Rush, C.J.
Indiana—The Crossroads of America—is a railroad capital. Statewide, dozens of railroad companies run trains on more than four thousand miles of track. [Footnote omitted.] Roads intersect those tracks, creating 5,693 public railroad– highway grade crossings. That’s one for every seventeen public-roadway miles—the highest concentration in the country. [Footnote omitted.]
To aid public travel, the State bars railroads from blocking those crossings for more than ten minutes, except in situations outside the railroads’ control. Violations carry minimum $200 fines. After 23 citations, Norfolk Southern challenged the State’s regulation as preempted by federal law. This issue of first impression in Indiana raises two questions. Does the standard presumption against preemption apply in the railroad-crossing context? And to what extent has Congress kept the tracks clear from state regulation of rail transportation?
We hold that while the longstanding presumption against preemption applies here, Indiana’s blocked-crossing statute is a remedy that directly regulates rail transportation and is thus expressly preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act.
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We disagree with Norfolk Southern and find at the outset that the presumption applies, given the State’s legitimate interest in protecting the public use of grade crossings. With that presumption on board, we then address the ICCTA’s express preemption provision. We conclude that because Indiana’s blocked-crossing statute provides a remedy that regulates rail transportation, the ICCTA expressly preempts it.
I. Federalism dictates that the presumption against preemption applies to the blocked-crossing statute.
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To start, we agree with Norfolk Southern that Congress comprehensively regulated the railroad industry dating back to the late nineteenth century. See United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 687 (1982). But even then, regulating railroad crossings for the public welfare remained “one of the most obvious cases of the [states’] police power.” Erie R.R. v. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm’rs, 254 U.S. 394, 410 (1921).
Indiana has exercised that police power for over 150 years….
Norfolk Southern responds that even if the blocked-crossing statute has protected the public interest for a long time, it remains a direct regulation of railroad operations. This is a fair point—and one that headlines our preemption analysis below—but it does not undermine the presumption against preemption.
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Thus, under Easterwood, “[o]ur analysis begins with a presumption against preemption,” Kennedy Tank, 67 N.E.3d at 1028.
II. The ICCTA, by its plain language, preempts Indiana’s blocked-crossing statute.
When Congress used the ICCTA to largely deregulate the rail industry, it included an express preemption provision to limit state involvement. That provision preempts state remedies that manage or govern rail transportation. We find that Indiana’s blocked-crossing statute is such a remedy for two reasons. First, because its effects substantially interfere with railroad operations. And second, because ICCTA preemption is not limited to explicitly economic regulations.
A. The ICCTA’s history informs its express preemption provision.
Over time, significant shifts have transformed federal regulatory control over interstate commerce. These changes provide essential context for the ICCTA’s express preemption provision.
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B. The ICCTA broadly preempts state statutes that manage or govern rail transportation but leaves routine crossing matters to the states.
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C. The ICCTA expressly preempts Indiana’s blocked-crossing statute.
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1. Indiana’s blocked-crossing statute regulates railroads
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In sum, as the en banc Fifth Circuit recognized, “[r]egulating the time a train can occupy a rail crossing impacts, in such areas as train speed, length and scheduling, the way a railroad operates its trains.” Franks, 593 F.3d at 411 (quoting Friberg v. Kan. City S. Ry., 267 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 2001)). So “mandat[ing] when trains can use tracks and stop on them is attempting to manage or govern rail transportation in a direct way.” Id.
Since the statute regulates rail transportation, we turn to the State’s next argument—that the ICCTA preempts only economic regulations.
2. ICCTA preemption is not limited to explicitly economic regulations.
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So since Indiana’s blocked-crossing statute is a remedy that directly regulates rail operations, the ICCTA categorically preempts it. See Wedemeyer v. CSX Transp., Inc., 850 F.3d 889, 894–95 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Categorical preemption occurs when a state . . . action is preempted on its face,” including when states “deny a railroad the ability to conduct some part of its operations.”). [Footnote omitted.] This holding mirrors those of several other jurisdictions addressing blocked-crossing preemption under the ICCTA…
Despite preemption, the State may have federal recourse for blocked crossings. The STB’s Rail Customer and Public Assistance Program “solves problems in ways ranging from a simple answer to a telephone inquiry to lengthy informal mediation efforts.” [Footnote omitted.] In 2017, that program addressed 32 issues related to railroad blocked crossings. [Footnote omitted.] The STB has also addressed ongoing blocked-crossing disputes with formal decisions.
Since the ICCTA preempts the blocked-crossing statute, it is the end of the line—we need not address preemption under the FRSA. The trial court is affirmed.
Conclusion
While the presumption against preemption applies in this railroad-crossing context, the ICCTA’s preemption provision unambiguously preempts Indiana’s blocked-crossing statute. We thus affirm summary judgment for Norfolk Southern.
David, Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.