Barnes, J.
Case Summary
Angela Brewer, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Rickey Brewer, appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of PACCAR, Inc., d/b/a Peterbilt Motors Company (“PACCAR”). She also appeals the denial of her motion for partial summary judgment. We reverse and remand.
Issue
The primary issue before us is whether, as a matter of law, PACCAR cannot be held liable for providing parts of a semi-tractor that lacked allegedly necessary safety features, where the semi-tractor ultimately was assembled by another company and the semi-tractor caused Rickey’s death.
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However, Angela does not claim the glider kit was manufactured in a defective way—i.e., it was constructed exactly as it was designed and intended to be constructed. Rather, Angela’s claim is that the glider kit was defectively designed because it lacked a number of safety features. In such a case, the IPLA specifies that a negligence standard applies, not a strict liability standard….
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There is no dispute that the PACCAR glider kit was a component part of the semi-tractor ultimately assembled by W&W by adding an engine, transmission, and exhaust system. The IPLA applies not only to manufacturers of a final product, but also manufacturers of a component part of a product where there is proof that the part itself was defective. I.C. §§ 34-20-2-3; 34-6-2-77. PACCAR notes, in part, that because W&W, not PACCAR, was the final manufacturer of the semi-tractor, responsibility for compliance with various federal registration, certification, and safety requirements for the semi-tractor fell to W&W. See 49 C.F.R. § 567.5(d)(1). However, federal motor vehicle safety regulations do not preempt state law product liability claims, unless a state standard directly conflicts with federal objectives.
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The essence of PACCAR’s argument is that, as component part manufacturer, it was entitled to leave responsibility for the ultimate safety of the completed semi-tractor in the hands of W&W, or in other words that it was entirely up to W&W to order those safety features it felt was necessary for the glider kit. If W&W did not order those features, PACCAR contends, it was entirely W&W’s fault for not doing so. PACCAR argues that it had no obligation to include safety features on the glider kit because it could not foresee precisely how W&W intended to use the completed semi-tractor or in what environment it would be used.
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…We are persuaded by this reasoning that if it was feasible for PACCAR to install as a standard feature any of the several safety measures Angela claims should have been installed in the glider kit, and such feature or features would not have detracted from the glider kit’s use in any conceivable configuration, a fact-finder may decide PACCAR is liable to Angela for a failure to include it or them, rather than leaving the safety of a completed semitractor entirely to the “haphazard” choices of companies like W&W. [Footnote omitted.] It would all depend upon a fact-finder’s determination of whether PACCAR’s decision to make a certain feature optional rather than standard was a reasonable decision under the circumstances.
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…As such, there is no inherent reason why the fault or responsibility for the semi-tractor’s safety must fall exclusively either to PACCAR or to W&W, or why they cannot both be liable for Rickey’s death with respect to the semi-tractor’s safety. The question would be whether PACCAR was an original negligent actor in the glider kit’s design and set in motion a chain of events that led to a foreseeable injury as a natural and probable consequence of that design. See id. The issue of proximate cause ordinarily is one for the jury to decide. Id.
Angela designated evidence, through Bloch, of several alleged design flaws in the glider kit PACCAR sold. Our holding today is that it was then incumbent upon PACCAR to designate undisputed evidence that it would have not been feasible, or that it would have been unreasonable, for PACCAR to have addressed any of those flaws in the glider kit, rather than leaving it entirely for W&W to address. PACCAR failed to do so and, therefore, failed to negate all elements of Angela’s product liability cause of action. Thus, PACCAR was not entitled to summary judgment. See Siner v. Kindred Hosp. Ltd. P’ship, 51 N.E.3d 1184, 1189 (Ind. 2016) (noting that under Indiana law, summary judgment movant has the burden of affirmatively negating an opponent’s claim)
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Conclusion
PACCAR’s position as a component manufacturer and not the final manufacturer of the semi-tractor that killed Rickey does not immunize it from liability under the IPLA; nor may PACCAR automatically transfer all responsibility for the semi-tractor’s safety to W&W. Angela has designated sufficient evidence for summary judgment purposes that there were several safety features PACCAR reasonably could have incorporated into its glider kits that might have prevented Rickey’s death. There also is no dispute that Rickey was a “consumer” of PACCAR’s product for purposes of the IPLA. We reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of PACCAR and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Vaidik, C.J., concurs. Mathias, J., concurs with separate opinion.
Mathias, Judge, concurring.
While I agree with my colleagues that Angela has designated sufficient evidence for summary judgment purposes, I write to express my reservations about the broad legal discussion that reaches this result. W&W, a sophisticated trucking company, explicitly ordered the glider kit from PACCAR without the optional rear window or backup alarm. Moreover, W&W ordered the glider kit with wiring to install a backup strobe light, but the strobe light was never installed. Thus, in my view, W&W, a sophisticated user, was well aware of any potential danger posed by PACCAR’s glider kit when it assembled the semitractor. And on appeal, the core of PACCAR’s arguments is a thinly disguised sophisticated user defense.
Our court has consistently held that the question of whether or not a manufacturer has discharged its duty under the sophisticated user exception is appropriately a question for the trier of fact. See, e.g., Natural Gas Odorizing, Inc. v. Downs, 685 N.E.2d 155, 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied. Accordingly, I agree that summary judgment was inappropriate here, and the matter should be remanded to the trial court where PACCAR can appropriately make its sophisticated user argument before a jury.