Mathias, J.
Orlando Lewis, Sr. (“Lewis, Sr.”) appeals the Johnson Superior Court’s order rescinding his appointment as the special administrator for the estate of his son Orlando Lewis, Jr. (“the Estate”).
We affirm.
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Lewis, Sr. contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it rescinded its appointment of him as special administrator of the Estate. Specifically, Lewis, Sr. maintains that he was appropriately appointed as the special administrator of the Estate under Indiana Code section 29-1-10-15, and thus the trial court abused its discretion when it removed him without complying with Indiana Code section 29-1-10-6 (the “Removal Statute”). Calloway argues that because the Removal Statute was not involved in the court’s decision, the trial court acted within its discretion when it reconsidered and rescinded its order appointing Lewis, Sr. as special administrator. [Footnote omitted.] Therefore, Calloway maintains that the trial court did not err when it named her and Toliver as the special co-personal representatives of the Estate. Under the particular facts and circumstances presented here, we agree with Calloway.
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Here, neither party argues that Lewis, Sr. was not properly appointed as special administrator under section 29-1-10-15. Rather, Lewis, Sr.’s primary argument is that the trial court had no basis to remove him as special administrator under the Removal Statute, which provides in relevant part …[Footnote 6: Notably, because Lewis, Sr. lives in Illinois, he would not have qualified to serve as a general administrator over the Estate in his individual capacity. See Ind. Code § 29-1-10-1(c). And under the Removal Statute, an individual can be removed as a personal representative of an estate if he “has ceased to be domiciled in Indiana[.]” I.C. § 29-1-10-6(b). However, there is no such residence restriction under the statute governing the appointment of special administrators, see I.C. § 29-10-10-15, and thus, although Lewis, Sr. lives out of state and cannot serve as a general administrator of an Indiana estate in his individual capacity, the legislature has deemed it appropriate that he has the ability to serve as a special administrator of an Indiana estate—a determination that is within its province. As this case shows, it may be well for the legislature to consider the concept of the best person to represent the interests of all beneficiaries in a special administration after notice to those beneficiaries or their representatives.]
Because of this statutory language, a panel of this court explained in Sandefur that “once the trial court has made an appointment of a special administrator, it may not remove the administrator without a finding that the special administrator meets one of the statutory criteria for removal.” 685 N.E.2d at 722. However, the trial court here did not utilize the Removal Statute, but instead it reconsidered its appointment of Lewis, Sr. as special administrator of the estate… We have similarly noted that trial courts have the inherent power to reconsider its appointment of special administrators. Brenton v. Lutz, 993 N.E.2d 235, 239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. And as stated above, we will consider the trial court’s decision here to reconsider its appointment of Lewis, Sr. as special administrator for an abuse of discretion. Hammar, 847 N.E.2d at 962.
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Incredibly, the special administrator statute requires no notice to beneficiaries prior to appointment of a special administrator, and neither petitioner, Lewis, Sr. in Johnson County, nor Toliver in Marion County gave such notice. And just as incredibly, after an appointment of a special administrator without notice, “[t]he appointment of a special administrator shall not be appealable.” I.C. § 29-1-10-15. Any conflict between Sandefur and Hammer is caused by this untenable procedure. Notice prior to appointment of a special administrator is required as a matter of equity in order to properly and fully inform the trial court prior to appointment, and it should also be required as a matter of law. [Footnote 7: We respectfully request that the General Assembly reconsider the language of Indiana Code section 29-1- 10-15 and create a special administrator appointment process that requires notice to beneficiaries or their representatives prior to appointment and that provides standards for the appointment of a special administrator by the trial court.]
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Therefore, based on the facts and circumstances before us, we view the trial court’s action rescinding Lewis, Sr. as special administrator of the Estate as a mere reconsideration of its prior ruling, and not a removal of a special administrator requiring application of the Removal Statute. And because of the trial court’s inherent power to reconsider its appointment of a special administrator, we conclude that it did not abuse its discretion when it revised its appointment of Lewis, Sr. to Toliver and Calloway as special co-personal representatives.
Conclusion
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by reconsidering its appointment of Lewis, Sr. when important new facts came to its attention, and we affirm its order replacing Lewis, Sr. with Toliver and Calloway as special co-personal representatives for the wrongful death action on behalf of the Estate.
Riley, J., and May, J., concur.