Rush, CJ.
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The vital mission of educating our youth requires schools to daily provide safety, security, and student discipline. In recent decades, schools have turned to resource officers for help. … Today we address for the first time one of those questions: when are students entitled to Miranda warnings at school?
Here, in response to a bomb threat on a bathroom wall, thirteen-year old B.A. was escorted from his bus and questioned in a vice-principal’s office. Officers hovered over B.A. and encouraged him to confess, but no one gave him Miranda warnings.
We hold that B.A. was in police custody and under police interrogation, so he should have been Mirandized. We therefore reverse his delinquency adjudications.
Scribbled in pink marker in a Decatur Middle School boys’ bathroom came the threat: “I will Got A bomb in the school Monday 8th 2016 not A Joke.” School Resource Officer Tutsie “immediately went into investigative mode” and soon narrowed the suspects to two students— including thirteen-year-old B.A.
The next Monday, February 8, 2016, school resource officers and administrators walked through the school and found it safe. Then, when B.A.’s bus arrived, Vice-Principal Remaly and School Resource Officer Lyday removed B.A. from his bus and escorted him to Remaly’s office.
B.A. sat in front of Remaly’s desk while Officer Lyday stood a few feet away. Early in B.A.’s interview, Officer Tutsie came in and took Officer Lyday’s spot while Officer Lyday moved to sit at a conference table behind B.A. Around that same time, a third school resource officer — Officer Wheeler—came in and sat at the conference table. All three officers wore police uniforms.
Vice-Principal Remaly led the interview, asking if B.A. knew why he was there. B.A. maintained that he did not. To see if B.A.’s handwriting matched the bomb threat, Officer Tutsie handed B.A. written sentences and told B.A. how to copy them.
After B.A. copied the sentences, Remaly decided that the handwriting sample matched the threat and asked B.A. why he did it. Then Officer Lyday interrupted to say, “Come on, man, just—just tell the truth.” B.A. started crying, lowered his head, and said “I don’t know. I’m sorry.” Remaly then ended the interview—which had lasted fifteen minutes—and called B.A.’s mother. When she arrived and asked B.A. what happened, he told her, “I’m sorry mom, it was a joke” and admitted that it was a dumb thing to do.
With these admissions, Remaly suspended B.A. from school, pending expulsion. He then turned B.A. over to the school resource officers, who arrested him and took him to the Marion County Juvenile Detention Center.
The State alleged that B.A. was delinquent for committing false reporting, a Level 6 felony if committed by an adult, and institutional criminal mischief, a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult. B.A. moved to suppress the evidence from his interview, arguing that he was entitled to Miranda warnings since he was under custodial interrogation and that officers failed to secure waiver of his Miranda rights under Indiana’s juvenile waiver statute. See Ind. Code § 31-32-5-1 (2017). After a hearing, the juvenile court denied the motion and found B.A. delinquent on both counts.
B.A. appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. B.A. v. State, 73 N.E.3d 720, 730 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). It held that Miranda warnings were not required because a school administrator questioned B.A. for an educational purpose. Id. We granted transfer, vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).
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The parties agree that Miranda warnings protect students at school but disagree whether B.A. was entitled to the warnings. The critical inquiry is whether he was under custodial interrogation. B.A. argues that he was in custody under the totality of the circumstances and that he was interrogated because police officers participated in his interview. The State responds that the officers’ presence was noncoercive and that they did not directly question B.A.
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Courts have understandably grappled with the custodial interrogation test in schools. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court applied J.D.B. and held that a seventh-grader was not entitled to Miranda warnings at school because he was not in custody. People v. N.A.S., 329 P.3d 285, 290 (Colo. 2014). …
These cases also show that there is no “educational purpose” exception to Miranda like the one our Court of Appeals applied. B.A., 73 N.E.3d at 730. Instead, “confessions of juveniles require special caution.” In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 (1967). Rather than using special caution, that exception would swallow the Miranda rule, leaving less protection for students than for other suspects.
Also in keeping with special protections for juveniles, our legislature has crafted Indiana’s juvenile waiver statute. See I.C. § 31-32-5-1. When Miranda applies to minor students, this statute does too. It allows an unemancipated juvenile to waive Miranda rights only through counsel or a custodial parent, guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem. Id. If the statute is not followed, the State cannot use any statements as evidence. D.M. v. State, 949 N.E.2d 327, 333–34 (Ind. 2011).
This background leads to two points worth emphasizing. First, Miranda’s key exception—for public safety—will of course apply in schools in cases of imminent danger. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984); Bailey v. State, 763 N.E.2d 998, 1001–02 (Ind. 2002). …
And second, none of this is to say that schools and their resource officers must avoid placing students under custodial interrogation. Students sometimes commit crimes that school resource officers will have to investigate, often by interviewing suspects. This proper role of resource officers may place students in custody. When it does, officers must give Miranda warnings and follow Indiana’s juvenile waiver statute before asking questions. See S.G. v. State, 956 N.E.2d 668, 675 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied; I.C. § 31-32-5-1.
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Since B.A. was under custodial interrogation but was not Mirandized, his statements should have been suppressed under both Miranda and Indiana’s juvenile waiver statute. The trial court thus abused its discretion in admitting the statements. We accordingly reverse his delinquency adjudications and remand this case to the juvenile court.
David, Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.