Mathias, J.
The trial court sentenced McCarty to two and one-half years with 290 days executed and the remainder suspended to probation. McCarty appeals and argues that the trial court erred by failing to provide him with written conditions of probation at sentencing and by imposing conditions that are impermissibly vague and not reasonably related to his rehabilitation.
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The State charged McCarty with Class D felony battery by bodily waste and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. A jury trial was held on May 11, 2017, and McCarty was found guilty as charged.
The trial court ordered McCarty to serve an aggregate two-and-one-half-year sentence. He was given credit for 290 days served, and the remainder of his sentence was suspended to probation. The trial court ordered the standard terms of probation and that McCarty “shall submit to a drug and alcohol evaluation and remain compliant with their recommendations.”
Four days after he was sentenced, McCarty met with a probation officer, and he signed a form acknowledging the conditions of his probation. The probationary terms at issue in this appeal are:
2. You will avoid persons and places of harmful character, or a person who is likely to influence you to commit a crime.
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7. You will (not) consume alcohol in a lawful manner unless ordered to abstain by the Court or any alcohol rehabilitation program.
The word “not” in the condition concerning alcohol use was handwritten on the form.
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Indiana Code section 35-38-2-1 provides that “[w]henever it places a person on probation, the court shall . . . specify in the record the conditions of the probation[.]” And “[w]hen a person is placed on probation, the person shall be given a written statement specifying . . . the conditions of probation[.]”1 I.C. § 35-38-2-2.3(b). …
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At his sentencing hearing, McCarty was ordered to comply with the standard conditions of his probation and undergo an alcohol and drug evaluation. However, the trial court did not specifically state the standard terms of probation, and McCarty was not advised of the specific terms of his probation until he met with his probation officer four days after his sentencing hearing.
… Indiana Code section 35-38-2-1 requires the trial court to have specified the terms of McCarty’s probation on the date of sentencing. …
… McCarty’s probation officer inserted the word “not” before the word consume. Id. The trial court did not order McCarty to abstain from consuming alcoholic beverages. The court only ordered an alcohol and drug evaluation and compliance with any resulting recommendations.
The probation officer’s unilateral and unauthorized alteration of a condition of McCarty’s probation is precisely why it is important for the trial court to specify the terms of probation and give a written statement of the conditions of probation to the defendant at the sentencing hearing as is required by Indiana Code sections 35-38-2-1 and -2.3. On remand, we direct the trial court to correct condition number 7 so that it does not need to be altered by probation personnel in the future.
Next, we address McCarty’s argument concerning the condition that he undergo a drug and alcohol evaluation. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court orally ordered McCarty to undergo an alcohol and drug evaluation. However, this orally imposed condition of probation was not included in the written statement listing the terms of McCarty’s probation.
A trial court’s failure to provide written probation terms may be harmless if the defendant has been orally advised of the condition and acknowledges that he understand the condition. Gil v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1231, 1234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). …
In this case, the trial court ordered McCarty to undergo an alcohol and drug evaluation but never asked him to acknowledge that he understood that condition of his probation. Sentencing Tr. p. 8. … Therefore, on remand, we instruct the trial court to provide McCarty with written terms of his probation which include a requirement that McCarty undergo a drug and alcohol evaluation.
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Finally, we consider McCarty’s claim that the following probationary term is unconstitutionally vague or overly broad. The condition provides that McCarty “will avoid persons and places of harmful character, or a person who is likely to influence you to commit a crime.”
… To avoid being unconstitutionally vague, the condition must be clear enough so that individuals of ordinary intelligence would be adequately informed of the general conduct that is proscribed. Patton, 990 N.E.2d at 516. …
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“Persons and places of harmful character” are subjective terms that are not readily defined. And what constitutes a place of harmful character is possibly even more difficult to define than a person of harmful character. The only objective example of a place of harmful character that readily comes to mind is a known “crack” or drug house.
For all of these reasons, we agree with McCarty that this condition of his probation is impermissibly vague. On remand, we direct the trial court to clarify this condition of McCarty’s probation so he is adequately informed of the general conduct that is proscribed. See id.; Patton, 990 N.E.2d at 516.
… On remand, the trial court is instructed to (1) correct the probation term that was altered by the probation officer; (2) provide McCarty with written terms of his probation, which includes each condition of probation; and (3) clarify and make more specific the probationary term that McCarty is to “avoid persons and places of harmful character, or a person who is likely to influence you to commit a crime” because this condition of probation is impermissibly vague.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Najam, J., and Barnes, J., concur.