Slaughter, J.
Domestic violence accounts for more than one-fifth of all violent crime in the United States, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Nonfatal Domestic Violence, 2003–2012, 1 (2014), and is widely recognized as a public-health crisis that harms both the victim and those within the victim’s household. Children exposed to domestic violence are more likely to suffer significant psychological and developmental issues. And they are more likely, as adults, to continue the cycle of violence by becoming either victims or abusers themselves. UNICEF, Behind Closed Doors: The Impact of Domestic Violence on Children, 7 (2006).
To protect victims and curb the vicious cycle of domestic violence, our legislature enacted the Indiana Civil Protection Order Act. The Act empowers those threatened with domestic violence to turn to the courts for urgent relief against those who would carry out such threats. But the Act is not one-sided. It balances the need to protect victims of domestic violence against the interests of those against whom a protective order is sought. Because of the potentially severe limitations on a restrained person’s liberty, the petitioner must prove the respondent is a present, credible threat to the petitioner or someone in the petitioner’s household.
Here, Respondent, S.H., consented to the trial court’s entry of an initial two-year protective order against him. But he challenged the later request of Petitioner, D.W., for another two-year protective order. Over S.H.’s objection, the trial court issued the new order. On this record, we hold there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s entry of another two-year protective order and thus reverse its judgment and remand with instructions.
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To obtain a protective order, the petitioner must show the respondent “represents”—present tense—“a credible threat to the safety of a petitioner or a member of a petitioner’s household.” Id. § 34-26-5-9(f). Thus, the respondent must pose a threat to a protected person’s safety when the petitioner seeks relief. If the petitioner meets this burden, “the court shall grant relief necessary to bring about a cessation of the violence or the threat of violence.” Id. See also Costello v. Zollman, 51 N.E.3d 362, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Protective orders have presumptive two-year terms. I.C. § 34-26-5-9(e).
In addition to focusing on the parties’ present situation, the Act requires that the threat posed by the respondent be viewed objectively. Not only must there be a present threat, but the threat must be credible— meaning plausible or believable. Thus, the petitioner must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent presently intends to harm the petitioner or the petitioner’s family. By focusing on the parties’ present situation, the Act not only allows courts to intervene as the parties’ circumstances warrant, but also contemplates that the parties’ relationship can change over time.
Entering one protective order does not, by itself, justify entering a second order—or renewing or extending the first order. True, the parties’ history is relevant. Indeed, the trial court’s extension of a protective order “must be viewed in light of the continuing harm or the threat of continuing harm that necessitated the issuance of the protective order in the first instance.” J.K. v. T.C., 25 N.E.3d 179, 181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting A.N., 10 N.E.3d at 1272). But the existence of a prior order does not dictate the outcome of a later dispute between the same parties. “The fact that an order for protection is issued under this chapter does not raise an inference or presumption in a subsequent case or hearings between the parties.” Id. § 34-26-5-9(h). Thus, the circumstances leading to entry of a prior order generally cannot be the sole basis for entering a new order or renewing or extending the previous one.
We agree with much of the case law interpreting Section 9 that our court of appeals has developed. The trial court should consider the factual basis underlying an initial protective order when determining whether to renew or extend an order or issue a new one. A.N., 10 N.E.3d at 1272. “[A]ny such reissuance, renewal, or extension must be based upon evidence that a protective order currently is ‘necessary to bring about a cessation of the violence or the threat of violence’ because of a continuing threat of harm.” J.K., 25 N.E.3d at 182 (emphasis in original). Whether a prior domestic-violence incident is remote in time is also probative— though not determinative—of whether a threat currently exists to justify issuing a protective order. Tons v. Bley, 815 N.E.2d 508, 511 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that unspecified violent acts occurring eight years earlier were not a sufficient basis for issuing a protective order). An example of a one-time threat that would justify reissuing, renewing, or extending an order for protection is where a respondent—even just once—issues what amounts to a perpetual threat: “You’ll never be safe. You’ll never know when I’ll show up. You’d better always be looking over your shoulder. Because one day—next week, next month, next year—I’ll get you. I promise you that.”
Unlike that scenario, here we have a single episode of physical violence with no follow-up act, no threat that the violence will recur, and no other reasonable grounds to believe that Sam presently intends to harm Diane or her family. Under these circumstances, the Act does not permit the reissuance, renewal, or extension of the protective order.
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We are mindful that victims of domestic violence often suffer hidden wounds that linger long after external injuries have healed or scarred over. And we do not question the sincerity of Diane’s multiple expressions of fear that Sam severely beat her before and will do so again. But a trial court may issue a protective order only if presented with enough evidence that the respondent represents a present, credible threat to the petitioner’s safety. Such evidence is simply lacking on this record.
Conclusion
For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand with instructions to vacate entry of the 2018 protective order against Sam. Today’s opinion does not prevent Diane from seeking, or a trial court from entering, further relief against Sam as may be warranted by acts of violence or threats of harm to Diane or her family.
Rush, C.J., and David, J., concur.
Goff, J., dissents with separate opinion in which Massa, J., joins.
Goff, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the Court’s opinion reversing the trial court. Indiana’s Civil Protection Order Act (the Act) is Indiana’s collective legal response to problems associated with domestic and family violence. The Act, along with Indiana’s Protection Order Registry and network of domestic violence victims’ advocates, ensures the safety of some of Indiana’s most vulnerable citizens. My colleagues seek only to assure fairness to all parties in cases arising under the Act. However, by requiring new evidence of an act or threat to justify extending the protection order beyond its initial two-year period, I believe the Court’s opinion today—although confined to the record here—unnecessarily weakens the Act’s protection.
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Protecting victims of domestic and family violence is a high priority for our State. The extraordinary powers embodied in the Act and the relative ease with which they can be invoked are necessary to prevent harm—and possibly death—to vulnerable persons at the hands of their abuser. To be sure, a protection order may “impose significant restrictions on a respondent’s freedom of movement and other rights.” A.N., 10 N.E.3d at 1272. But the legislature expressly directed courts to construe the Act to promote the victim’s safety and protection. The Court’s decision today, in my opinion, runs contrary to this intent. Massa, J., joins.