Mathias, J.
In November 2018, the Marion Circuit Court granted a petition for specialized driving privileges to Dezie McClung (“McClung”), a Marion County resident whose driving privileges had been suspended. Shortly thereafter, the Indiana Attorney General, on behalf of the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (“BMV”), filed a motion to correct error arguing that the trial court’s order was contrary to Indiana Code section 9-30-16, which imposes a durational limit on specialized driving privileges when such privileges are granted. The trial court denied the BMV’s motion to correct error. This appeal by the BMV presents one issue for our review: whether the trial court acted contrary to law when it denied the BMV’s motion to correct error and permitted specialized driving privileges to be granted for indefinite periods. Because we find that the trial court’s order was contrary to applicable law, we reverse and remand.
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Within the specialized driving privileges statutory scheme and at issue in this case is Ind. Code section 9-30-16-3 (“Section 3”), regarding court-ordered suspensions of driving privileges, and section 9-30-16-4 (“Section 4”), regarding suspensions of driving privileges that result from administrative action by the BMV….
The dispute in this case arises from Section 4’s incorporation by reference of Section 3, subsections (b), (c) and (d). Specifically, the BMV’s appeal of the grant of specialized driving privileges for an indefinite time period involves Section 3(c) and whether it unambiguously directs trial courts—when they grant specialized driving privileges to drivers whose underlying suspensions arise from administrative action—to cap the duration of the privilege at two and one-half years, as the trial courts must do when they grant specialized driving privileges to drivers whose underlying suspensions are court ordered.
I. Permitted Duration of Specialized Driving Privileges
The BMV argues that Section 4 unambiguously incorporates Section 3(c), thereby limiting the authority of trial courts to grant petitions for specialized driving privileges that last longer than two and one-half years, no matter whether the underlying suspension is administrative or court ordered. The BMV’s appeal takes issue with the unlimited duration of the specialized driving privileges granted to McClung, namely, with how the trial court ordered McClung’s specialized driving privileges to remain in effect until “further court order.” In the BMV’s view, the trial court’s order is contrary to law because Section 4 unambiguously incorporates Section 3’s durational limit. And, the BMV posits, even if the statutory scheme is ambiguous, the provisions can be harmonized to give effect to the legislature’s intent of incorporating the limits of Section 3 into Section 4 without an unreasonable or unjustifiable result. [Footnote omitted.]
The trial court, after analyzing the legislative history of Indiana Code section 9- 30-16, concluded that Section 3, subsections (b), (c) and (d), cannot be reconciled with Section 4. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that the legislature did not intend for the durational limit in Section 3 to apply to administrative suspensions like McClung’s, which are governed by Section 4. We disagree. Section 4 clearly and unambiguously incorporates Section 3(c), the effect being that all grants of specialized driving privileges, including McClung’s, are subject to the two-and-one-half-year durational limit. We do, however, agree with the trial court that the effect of Section 4’s incorporation of Section 3(b) is ambiguous and is thus subject to judicial construction.
Generally speaking, Section 4 properly incorporates by reference the three subsections of Section 3….
Section 3(c) sets a durational floor and ceiling for grants of specialized driving privileges. It reads: “Except as provided in [a subsection not applicable here], regardless of the underlying offense, specialized driving privileges granted under this section shall be granted for: (1) at least one hundred eighty (180) days; and (2) not more than two and one-half (2 1/2) years.” I.C. § 9-30-16-3(c). Section 4, in comparison, contains no language about the duration of specialized driving privileges. The incorporation of Section 3(c) into Section 4 is accomplished by the plain meaning of the statute, presenting no conflict and thus no need for judicial construction.
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Therefore, we need not assess the statute’s legislative history to determine the legislature’s intent in amending Section 4 to incorporate Section 3(c). The statutory language is the best determinant of the legislature’s intent, and here, the provision creating a durational limit for grants of specialized driving privileges can be applied as written without conflict. We are comfortable concluding that a harmonious reading of Section 3 and Section 4 allows for the incorporation of Section 3(c), regarding durational limits, into Section 4, which is otherwise silent as to durational limits.
II. Interpreting Ambiguity in the Statute
Although we conclude that the effect of Section 4’s incorporating language is unambiguous as to Section 3(c), the same cannot be said for the incorporation of subsection (b). Reading subsection (b) into Section 4 leaves room for multiple interpretations, and, therefore, the incorporating language challenged here does present a measure of ambiguity as far as determining the proper venue for filing a petition for specialized driving privileges. Thus, in resolving the conflict in the instant case, we look to the intent of the legislature in enacting the statutory scheme and to the BMV’s interpretation thereof. This is appropriate because we must read the sections of a statute—here, Section 3 and Section 4—together, endeavoring to harmonize conflicting provisions where possible.
Section 4(d) directs a driver with an administrative suspension to petition for specialized driving privileges in the county in which the driver resides.8 As previously discussed, however, Section 4(a) incorporates Section 3(b), which directs the same driver with an administrative suspension to petition for specialized driving privileges in the county of the court that ordered or imposed the suspension. The plain meaning of these provisions could be fairly read to require drivers with BMV-imposed suspensions to file petitions for specialized driving privileges in the trial courts of two counties: the driver’s county of residence and the county whose order gave rise to the BMV-imposed suspension, if the counties are not one and the same…
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McClung—and, we presume, many other Hoosier drivers—is subject to three administrative suspensions of his driving privileges, two of which have no expiration date and will—absent a grant of specialized driving privileges or their subsequent revocation—prevent him from driving for the rest of his life. This is a drastic consequence imposed on Indiana drivers, primarily by the BMV but also by trial courts, when they fail to adhere to Indiana’s laws governing motor vehicles and licensing. If we were to accept the trial court’s interpretation of the legislature’s intent as allowing specialized driving privileges from administrative suspensions to be granted for unlimited durations, we would be permitting the functional reversal of valid, lifetime suspensions that have been deemed necessary by the BMV, the administrative agency charged with enforcing the statute. We are convinced by the BMV’s point that the allowance the law creates for specialized driving privileges is just that—a privilege available to suspended drivers. The granting of that privilege does not equate to a reversal of the suspension, a point further evinced by a plain reading of Section 3(d) also incorporated without conflict into Section 4: “The terms of specialized driving privileges must be determined by a court.” I.C. § 9-30-16-3(d). The terms of specialized driving privileges include an unambiguous durational limit, plus a venue requirement that varies based on the petitioner’s county of residence and type of underlying suspension. These limits on the trial court’s authority to grant petitions for specialized driving privileges are justifiable.
Conclusion
The BMV has provided an interpretation of the statute at issue here that is consistent with the statute’s public safety rationale. Its interpretation of the ambiguous provisions is, therefore, a reasonable one to which we must defer because the BMV is the administrative agency responsible for the enforcement of the statutory scheme. Thus, we conclude that the trial court’s order denying the BMV’s motion to correct error was contrary to law because it granted specialized driving privileges to McClung that exceeded the two-and-one-half year maximum allowed under Section 4(a)’s incorporation of Section 3(c). Trial courts may not grant petitions for specialized driving privileges without also imposing a durational limit that complies with the statutory scheme. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Robb, J., and Pyle, J., concur.