Rush, C.J.
If police interrogate someone in custody without providing Miranda warnings, the person’s interrogated statements are generally inadmissible as evidence against that individual in a criminal trial.
Here, two police officers interrogated Ernesto Ruiz in a secured area at a police station, without providing him Miranda warnings. When the State tried to use statements Ruiz made during the interrogation as evidence against him in a criminal trial, he moved to suppress them as inadmissible. The trial court granted the motion.
The State appealed, arguing suppression was contrary to law because Ruiz—although interrogated—was not in custody. Finding substantial, probative evidence that he was in custody, we affirm the trial court’s decision.
Facts and Procedural History
In a small, windowless room in a secured area of the Seymour Police Department, two police officers tag-teamed an interrogation of Ernesto Ruiz, who had been accused of a crime. Neither officer gave him Miranda warnings, and multiple times the officers told Ruiz that he was to “sit tight” in the interrogation room.
Later, the State sought to use a video of the interrogation as evidence against Ruiz in a criminal trial. Ruiz moved to suppress it, arguing his statements in the video were inadmissible because they were made during custodial interrogation in the absence of Miranda warnings.
The trial court heard evidence on the matter: testimony from the two officers who interrogated Ruiz, and the audio–video recording of the interrogation. The court also heard arguments, which the court considered overnight along with relevant caselaw. The next day, the court heard more testimony and argument, and then granted Ruiz’s motion to suppress.
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The State claimed that it could not proceed without the evidence that had been suppressed. For this reason, and since a jury had already been empaneled, the court declared a mistrial.
The State appealed the suppression decision, see Ind. Code § 35-38-42(5) (2018), and a panel of the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding the interrogation was not custodial, State v. Ruiz, No. 36A01-1712-CR-2999, 2018 WL 3543561, at *5 (Ind. Ct. App. July 24, 2018).
Ruiz petitioned for transfer, which we now grant, vacating the Court of Appeals decision. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).
Standard of Review
The State brings this appeal under Indiana Code 35-38-4-2(5), which authorizes the State to appeal an order granting a motion to suppress if the order ultimately prevents further prosecution of at least one charged count. …
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Here, the trial court’s suppression decision was proper if Ruiz was under custodial interrogation, which triggers Miranda. Because the State admits that Ruiz was under interrogation, we focus our review on the trial court’s determination that Ruiz was in custody.
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Discussion and Decision
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The State acknowledges that Ruiz was under police interrogation but contends that he was not in custody. Custody under Miranda occurs when two criteria are met. First, the person’s freedom of movement is curtailed to “the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112 (2010) … And second, the person undergoes “the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012).
We hold that the State did not carry its burden here to show that the trial court’s ruling was contrary to law. The record includes substantial, probative evidence of circumstances that, taken altogether, met both criteria of Miranda custody.
I. The totality of objective circumstances surrounding the interrogation would make a reasonable person feel not free to end the questioning and leave.
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To start, the time and place of the interrogation were directed by Detective Greg O’Brien, who showed up at Ruiz’s home, informed Ruiz of the allegations against him, explained that he “needed to interview” Ruiz, and “asked him to come up to the police station.” Importantly, Detective O’Brien did not inform Ruiz that any other time or place would suffice for the interview. …
… Although he was not handcuffed or locked inside the interrogation room, Ruiz was physically and visually cabined to the small compartment with officers positioned near the single, shut door.
Inside the interrogation room, Ruiz was at first alone with Detective O’Brien, who began the questioning. But after about thirteen minutes, Detective Troy Munson entered, closed the door, and became the primary interrogator. At this time, and through the end of the interrogation, the police outnumbered Ruiz in the room two-to-one.
When Detective O’Brien started to question Ruiz, he told Ruiz—a single time—that he could walk out “that door.” But the trial court did not err in concluding that this statement was not enough to make a reasonable person feel free to leave, for three reasons.
First, the officers told Ruiz to “sit tight” multiple times, belying any prior indication that Ruiz was free to go.
Second, the circuitous path by which Detective O’Brien took Ruiz into the interrogation room drew a labyrinthine exit route with many obstructions to egress. One of the doors Detective O’Brien led Ruiz through required a key fob when heading toward the interrogation room. And nobody told Ruiz that it was unlocked going the opposite direction.
Finally, and most importantly, the police significantly undercut any initial message of freedom when they dramatically changed the interrogation atmosphere. Shortly after Detective O’Brien began the interview, a second officer—whom Ruiz had not yet met—entered the interview room; shut the door; and took over as the main, and more aggressive, interrogator. In this way, the police completely recast the interrogation, subverting the force and applicability of Detective O’Brien’s earlier walk-out-that-door statement. And at no point did either officer say anything to preserve that statement’s validity.
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As custody turns on the totality of the circumstances, the conditions bearing on the curtailment-of-movement inquiry also factor into the second custody inquiry: whether the person was subjected to coercive pressures that necessitate Miranda safeguards.
II. The station-house interrogation included the coercive pressures that drove Miranda.
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The State devotes little attention to this specific custody inquiry. But it does argue that Ruiz “was never coerced to cooperate in exchange for freedom.” We disagree, as the record includes substantial, probative evidence to the contrary. And overall, the station-house questioning here both resembles the Miranda paradigm and exhibits the coercive pressures that Miranda targeted.
The interrogation here was not brief roadside questioning, see Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439, or interrogation in the “low atmospheric pressure” of a suspect’s typical surroundings, Ellison, 632 F.3d at 730. Rather, it took place at the station house in an isolated room—removed from Ruiz’s friends, family, and familiar environment, and with multiple officers employing various interrogation tactics for almost an hour, trying to convince their suspect to incriminate himself.
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These types of coercive pressures, applied in a station-house interrogation, are precisely what induced Miranda’s warning requirements. So, the second custody criterion, like the first, was met.
Conclusion
The Fifth Amendment secures a suspect’s right against self-incrimination. And to protect this right from the inherently compelling pressures of custodial interrogation, Miranda requires police to provide certain safeguards. Here, the police did not provide those safeguards to Ruiz before interrogating him at the station house.
Because the totality of objective circumstances evidenced on this record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the interrogation was custodial, we affirm the suppression of Ruiz’s statements.
Justices David and Goff concur.
Justice Massa concurs in result.
Justice Slaughter dissents, believing transfer should be denied.