May, J.
Clint Fields appeals the trial court’s vacation of a default judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(8). [Footnote omitted.] As the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the equitable relief provided in Trial Rule 60(B)(8), we affirm.
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Fields appeals the trial court’s grant of Safway’s motion to set aside default judgment pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B)(8). Fields alleges that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Safway relief from default judgment without requiring Safway to present evidence of exceptional circumstances to justify that relief and that the trial court granted relief “based solely upon factually unsupported equitable considerations[.]” (Br. of Appellant at 8.)
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Fields seems to be operating on the notion that Safway was required to present evidence of timely filing, a meritorious defense, exceptional circumstances, and equitable considerations. Further, Fields argues the trial court comingled the “exceptional circumstances” and the “equitable considerations” and therefore, misapplied the law. We disagree, because the equitable considerations can constitute the exceptional circumstances presented to the trial court.
Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(8) allows a trial court to grant relief from judgment for “any reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment, other than those reasons set forth in sub-paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4).” The motion for relief must be filed within a reasonable time and the movant must present a meritorious defense. Ind. Trial Rule 60(B).
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Fields argues the trial court misinterpreted the law and went against the logic and effect of the facts when it characterized Safway’s inexcusable neglect as “plausible and understandable[.]” (Appellant’s Br. at 19 (quoting Appealed Order at 4).)
The trial court found it “accept[ed] as true for purposes of the Motion to Set Aside the facts as alleged by Safway concerning Safway’s actions after receiving the Complaint and Summons.” [Footnote omitted.] (Appealed Order at 3.) There was more to Safway’s actions than merely the fact that its employees had not followed the correct procedure. This complaint had to traverse through three entities: Safway, Barton Marlow and Sedgwick. We cannot disagree with the trial court’s reasonable inference that, while the actions of Safway employees are not excusable, the situation created here was exceptional and thus, “plausible and understandable.” (Id.); see Huntington, 39 N.E.3d at 658 (proper for trial court to consider “‘excusable reason’ for untimely responding” as an equitable reason for relief).
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Safway filed its motion to set aside default judgment one month after the court granted the default judgment. Fields argues that while “mired in discovery involving Safway’s effort to set aside the default judgment, witnesses’ recollections and physical evidence grew older, and [Fields’] ability to uncover the facts necessary to prove his allegations against Safway grew more remote.” (Br. of Appellant at 23.) Fields’ argument that he was “mired in discovery[,]” (id.), such that he is now prejudiced is without merit.
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The trial court accepted Safway’s alleged facts regarding Safway’s actions after receiving the complaint. Therefore, we know that within five days of receipt of the complaint, Safway had reviewed it and sent it to the general contractor for insurance coverage and the general contractor had sent it on to Sedgwick to handle. While the trial court concluded Safway’s actions constituted neglect that was inexcusable, it also found those actions were “plausible and understandable [and t]here was no intentional ignoring of the lawsuit[.]” (Appealed Order at 4.) Based on that finding, the trial court concluded Safway had not acted in bad faith.
Fields argues Safway did not respond with appropriate promptness. Fields contends “promptness is determined by reasonableness, and is closely tied with the size and sophistication of the moving party.” (Appellant’s Br. at 24.) However, the Court’s analysis in Huntington regarding promptness is located in the analysis pertaining to Trial Rule 60(B)(1). That analysis provides that to justify an untimely response, the movant can show a breakdown of communication between agents of the party, i.e., the insurer and the insured, but not merely inattentiveness of the party itself. However, once the Court moves to Trial Rule 60(B)(8), it again lists “quick action” as a factor to be weighed when considereding equitable reasons. Huntington, 39 N.E.3d at 658. This has nothing to do with a party’s neglect that resulted in the default judgment; rather, it has to do with the speed of action once the default judgment was entered.
The trial court found: Fields was injured on February 10, 2017; Fields filed a complaint on March 28, 2017; Fields filed a Motion for Default Judgment on April 25, 2017; the trial court granted Fields’ motion the following day; and Safway filed a Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment on May 26, 2017. The trial court found Safway had taken “prompt action to address the situation.” (Appealed Order at 4.) Fields’ invitation to consider one month as not prompt enough is an impermissible request to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See Prime Mort. USA, Inc., 885 N.E.2d at 656 (appellate court may not reweigh evidence when trial court makes findings of fact).
Conclusion
As we determine the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Safway’s Motion for Relief from Judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(8), we affirm the trial court’s order to vacate the partial default judgment herein.
Affirmed. Riley, J., concurs. Mathias, J., dissents with separate opinion.
Mathias, Judge, dissenting.
I agree with the trial court that Safway did not establish mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect sufficient to justify relief, under Trial Rule 60(B)(1), from the default judgment entered in favor of Fields. I part ways with the trial court, and the majority, however, to the extent that they conclude that Safway was entitled to relief under Rule 60(B)(8).
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Here, the trial court found that Safway’s failure to respond to the complaint was negligent. It further found that Safway’s negligence was not excusable for purposes of relief under Rule 60(B)(1). But this does not mean that an inexcusably negligent movant such as Safeway may then gain relief under Rule 60(B)(8). To the contrary, it means that they may not be afforded relief at all. Indeed, if a party’s neglect does not constitute excusable neglect under Rule 60(B)(1), it would make no sense to nevertheless afford that party relief under Rule 60(B)(8). Otherwise, a party could do an end run around Rule 60(B)(1), opening up the possibility of a parade of cases bypassing the intent of the rule to permit relief only for excusable neglect.
Under circumstances where the moving party was negligent, Rule 60(B)(1) should be the exclusive remedy. If that party’s negligence was inexcusable, they should not be afforded relief under Rule 60(B)(8). Because the majority concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent.