Slaughter, J.
At issue is whether Indiana law allows a judgment-creditor to garnish a cash bail bond the judgment-debtor posted in an unrelated criminal matter. The plaintiff tried to garnish the bond to satisfy his unpaid civil judgment, but the trial clerk, who was named a garnishee-defendant in the civil case, released it to the defendant’s attorney. The plaintiff sought to hold the clerk liable, but the trial court ruled the bond was not subject to garnishment and found for the clerk. We disagree and reverse. The clerk who holds the bond in a criminal case is an eligible garnishee-defendant in the civil case where the judgment was entered, and the bond remains subject to the garnishment lien filed there. The only qualification is that the judgment-creditor may not recover on the bond until the criminal court releases it. Here, the clerk is liable on the bond because she distributed its proceeds before the civil court determined the plaintiff’s right to them.
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This case involves the interplay among several statutes—those governing garnishments, proceedings supplemental, and bail bonds. See Ind. Code ch. 34-25-3; 34-55-8; 35-33-8 (2008 Repl.). We must determine not only what each statute means but also how each interacts with the others…
We hold that the governing statutes permit a civil-judgment-creditor to garnish a cash bond held by a court clerk that a judgment-debtor has posted in an unrelated criminal matter, but those funds are available to the judgment-creditor only if the criminal court has ordered the bond released. Here, the Clerk should have held the cash bond posted in the criminal matter until the Civil Court determined Garner’s right to the proceeds to satisfy his judgment. We reverse the trial court’s judgment for the Clerk and remand with instructions to enter judgment for Garner.
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I. Indiana law allows a judgment-creditor to garnish a cash bail bond posted by a judgment-debtor and held by a court clerk in an unrelated criminal matter.
A. Court clerks are subject to garnishment proceedings
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Indiana’s garnishment statute specifically subjects “clerks of the circuit and superior courts” to garnishment to the extent they have “money or choses in action” belonging to a judgment-debtor “at the time of service of the garnishee process”. Id. §§ 34-25-3-1(a)(1)(A), 1(b) (2008 Repl.). Trialcourt clerks receive no special treatment or consideration as garnisheedefendants, but are treated “in the same manner as …other persons…subject to garnishment.” Id. § 34-25-3-1(b) (2008 Repl.). In their official capacity, clerks often hold another person’s money or property, including payment of judgments, fees, restitution, and bail. See id. ch. 35- 33-8 (2008 Repl.).
We see no ambiguity in these statutes. They establish that court clerks can be garnishees, and they do not prohibit garnishing cash bail bonds.
B. Our bail-bond statute does not prohibit garnishing cash bonds.
Next, we consider whether the bail statute precludes garnishment and hold it does not. Like garnishments and proceedings supplemental, bail bonds also are governed by statute. Id. ch. 35-33-8 (2008 Repl.). When a clerk receives a criminal defendant’s bond, she holds it (among other reasons) to ensure the defendant’s appearance in court. Id. § 35-33-8-1(1) (2008 Repl.). By operation of law, a defendant who pays a cash bond agrees the court may “retain all or a part of the cash to pay publicly paid costs of representation and fines, costs, fees, and restitution that the court may order the defendant to pay if the defendant is convicted.” Id. § 35-33- 8-3.2(a)(1) (Supp. 2012). But a defendant may be entitled to recoup any remaining portion of the cash bond if the court alters or revokes bail, id. § 35-33-8-5 (2008 Repl.), or when the criminal matter ends, id. § 35-33-8- 3.2(b) (Supp. 2012).
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We conclude that nothing in Chapter 35-33-8, including Section 35-33-8- 7(b), exempts cash bail bonds from proceedings supplemental or prohibits a judgment-creditor from garnishing the cash bond that a judgment-debtor deposits with the clerk in an unrelated criminal matter.
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C. Indiana case law does not prohibit garnishing cash bail bonds
Next, we reject the Clerk’s argument that a pair of appellate decisions compels a different result. See O’Laughlin v. Barton, 549 N.E.2d 1040 (Ind. 1990); J.J. Richard Farm Corp., 642 N.E.2d 1384. Neither O’Laughlin nor J.J. Richard Farm Corp. addressed the precise issue presented here, which is whether cash bail bonds are garnishable under Indiana law.
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D. In a garnishment case, the civil court with jurisdiction over proceedings supplemental does not automatically yield jurisdiction to the criminal court that admitted the defendant to bail.
Under Indiana law, the court that issued the underlying civil judgment retains jurisdiction over proceedings supplementary to execution. See Prime Mortg. USA, Inc., 885 N.E.2d at 668; T.R. 69(E). Even when proceedings supplemental run parallel to some other action in another court—e.g., a criminal matter or estate administration—the proceedings supplemental court does not yield jurisdiction to the other court. Cf. Murphy v. Busick, 22 Ind. App. 247, 248-49, 53 N.E. 475 (1899) (explaining that party acting under direction of circuit court in one county does not prevent circuit court in another county from requiring him to answer in supplementary proceedings).
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Reviewing the relevant caselaw and the various statutes in tandem, we see no prohibition against garnishing bail bonds. Because the Indiana Code expressly provides that circuit- and superior-court clerks can be named as garnishee-defendants—subject to garnishment in the same manner and to the same extent as others—we hold that cash-bond proceeds held by such clerks are garnishable.
II. The Clerk is liable to Garner for the $5,000 bond proceeds
The Clerk does not dispute that Garner properly initiated proceedings supplementary to execution to garnish Kempf’s cash bail bond. Garner filed a complaint in the same Civil Court and under the same case number as the underlying civil judgment…
Here, the Clerk’s duty was to hold the cash bond posted in the criminal matter pending the Civil Court’s determination of Garner’s right to the proceeds to satisfy his judgment. See First Nat’l. Bank of Indianapolis v. Armstrong, 101 Ind. 244, 247 (1885). The Clerk failed to inform the Criminal Court of the lien, and then she released the bond to Kempf’s attorney despite having been served with the garnishment complaint in the Civil Court. It is no excuse that the Criminal Court ordered the Clerk to release the bond to the attorney. “Even when forcibly divested, [the garnishee] will be presumed responsible for the forthcoming of the property”, id., because she holds the money received from any claimant until there has been a final determination by the court hearing the proceedings supplemental. Id. When the Criminal Court judge, unaware of the judgment-creditor’s lien, approved Kempf’s request to use those proceeds to pay his defense counsel’s fees, those proceeds were no longer encumbered to ensure Kempf’s appearance at his criminal trial. At that point, the proceeds were subject to Garner’s preexisting garnishment lien in the Civil Court. Because the Clerk released the $5,000 cash bond before the Civil Court determined Garner’s right to the proceeds, she is liable to Garner for that amount.
Conclusion
For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment for the Clerk and remand with instructions to enter judgment for Garner in the amount of $5,000.
Massa and Goff, JJ., concur.
David, J., dissents with separate opinion in which Rush, C.J., joins
David, Justice, dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion. The case at bar is one dealing with an issue of first impression in our State. No other Indiana appellate case has expressly decided whether garnishment of criminal bail bonds held by the clerk of a court is permissible to satisfy an unrelated civil judgment. Thus, we are not bound by precedent on this issue and, in the absence of express statutory authority permitting garnishment of bail bonds in a criminal case to satisfy a judgment in an unrelated civil case, Garner should be precluded from garnishing the cash bond Kempf posted. Accordingly, I would hold that the Vanderburgh County Clerk cannot be held liable for complying with the criminal court’s order to release the proceeds of the cash bond.
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In sum, I believe a reading of the statute as broad as our majority has allowed—permitting garnishment of a bail bond to satisfy a judgment in an unrelated civil case where our legislature has not authorized it— departs from the way we treat criminal statutes. I also fear the majority overlooks the tension within our statutes that this holding creates and the impossible predicament it places our court clerks in. Given the criminal court’s order directing release of the bond proceeds, and in absence of statutory authority indicating that garnishment of the posted bail is permissible to satisfy a judgment from an unrelated civil case, I think the Clerk correctly released the cash bond to Kempf’s criminal defense attorney. Accordingly, I would affirm the civil trial court’s decision to deny Garner’s motion for proceedings supplemental and find that the Clerk cannot be held liable to Garner.
Rush, C.J., concurs.