Slaughter, J.
We hold that the parties’ “rent-to-buy” agreement is not a land-sale contract but a rental agreement subject to Indiana’s residential landlord-tenant statutes. Plaintiffs, which own and manage the properties held in inventory, are “landlords” that violated the Statutes by delivering the disputed property in an uninhabitable condition. We affirm the trial court’s judgment for the tenants and against Plaintiffs on their claim under the Statutes. On the other counts, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
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We hold that the parties’ Agreement is subject to the protections afforded by the residential landlord-tenant statutes. Ind. Code art. 32-31 (2012). First, their Agreement—a purported rent-to-buy contract—is a residential lease and not a land-sale contract, so it is not exempt from the Statutes’ coverage on this basis. Second, the Agreement is a rental agreement for a “dwelling unit” under the Statutes, so Plaintiffs had to deliver the House in a safe, clean, and habitable condition—which they did not do.
1. Not a land-sale contract
We begin by considering Plaintiffs’ threshold argument that the Agreement qualifies as a “contract of sale” exempt from the Statutes…
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Although the Agreement describes the first twenty-four payments as “rent”, Plaintiffs say those were not payments for using the House but were “amortized payments of principal and interest which were credited toward the purchase price in the land sales contract.” Again, Plaintiffs point to the declaration, in which the Couple agreed, “I am not renting the property. All payments shall apply to the principal and interest shown on the amortization schedule provided at closing.” According to Plaintiffs, this financing condition relieved the Couple of having to make an immediate down payment, which they could not afford, and permitted them instead to substitute its equivalent payable over twenty-four months.
We agree with Plaintiffs that most of the transaction’s terms and formal structure suggest this was a sale—albeit unorthodox—necessitated by the Couple’s inability to afford a down payment for the House. But the transaction’s purported form and assigned label do not control its legal status. For at least the first two years, the Agreement was a residential lease with a contingent commitment to sell.
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2. “Rental agreement” for a “dwelling unit”
Having held the Agreement was not a “contract for sale”, we next consider whether it is subject to the residential landlord-tenant statutes. The Statutes apply to “dwelling units that are let for rent under a rental agreement”. I.C. § 32-31-8-1(a). Thus, the two issues here are (i) whether the House is a “dwelling unit” and (ii) whether the parties’ Agreement is a “rental agreement”. As discussed next, we hold that both statutory requirements are satisfied, thus subjecting the parties’ relationship to the residential landlord-tenant statutes, including the obligation to deliver the premises in a “safe, clean, and habitable condition.” Id. § 32-31-8-5(1).
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Based on our conclusions above, we hold that the Couple are tenants of a dwelling unit that is the subject of a rental agreement governed by the residential landlord-tenant statutes. Under these Statutes, Plaintiffs were required to deliver the House to the Couple in a habitable condition, id. § 32-31-8-5(1), which they did not do. The Statutes also render the Agreement’s purported waiver of their obligation as void. Id. § 32-31-8-4. Thus, the trial court was correct in finding that Plaintiffs breached the statutory warranty of habitability.
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If this case were simply about the parties’ freedom of contract, the Couple would have no legal recourse. Plaintiffs disclaimed the warranty of habitability, informed the Couple that the House required significant renovation, and forbade them from taking up residence there before it was habitable. The Couple agreed to these terms but soon thereafter violated them. Were it not for the governing Statutes, Plaintiffs would be entitled to relief against the Couple for having breached their Agreement. But the Statutes are not about vindicating parties’ freely bargained agreements. They are, rather, about protecting people from their own choices when the subject is residential property and their contract bears enough markers of a residential lease. Unless a statute is unconstitutional, the legislature is entitled to enact its policy choices. The disputed statutes at issue here reflect those choices.
B. Deceptive consumer sales act
Next, we address the Couple’s claim under Indiana’s Deceptive Consumer Sales Act. Ind. Code ch. 24-5-0.5 (2012). The trial court found for the Couple, concluding that Plaintiffs “intentionally deceiv[ed] the [Couple] as to the nature of the Purchase Agreement” by making “false or deceptive statements about the ability to disclaim the warranty of habitability and obligations associated with said warranty.” The court awarded the Couple $1,000 in compensatory damages and $3,000 in punitive damages. The court of appeals reversed the trial court on this claim, based on its determination that the Agreement was not a lease and thus wasn’t subject to the Statute, especially its warranty of habitability. 112 N.E.3d at 725. As discussed, we have vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and hold that the Agreement is subject to the residential landlord-tenant statutes. But that does not mean we are reinstating the trial court’s award for the Couple under the Act. We still find their claim to be without merit, and thus reverse the trial court on this claim, for three reasons.
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Conclusion
For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment for the Couple and against Plaintiffs under the residential landlord-tenant statutes. We reverse the judgment awarding relief to the Couple under the deceptive consumer sales act and remand with instructions to enter judgment for Plaintiffs. We affirm the trial court’s resolution of the remaining claims and counterclaims. And we remand with instructions to recalculate the Couple’s award of reasonable attorney’s fees, including appellate fees they may seek.
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Goff, JJ., concur.