Mathias, J.
Donald B. Kite, Sr. (“Kite”) appeals the order of the Marion Circuit Court denying his petition for an election contest in which he claimed that Alexandra Curlin (“Curlin”) was ineligible to hold the seat on the school board to which she was elected. On appeal, Kite claims that Curlin does not reside in the district she was elected to represent and is therefore statutorily ineligible for the school board seat. Curlin argues that her residency, and therefore her ineligibility, was discoverable prior to the election and that Kite’s post-election challenge is untimely. Because we agree with Kite that Curlin continues to be ineligible for the seat she holds, we reverse and remand.
….
Kite first argues that the trial court erred by concluding that he could not challenge Curlin’s eligibility after the election. Kite correctly notes that the applicable statutory scheme clearly permits such post-election challenges…
….
Kite also correctly notes that Curlin was not an eligible candidate for the District 2 seat to which she was ultimately elected. The trial court did not find otherwise. Indeed, it is undisputed that Curlin did not reside in District 2. Nor is there any evidence that she moved or planned to move into District 2. Indiana Code section 3-8-1-34(b) clearly provides that, for “a candidate for school board office seeking to represent an election district that consists of less than the entire school corporation,” “[t]he candidate must have resided in the election district for at least one (1) year before the election.” (emphasis added). The 2015 Plan adopted by MSDWT incorporated this requirement by stating that a candidate for a seat representing a residence district must have lived in that district “for a period of time in excess of one (1) year prior to the date of the general election on which the candidate’s name appears on the ballot for election[.]” Ex. Vol., Joint Ex. 1 pp. 3–4. Thus, Curlin was clearly ineligible for the District 2 seat on the School Board.
….
Thus, our General Assembly has expressed its intention to prioritize the geographic diversity of the composition of a school board over seating the candidate who received the most votes if the election of a candidate dilutes or destroys the geographic diversity of the board….
Again, the trial court did not conclude that Curlin was eligible to hold the seat representing District 2. The outcome of this case would therefore seem to be simple: Curlin was an ineligible candidate due to her residency in District 1, and Kite brought a statutorily authorized post-election challenge to her eligibility wherein it was clearly established that Curlin was an ineligible candidate. The trial court, however, concluded that it could not unseat Curlin despite her ineligibility based on controlling precedent.
II. Precedent Disfavors Post-Election Disenfranchisement
Our supreme court has held that Indiana law strongly disfavors “post-hoc disenfranchisement of voters…
Relying on the above-emphasized language, the trial court determined that Curlin’s ineligibility for the District 2 seat was merely a “technical” issue and that unseating Curlin would improperly disenfranchise the electorate who voted for Curlin. We agree with Kite that the question of whether a candidate is ineligible for office due to her failure to meet a residency requirement is not a mere formal or technical objection.
….
The trial court here, citing White, concluded that because Curlin’s ineligibility was discoverable prior to the election, a post-election challenge was untimely. Although there is language in White supporting this conclusion, and we understand why the trial court relied thereon, we believe that the facts of White, and the facts of Burke on which the White court relied, are distinguishable from the facts of the present case.
As set forth above, in both White and Burke, the disqualifications at issue had ceased to exist by the time the winning candidate had been elected and assumed office. Curlin, in contrast, was and continues to be ineligible for the office she now holds. We do not read White or Burke as prohibiting a post-election challenge to the continued ineligibility of a candidate simply because the ineligibility could have been discovered prior to the election.
….
But despite our strong disinclination to overturn the results of an election after the fact, Curlin, unlike the candidates in White and Burke, remains statutorily ineligible for the seat that she currently holds. To hold that Kite cannot now challenge Curlin’s current eligibility would be to effectively read the postelection challenge statutes out of the Indiana Code. We do not believe this was the intent of our supreme court in White or Burke, where the disqualifications were not continuing.
Conclusion
It is undisputed that Curlin does not reside in District 2. Nevertheless, Curlin ran for, and was elected to a seat on the School Board representing District 2. Under the applicable statutes, she is ineligible to hold the seat she currently holds. This ineligibility, although discoverable prior to the election, was not discovered until after the election. Although Indiana law disfavors post-election removal of candidates who were chosen by the voters, we are unable to overlook the fact that, unlike the candidates in Burke and White, Curlin remains ineligible for the seat she holds. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Robb, J., and Pyle, J., concur.