Mathias, J.
Jacob M. Breda (“Breda”) appeals the order of the Vigo Superior Court revoking his placement in a community corrections work release program and requiring him to serve the balance of his suspended sentence in the custody of the Department of Correction (“DOC”). Breda claims that Indiana Code section 35-38-2.6-5, which sets forth the options available when a defendant violates the terms of a community corrections program, violates the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers. We conclude that Breda has waived this argument by failing to present it to the trial court. Waiver notwithstanding, this court has already determined that section 35-38-2.6-5 does not violate the separation of powers. We therefore affirm.
…
Breda claims that Indiana Code section 35-38-2.6-5 violates the separation of powers provisions of the Indiana Constitution.
…
A trial court may, at the time of sentencing, “suspend the sentence and order a person to be placed in a community corrections program as an alternative to commitment to the department of correction.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2.6-3(a). “The court may impose reasonable terms on the placement or require the director of the community corrections program to impose reasonable terms on the placement.” Id.
…
[P]rior to the 2015 amendment, when a defendant violated the terms of his or her direct placement in a community corrections program, the trial court had authority to change the terms of the placement, continue the placement, or revoke the placement. However, under the current version of the statute, if a defendant violates the terms of his or her placement, the community corrections director has the authority to change the terms of the placement, continue the placement, reassign the defendant to a different community corrections program, or request that the trial court revoke the placement.
Breda claims that this change in the statute “interferes with the discharge of the [trial] court’s duties because it eliminates any discretion the court had in determining the appropriate sanction” and that the statute is therefore facially unconstitutional. Appellant’s Br. at 9. Breda also argues that, even if the statute is facially constitutional, it is unconstitutional as applied to him because the trial court here indicated that it had no choice but to revoke his placement and order him to serve the remainder of his sentence in the DOC. Tr. p. 23. He argues that, if the trial court had the discretion it had under the prior statute, it might have ordered him to serve only a portion of his remaining sentence in the DOC.
We addressed a similar argument in Morgan, supra. In that case, the defendant was eventually ordered to serve two years of his sentence on work release under the supervision of the county community corrections department. 87 N.E.3d at 508. Morgan subsequently violated several of the terms of his placement in community corrections, including escaping the facility. Id. The State filed a petition to revoke Morgan’s placement, and at the revocation hearing, Morgan admitted to some of the allegations and provided excuses for the others. Id. The trial court revoked Morgan’s placement and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in the DOC. Id.
On appeal, Morgan claimed that Indiana Code section 35-38-2.6-5, as amended in 2015, was unconstitutional because it “impermissibly delegates judicial authority to a member of the executive branch, i.e., the community corrections director[.]”1 Id. The Morgan court rejected this argument, concluding:
The statute in question here does not act as a coercive influence on the judiciary’s ability to discharge its duties. . . . With the statute at issue, the community corrections director is given the ability to manage the community corrections program but not to revoke placement or resentence participants. Although the community corrections director can recommend revocation of placement, it remains the trial court’s duty to determine whether revocation will be ordered. See Madden v. State, 25 N.E.3d 791, 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (trial courts set the terms of community corrections but the program has authority to supervise those terms), trans. denied. The community corrections director did not increase the trial court’s overall sentence of twenty years, nor did the director alter the two years Morgan was sentenced to serve on work release. . . . After hearing evidence, the trial court determined revocation was proper and ordered Morgan to serve the remaining portion of his suspended sentence in the DOC. Morgan has not demonstrated an improper delegation of the judiciary’s duty to sentence convicted persons.
Morgan, 87 N.E.3d at 509–10 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Breda fails to cite Morgan, much less attempt to distinguish Morgan from the present case. We therefore conclude, as we previously held in Morgan, that the current version of Indiana Code section 35-38-2.6-5 is not unconstitutional. The trial court still maintains the authority to sentence a defendant, including placement in a community corrections program. Once a defendant is in a community corrections program, the community corrections director can change the terms of the placement and reassign a defendant to a specific program, but only the trial court may, at the request of the director, revoke a defendant’s placement and order the defendant to execute the remaining portion of the defendant’s sentence. Thus, the statute does not constitute a violation of the separation of powers, either facially or as applied to Breda.
Conclusion
Because Indiana Code section 35-38-2.6-5 does not violate the constitutional separation of powers, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Bailey, J., concur.