Slaughter, J.
In Estate of Hammar, 847 N.E.2d 960 (Ind. 2006), we held that a trial court may reconsider its appointment of a special administrator for a decedent’s estate without implicating the statutory requirements for formally removing an administrator. Applying Hammar, we affirm the trial court’s exercise of discretion here to reconsider its initial appointment of the decedent’s father as special administrator. Though not required by statute or trial rule, courts should nevertheless give notice and hold a hearing before appointing a special administrator or rescinding such an appointment.
….
A special administrator appointed to bring a wrongful-death lawsuit acts as trustee for the suit’s statutory beneficiaries—here, Junior’s minor children, J.T. and K.L. The issue here is not whether the trial court was entitled to appoint Senior as a special administrator under Indiana Code section 29-1-10-15. Everyone agrees it was. The issue, instead, is whether the court was entitled to rescind its appointment of Senior without triggering the removal provision in the same chapter, I.C. § 29-1-10-6. Senior claims he was duly appointed under Section 15, and that the trial court abused its discretion when it removed him without complying with Section 6.
On the merits, we hold, first, that the trial court could reconsider its appointment of Senior because the matter was still pending; second, that the court did not abuse its discretion in rescinding Senior’s appointment; and, third, that a court should give notice and hold a hearing before appointing a special administrator or reconsidering such an appointment, even if the governing statute and trial rule do not require these things.
A. The trial court could reconsider its prior appointment of Senior because the underlying matter was still pending.
In rescinding Senior’s appointment, the trial court did not invoke the removal statute but relied, instead, on its inherent power to reconsider a prior ruling. As we held in Pond v. Pond, 700 N.E.2d 1130 (Ind. 1998), “A trial court may reconsider an order or ruling if the action remains in fieri, or pending resolution.” Id. at 1135. An action is in fieri—i.e., still pending— until the court enters judgment. Id. In Hammar, we observed that a court’s authority to reconsider a prior ruling “is firmly established in common law”. 847 N.E.2d at 962. And we extended this general rule to affirm a court’s reconsideration of its prior appointment of a special administrator. Id. Senior acknowledges Hammar, but contends its holding does not govern here. We disagree.
….
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in reconsidering its appointment of Senior.
As we held in Hammar, a trial court has power to rescind its appointment of a special administrator. And we hold on this record that the court’s exercise of that power to rescind its appointment of Senior was not an abuse of discretion. Under Hammar, a petition to reconsider appointment of a special administrator does not render the removal statute meaningless. Such petition merely provides the trial court with an equitable basis for revisiting what here was an ex parte, without-notice initial appointment of Senior as special administrator. That is particularly true when the special administrator is responsible for pursuing what is potentially a multimillion-dollar claim.
….
The court also found it “compelling” that Toliver and Calloway should serve as co-special administrators for the benefit of their respective wards to ensure the children’s interests are well-represented. After all, the beneficiaries of the wrongful-death claim are not Junior’s parents but his surviving children. The court thus gave higher priority to the rights of these children’s parents or guardians than to their grandparents. And it defended that determination by finding that neither grandparent was particularly close to either grandchild before the accident. The court concluded that although “diligence and promptness are virtues”, the best interests of Junior’s surviving children should not be determined solely by who files first. We hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in rescinding its appointment of Senior and vacating his letters of administration.
C. Though not required by statute or rule, an appointing or rescinding court should notify interested parties and hold a hearing.
Senior’s race to the courthouse just days after the accident deprived other interested parties of the opportunity to seek their own appointment. One source of this problem is that the governing statute requires no notice to beneficiaries or other interested parties before the court appoints a special administrator. I.C. § 29-1-10-15. Compounding this problem is that the statute affords no right of appeal to someone aggrieved by the court’s appointment. Id. Although the statute does not require it, to avoid potential due-process problems, a court faced with a motion for appointment as a special administrator should afford notice to beneficiaries or their legal representatives and hold a hearing. The motion should identify each potential beneficiary or legal representative likely to be interested in the appointment of a special administrator, along with each person’s contact information. The court should then notify such persons of the motion and the date, time, and place for hearing on the motion. The hearing is to determine whether the movant would be a suitable special administrator and to permit other interested persons the opportunity to object or to file their own requests for appointment. If the motion does not identify a potential beneficiary or legal representative, it is more likely the trial court will have abused its discretion if it later refuses to rescind its appointment should that person, unnamed and unidentified in the initial motion, later come forward and assert an interest in the appointment. Though not required by Trial Rule 53.4, the trial court should promptly (within five days) schedule a hearing and provide notice when someone moves to reconsider the appointment of a special administrator.
Conclusion
For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order reconsidering its appointment of Senior as special administrator.
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Goff, JJ., concur.