Opinion by Justice Slaughter
Chief Justice Rush and Justices David, Massa, and Goff concur.
We held in Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394 (Ind. 1996), that an adult criminal defendant cannot challenge the validity of his guilty plea on direct appeal. He must, instead, pursue post-conviction relief and raise in that proceeding any claims of error concerning his plea.
At issue here is whether to extend Tumulty to the juvenile-law counterpart to a criminal plea—namely, an agreed delinquency adjudication. We hold that juveniles cannot immediately challenge on direct appeal any errors concerning their agreed adjudication. But because juveniles are not eligible for post-conviction relief, before pursuing their constitutional right to appeal, they must first assert any claims of error concerning their agreed judgment in a request for post-judgment relief filed with the juvenile court. Juveniles who seek that relief in post-judgment proceedings have a statutory right to counsel under Indiana Code article 31-32.
J.W., a juvenile, has a significant history with the juvenile-justice system dating to his early teens. …
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Both the police and probation officers testified at J.W.’s detention hearing in July 2017. The probation officer recommended that J.W. remain in secure detention, based on his failure to benefit from less restrictive services. The court adopted the recommendation and continued J.W.’s placement in secure detention. The following day, the court issued an order finding probable cause that J.W. was delinquent and that detention was “essential to protect the child or the community”.
In August 2017, the court held an initial hearing that J.W., his counsel, and his mother attended. Counsel advised that the State and J.W. had agreed to settle the case and represented that J.W. would admit to Count 1, class B misdemeanor false informing if committed by an adult,… in exchange for the State’s dismissing Count 2, leaving home without the permission of a parent, guardian, or custodian… Counsel also advised that J.W. would waive a pre-dispositional report and would accept placement in the Department of Correction.
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Despite the parties’ consent judgment, entered in accordance with their settlement, J.W. appealed, arguing that his agreed delinquency judgment should be set aside for four reasons. First, he said, the court did not provide him with the statutory advisement of rights required by Indiana Code section 31-37-12-5; did not determine whether he had knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights; and did not provide him and his parents with the required opportunity to be heard during the proceedings. Second, the facts he admitted to during his colloquy do not constitute an offense. Third, the trial court abused its discretion in committing him to the Department of Correction without determining that he knowingly and intentionally entered into the agreed judgment and without providing him with an opportunity to be heard. Fourth, his counsel was ineffective for all the reasons outlined in the first three arguments.
Following its own precedent, the court of appeals dismissed J.W.’s appeal, concluding that “the appropriate remedy for relief that a juvenile defendant must seek is through the filing of a Trial Rule 60 motion”. J.W. v. State, No. 33A04-1708-JV-1934, 2017 WL 6273184, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2017) (quoting favorably from J.H. v. State, 809 N.E.2d 456, 458 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied). And the court remanded the case to the trial court to allow J.W. to file a motion for relief from the judgment adjudicating him a delinquent.
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Indiana’s judicial policy strongly favors agreements to settle litigation disputes. Georgos v. Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448, 453 (Ind. 2003). Our judicial system counts on such settlements to occur in the lion’s share of both civil and criminal cases. Otherwise, with more than a million cases filed in our trial courts each year, the system would grind to a halt.
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In criminal cases, the same principles apply to encourage parties to enter into—and for courts to enforce violations of—plea agreements. A plea agreement is a contract, and its terms are binding on the defendant, the State, and the trial court. Pannarale v. State, 638 N.E.2d 1247, 1248 (Ind. 1994). See also I.C. § 35-35-3-3(e). Choices have consequences. And as we held in Tumulty, one consequence of a defendant’s choice to plead guilty and allow judgment to be entered against him is that he is foreclosed from challenging his conviction on direct appeal. … Tumulty, 666 N.E.2d at 396.
What we have said about agreed dispositions in the civil and criminal sphere is no less true of such dispositions in juvenile cases—which are, after all, civil proceedings. Bible v. State, 253 Ind. 373, 381, 254 N.E.2d 319, 322 (1970). … As with other consent judgments, an agreed delinquency judgment limits the juvenile’s ability to challenge the agreed judgment on direct appeal. As discussed next, the juvenile must instead pursue another avenue for obtaining relief—one that begins in the trial court.
We encourage settlements for all the reasons stated. But if an agreement is legally problematic, the aggrieved party will have recourse to challenge its validity and enforceability. The issue is not whether legal recourse exists but what procedure the litigant must pursue to obtain relief.
Challenging a consent judgment often requires the aggrieved party to develop a factual record that he did not enter into the agreement freely and with informed consent. … Thus, once a trial court enters a consent judgment, the party attacking it must typically initiate further proceedings in the trial court to establish a factual basis for its alleged invalidity.
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As mentioned, juveniles must have a suitable procedural vehicle for challenging an allegedly unlawful adjudication agreement, and that includes developing an adequate factual record to support their claims. Post-conviction proceedings will not suffice because they apply only to adult criminal convictions. Jordan v. State, 512 N.E.2d 407, 408 (1987). We hold that Trial Rule 60 is an appropriate avenue through which a juvenile must raise any and all claims premised on the illegality of an agreed delinquency adjudication. Under Rule 60, “the court shall hear any pertinent evidence, allow new parties to be served with summons, allow discovery, [and] grant relief”. Ind. Trial Rule 60(D). And after the trial court has ruled, a party aggrieved by the post-judgment ruling can then appeal. T.R. 60(C).
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… Moreover, in the interest of judicial economy, if a juvenile’s direct appeal includes any claim subject to our extended Tumulty rule, the entire appeal shall be dismissed without prejudice so the so-called “Tumulty claims” can receive a full airing in the juvenile court. Only after the juvenile court has resolved the Tumulty claims in a post-judgment proceeding can the juvenile proceed on appeal with all his claims.
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Finally, a juvenile who challenges the validity of his consent judgment through a post-judgment motion is entitled to legal representation. Our legislature has codified the right to counsel in juvenile proceedings when a child is charged with a delinquent act, I.C. §§ 31-32-2-2(1), 31-32-4-1(1), and “in any other proceeding” at the court’s discretion, id. § 31-32-4-2(b). We hold that the statutory right to counsel extends to the Tumulty-type post-judgment proceedings contemplated here under Trial Rule 60(B), in which a juvenile asserts one or more claims premised on the allegation that his consent judgment was obtained unlawfully.
For these reasons, we grant transfer and hold that before J.W. may pursue an appeal, he must first seek relief from the trial court under Trial Rule 60(B). …