Mathias, J.
On July 12, 2017, the State filed a complaint for removal from office against Yorktown clerk-treasurer Beth A. Neff (“Neff”) for neglecting to perform several of her official statutory duties. Neff filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the Delaware Circuit Court denied. After a summary evidentiary proceeding, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered judgment in Neff’s favor and against removal from office.
The State appeals the entry of judgment on the merits in favor of Neff. We reverse and remand. Neff also cross-appeals the trial court’s decision to deny her motion to dismiss, and on this issue, we affirm.
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Article VI Sections 7 and 8 of the Indiana Constitution provide the mechanism and standards by which an officer of the State can be impeached. Section 7 states:
All State officers shall, for crime, incapacity, or negligence, be liable to be removed from office, either by impeachment by the House of Representatives, to be tried by the Senate, or by a joint resolution of the General Assembly; two-thirds of the members elected to each branch voting, in either case, therefor.
And Section 8 provides that “[a]ll State, county, township, and town officers, may be impeached, or removed from office, in such manner as may be prescribed by law.” Our supreme court has explained that both sections should be construed together. McComas v. Krug, 81 Ind. 327, 333 (1882).
In accordance with both constitutional provisions, our legislature enacted Indiana Code section 5-8-1-35 (the “Removal Statute”) which provides that an elected official can be removed for “refusing or neglecting to perform the official duties pertaining to the officer’s office.” Id. at (a)(2). The State sought Neff’s removal under this statute.
The duties of a clerk-treasurer are delineated in Indiana Code section 36-5-6- 6(a) which explains that a clerk-treasurer shall do the following…
The parties do not disagree that Neff failed to perform statutory duties required by her office. Rather, the parties disagree as to the level of negligence in failing to fulfill those duties necessary to remove a clerk-treasurer from office. The State argues that “nonfeasance is not a failure to complete all duties all the time, but that the total failure or neglect of a required duty may suffice.” Appellant’s Br. at 15. And Neff contends that “removal must be for a failure to perform all of the duties, not for the failure to perform a specific duty or even group of duties.” Appellee’s Br. at 14–15. Both parties cite to the same two cases to support their respective positions.
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Although we recognize several alleged errors committed by Neff during her time as clerk-treasurer, specifically from 2011–2015, we focus on the allegations in Count I of the State’s complaint which alleged that Neff had “failed to reconcile at least monthly the balance of public funds,” Appellant’s App. p. 25, for a period of forty-eight consecutive months. [Footnote omitted.] Indiana Code section 36-5-6- 6(12) requires a clerk-treasurer to “[p]erform all other duties prescribed by statute.” And one of those statutory duties is to “reconcile at least monthly the balance of public funds, as disclosed by the records of the local officers, with the balance statements provided by the respective depositories.” Ind. Code § 5-13-6- 1(e). Moreover, section 2-7 of the Manual states that “[t]he record balance at the end of every month shall be reconciled with the bank balance.” Ex. Vol., State’s Ex. 11.
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Unlike the councilmen in McRoberts or the trustee in Ayer, Neff’s failure to reconcile the Town’s books was not an isolated incident explainable as a discretionary function, but rather represented a total omission to perform a required statutory duty for forty-eight straight months. See McRoberts, 192 N.E. at 430. Moreover, distinguished from McRoberts, Neff did not have any potential legitimate reason for neglecting to properly reconcile the Town’s financial records on a monthly basis. And distinguished from Ayer, Neff did not have the discretion not to reconcile the Town’s financial records with or without reason. Thus, we reject Neff’s reading of McRoberts and Ayer and hold that an officeholder like Neff need not abandon each and every statutory duty before removal from office may be warranted.
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While Neff’s actions may not rise to the level of the hypothetical provided by the McRoberts court “where a sheriff closes his office and remains away and refuses and neglects to discharge the duties thereof,” 192 N.E. at 430, she neglected to perform a critical, official, and mandatory duty of her office for an extended period of time. Therefore, we hold that Neff’s failure, over a period of years, to perform a critical, official and mandatory duty for a clerk-treasurer falls squarely within the confines of Article VI Sections 7 and 8 of the Indiana Constitution and our legislature’s response via the Removal Statute.
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Conclusion
The Removal Statute does not require a town’s clerk-treasurer to refuse or neglect to perform each and every official duty before removal from office is warranted. And based on the facts and circumstances before us, because Neff neglected to properly reconcile the Town’s financial records for forty-eight consecutive months, the trial court erred when it determined that her removal was not warranted under the Constitution of Indiana and the Removal Statute. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s decision not to remove Neff from office, and we remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. On Neff’s cross-appeal, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny Neff’s motion to dismiss.
Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.
Riley, J., and May, J., concur.