Mathias, J.
Following a jury trial in Vanderburgh Superior Court, Clinton Loehrlein (“Loehrlein”) was convicted of one count of murder, two counts of Level 1 felony attempted murder, two counts of Level 3 felony aggravated battery, and one count of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. Loehrlein appeals and presents two issues for our review, which we restate as: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying Loehrlein’s motion to set aside the jury verdict based on juror misconduct, and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing Loehrlein’s proffered instruction defining the term “wrongfulness” in the insanity defense statute. Concluding that the trial court did not err by refusing Loehrlein’s tendered instruction but that the trial court did err by denying Loehrlein’s motion for a new trial based on the gravity of the juror’s misconduct, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
I. Juror Misconduct
Loehrlein first argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct, referring to the false answers L.W. gave on the jury questionnaire. Loehrlein claims that, had he known of the charge against L.W. and her prior experiences of being a victim of domestic violence, he would have moved to have her dismissed from the jury.
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Proof that a juror was biased against the defendant or lied during voir dire generally entitles the defendant to a new trial. Id. (citing Warner v. State, 773 N.E.2d 239, 246 (Ind. 2002)). “A defendant seeking a new trial because of juror misconduct must show gross misconduct that probably harmed the defendant.”
In the present case, the parties first dispute whether Juror L.W. committed gross misconduct. Loehrlein claims that the evidence clearly shows that L.W. was dishonest in her response to the jury questionnaire. The State contends that L.W.’s response to Question 15 on the questionnaire was not dishonest. We agree with Loehrlein.
Question 15 was clear in asking whether potential jurors, or members of their immediate family or close friends had ever “been charged with or convicted of a crime.” Appellant’s Confidential App. Vol. 3, p. 31. This is not a question that calls for an elusive, cryptic answer. It calls for a simple, yes-or-no response. By writing “N/A,” L.W. clearly indicated that she had never been charged with a crime. But this was plainly and patently false. L.W. later admitted that an information had been filed charging her with domestic battery. No matter how much word-smithing L.W. attempted at her deposition, she was, rightly or wrongly, charged with a crime. We find L.W.’s response that she did not believe she had been charged with a crime because she was never “read her rights” in open court to be incredulous. As a licensed attorney who had practiced some criminal law, L.W. knew, or at the very least should have known, that she had been charged with a misdemeanor. Indeed, she admitted that the charge had been dismissed. Had she not been charged, there would have been nothing to dismiss. L.W.’s lack of candor on the jury questionnaire is particularly troubling in light of the fact that she is a licensed attorney. Shes hould therefore have been well aware not only of the fact that she was charged with a crime, but also of her ethical responsibility to be as forthcoming as possible in response to the jury questionnaire.
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L.W.’s deceptive response to Question 15 is exacerbated by her response to Question 16, which asked if she had ever been the victim in a “criminal matter.” Id. L.W. again answered this question with “N/A,” despite her own deposition testimony that she had been the victim of dozens of incidents of domestic violence.
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A jury questionnaire is not the appropriate place to give elusive, half-true answers. And in light of L.W.’s admission that she had always wanted to be a juror but was concerned that she would not be selected because she is a lawyer, her responses to the jury questionnaire are even more troubling. To put it shortly, we have no hesitation in concluding that L.W.’s incorrect, untruthful response to Question 15 amounted to gross misconduct.
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Here, the trial court denied Loehrlein’s motion for a new trial, thereby implicitly determining that L.W.’s conduct did not probably harm Loehrlein. Given the facts and circumstances before the court, we are of the opinion that this constituted an abuse of discretion. As in Dye, L.W.’s untruthful answers on the jury questionnaire deprived Loehrlein of the ability to delve into her prior experience with domestic violence. This is particularly concerning here, where Loehrlein savagely attacked members of his own family.
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Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Loehrlein’s motion for a new trial. L.W.’s misleading answers to the jury questionnaire constituted gross misconduct, and this misconduct probably harmed Loehrlein by denying him the opportunity to strike L.W. from the jury. We therefore reverse Loehrlein’s convictions and remand for a new trial.
Conclusion
Juror L.W.’s untruthful and misleading responses on the jury questionnaire constituted gross misconduct that harmed Loehrlein by depriving him of the opportunity to further investigate L.W.’s history and remove her from the jury due to her prior history as a victim of domestic violence and as someone who had criminal charges against her dismissed. We therefore reverse Loehrlein’s convictions and remand for retrial.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Kirsch, J., concurs.
Bailey, J., dissents with opinion.
An issue of juror misconduct is a matter that is within the trial court’s discretion. Lopez v. State, 527 N.E.2d 1119, 1130 (Ind. 1988). Because I am not persuaded that Loehrlein has shown the trial court abused its discretion by denying Loehrlein’s motion to set aside the verdict, I respectfully dissent.
I believe that the instant circumstances are akin to those in Warner; that is, clear evidence that the defendant committed the charged conduct, and the juror’s testimony of impartiality. Indeed, Loehrlein admitted that he had killed his wife and attempted to kill his daughters. When J.W. was deposed, she adamantly insisted that: (1) she had not been formally arraigned on a charge against her, but if a charge had been filed, it was baseless and dismissed without her ever having appeared in court; (2) she did not consider herself a crime victim despite a history of domestic violence because she had chosen not to report any incident; and (3) her participation as a juror was not affected.
J.W., a practicing attorney, stated at her deposition that the contested issue for the jury was whether Loehrlein had established his insanity defense. J.W. denied that her domestic violence history affected the insanity determination. Indeed, two appointed mental health experts testified that Loehrlein was sane and his own expert witness described Loehrlein’s thought processes but stopped short of opining that he was insane. Because Loehrlein admitted to the attacks and the jury heard from unified experts, there is no discernible harm from his loss of the opportunity to strike J.W. as a juror. Therefore, I vote to affirm his convictions.