Rush, C.J.
As today’s companion opinion, Blair v. EMC Mortgage, LLC, concludes, two statutes of limitations apply equally to a cause of action upon a promissory note. And because both statutes prevent a mortgage lender from waiting indefinitely to sue for a borrower’s default, there is no need to impose an additional, judicially created time constraint.
Here, a lender asks us to apply both statutes and find that its action to recover the full amount owed upon an accelerated promissory note is not time-barred. We find that, under either statute of limitations, the lender can assert its claim. We thus reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the lender’s complaint and remand.
….
As explained today in Blair v. EMC Mortgage, LLC, No. 19S-MF-530, ___ N.E.3d ___, slip op. at 7 (Ind. Feb. 17, 2020), two statutes of limitations apply equally when a lender sues for payment upon a promissory note: Section 34-11-2-9 is the general statute of limitations for claims on promissory notes, and Section 26-1-3.1-118(a) is the relevant UCC statute of limitations. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-9 (2019); Ind. Code § 26-1-3.1-118(a) (2019). Under either statute, there are multiple accrual dates for causes of action. Blair, slip op. at 8–9.
Here, Alialy asserts that CAG waived its argument regarding Section 26-1-3.1-118(a) because CAG failed to reference that specific statute to the trial court and instead focused on the general statute. Alialy further argues that it would be “blatantly unfair” to allow CAG to accelerate the note up to its maturity date.
We disagree. For reasons described below, CAG did not waive its argument under Indiana Code section 26-1-3.1-118(a). Moreover, this issue is of no consequence. CAG invoked Indiana Code section 34-11-2-9 in the trial court and could recover equally under either statute because it filed suit within six years of acceleration. And, as we explained in Blair, we will not impose an additional rule of reasonableness on a lender’s ability to bring an action upon a closed installment contract. Blair, slip op. at 5–6.
I. CAG did not waive its argument under Indiana Code section 26-1-3.1-118(a).
Alialy claims that, because CAG did not cite to the UCC or reference Indiana Code section 26-1-3.1-118(a) to the trial court, CAG waived any argument on appeal that the statute applied.
….
In its response to Alialy’s motion to dismiss, CAG argued that the timing of the statute of limitations enabled it to recover. Specifically, CAG asserted that the six-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until it exercised its optional acceleration clause in 2016; and thus, its complaint filed in 2017 fell “well within the applicable” time period. Though CAG cited only Section 34-11-2-9 below, the issue before the trial court was whether CAG’s complaint was filed within the six-year limitations period. And, as we explained in Blair, that time period is identical under either statute. Blair, slip op. at 7–9. In other words, Alialy was on notice of the timing issue in the trial court and had notice and an opportunity to defend against both statutes on appeal. Accordingly, CAG’s argument that its claim was also timely filed under the relevant UCC statute is not waived.
But this waiver issue ultimately does not affect CAG’s ability to recover the amounts that it is owed.
I. CAG can equally recover amounts owed under either statute of limitations.
For the reasons outlined in Blair, we find that—under either of Indiana’s two applicable statutes of limitations—a cause of action for payment upon a promissory note with an optional acceleration clause can accrue on multiple dates. Id. One of those dates is when a lender exercises its option to accelerate before a note matures. Id. at 8–9. And, as also explained in Blair, we find it unnecessary to impose a rule of reasonableness when a lender sues to enforce installment obligations on a closed installment contract, such as a promissory note. Id. at 5–6.
Here, the two statutes provide CAG identical paths to relief. Cf. Moryl, 4 N.E.3d at 1138 (noting that the plaintiff timely filed her complaint under either statute). CAG brought its claim against Alialy in 2017, well within six years of when it accelerated the debt in 2016. Thus, CAG’s claim to recover the full amount owed on the note is not time-barred.
Conclusion
We find that CAG did not waive its argument under Indiana Code section 26-1-3.1-118(a). But this issue is of no consequence, because under either applicable statute of limitations, CAG’s claim is timely. We thus reverse the trial court’s order dismissing CAG’s complaint and remand.
David, Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur