Mathias, J.
Aaron B. Hoskins (“Hoskins”) appeals his conviction for Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe in Cause No. 86C01-1909-F6-79 (“Cause No. F6-79”) and the revocation of his probation in Cause Nos. 86C01-1606-F6-21 (“Cause No. F6-21”) and 86C01-1704-CM-39 (“Cause No. CM-39”). On appeal, Hoskins argues that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. Because Hoskins pleaded guilty, his claim cannot be raised on direct appeal and instead must be presented in a petition for post-conviction relief. We therefore dismiss Hoskins’s appeal.
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Hoskins claims that he did not knowingly or intelligently waive his right to counsel. The State argues that Hoskins cannot bring this claim on direct appeal because he pleaded guilty. We agree with the State.
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In Creekmore [v. State, 853 N.E.2d 523, 532–33 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), clarified on denial of reh’g, 858 N.E.2d 230,] the defendant pleaded guilty and claimed on direct appeal that he did not knowingly or intelligently waive his right to counsel. We concluded that “[t]he issue of whether Creekmore knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel should be pursued by filing a petition for postconviction relief.” Creekmore, 853 N.E.2d at 533. We therefore dismissed Creekmore’s appeal as to this issue. Id.
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The same result obtains here. Hoskins pleaded guilty to both the new criminal offense and to the probation violations. His argument on appeal regarding his waiver of the right to counsel attacks not the trial court’s sentencing discretion, but the validity of his plea. His claim must therefore be presented by way of a petition for post-conviction relief.
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Conclusion
Because Hoskins’s claim cannot be presented on direct appeal and must instead be presented in a petition for post-conviction relief, we dismiss this appeal without prejudice as to his ability to present this claim in a petition for postconviction relief. See Huffman [v. State], 822 N.E.2d [656,] 660 [Ind. Ct. App. 2005] (holding that defendant who pleaded guilty to a probation violation could not raise claims on direct appeal attacking the validity of the plea and dismissing without prejudice as to her right to raise these issues in a subsequent post-conviction proceeding).
Dismissed.
Kirsch, J., and Bailey, J., concur.