, reverse the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss Count III as to the Crime Victims Relief Act claim and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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I. Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 5-11-15-1(a), the claim accrues when the OAG gets the final, verified report.
The first issue is when the statute of limitations began to run as to the State’s misappropriation of public funds claims against Robertson (Counts I and II). 1 Robertson argues that the limitations period began to run, at the latest, on December 11, 2014 when the SBOA provided the OAG with a copy of its preliminary report. The OAG argues that the limitations period began only after it filed its final, verified report on January 22, 2016.
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The operative statute provides that with regard to a preliminary report, “the state examiner may provide a copy of the report to the attorney general. The attorney general may institute and prosecute civil proceedings against the delinquent officer or employee. . .” Ind. Code § 5- 11-5-1(e). With regard to a final verified report, the statute provides that once filed: “[t]he attorney general shall diligently institute and prosecute civil proceedings.” Ind. Code § 5-11-5-1(a).
Here, the OAG filed its complaint pursuant to Indiana Code section 5- 11-5-1(a). Given the permissive language about the preliminary report (“may”) and the mandatory language about the final, verified report (“shall”), we agree with our trial court and Court of Appeals colleagues that our Legislature did not intend that the discovery rule apply to claims brought pursuant to Indiana Code section 5-11-5-1(a). That is, the plain language of the statute does not require the OAG to take any action until it receives a verified final report. Therefore, the statute controls instead of the default discovery rule for when claims under this statute must be brought. To hold otherwise would require us to rewrite the statute such that the permissive “may” would become a “shall” with regard to the OAG instituting legal action after receiving a preliminary report. We will not do this. See Ind. Alcohol & Tobacco Comm’n v. Spirited Sales, LLC, 79 N.E.3d 371, 376 (Ind. 2017) (citation omitted) (“We may not add new words to a statute which are not the expressed intent of the legislature.”)
Further, there are good reasons for the OAG to wait to institute legal proceedings until receiving the final report. For instance, if the OAG is forced to act on the preliminary report which is subject to change and unverified, it puts the OAG in the position of relying on unverified and incomplete information, hindering ongoing investigation, and creating premature, potentially unnecessary litigation.
Should there be a very egregious case of misappropriation of public funds that requires immediate action, the OAG can file upon receipt of the preliminary report pursuant to Indiana Code section 5-11-5-1(e). In that case, the limitations period would begin to run when the OAG receives the preliminary report. Otherwise, waiting for a final, verified report allows for judicial efficiency and fairness to the accused as well—the OAG won’t be forced to bring litigation against a party unless the investigation is complete.
Finally, to the extent Robertson and amicus are concerned that waiting for a final report before the limitations period begins to run will result in indefinite tolling of the statute of limitations because the SBOA can deliberately drag out the process, this concern is highly speculative. As our Court of Appeals aptly noted, our Legislature chose not to impose a time limit for conducting investigations and recognized that some investigations will necessarily take longer than others depending on the circumstances. It is not for the Court to set a deadline when one is not prescribed by the applicable statute.
In light of the above, we hold the statute of limitations for the OAG’s complaint to recover public funds pursuant to Indiana Code section 5-11- 5-1(a) does not begin until the OAG receives from SBOA the final, verified report. In this case the OAG received the final, verified report on January 22, 2016. It filed its complaint on May 5, 2017, less than two years later. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Robertson’s motion to dismiss Counts I and II.
II. The CVRA claim is untimely
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While our trial court and Court of Appeals colleagues applied the statute of limitations pursuant to Indiana Code section 5-11-15-1 to all three counts, a different statute—Indiana Code section 34-24-3-1—governs with regard to the CVRA claim. This statute does not provide a limitations period, and thus, the default discovery rule applies as there is no legislative intent to the contrary and our case law, discussed above, is clear that the two-year limitations period applies to these claims. Accordingly, we find that while the OAG may proceed with its first two Counts against Robertson, the CVRA claim is untimely. The OAG knew or should have known of its injury by December 11, 2014, when the SBOA provided the OAG with a copy of its preliminary report and the complaint was not filed until May of 2017, more than two years later.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s denial of Robertson’s motion to dismiss Counts I and II, reverse the trial court’s denial of Robertson’s motion to dismiss Count III and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Rush, C.J., and Massa and Goff, JJ., concur. Slaughter, J., concurs in the judgment with separate opinion.
Slaughter, J., concurring in the judgment.
I agree with much of the Court’s opinion. As to Part I, I agree that the State’s claims for misappropriated public funds are timely and may proceed. As to Part II, I agree that the State’s claim for treble damages under the Crime Victims Relief Act is time-barred and cannot proceed. I write separately to address two related issues. The first concerns the procedural posture of this case—specifically, the Court’s tacit approval of using Trial Rule 12(B)(6) to decide the merits of an affirmative defense, contrary to our recent case law. The second concerns how to apply this case law here.
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