Mathias, J.
Fort Wayne Community Schools and its employee Jacalyn Butler (collectively “FWCS”) bring this interlocutory appeal from the Allen Superior Court’s partial denial of summary judgment on Steffanie Haney’s (“Haney”) complaint alleging battery against her daughter M.H. and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation of M.H.’s Fourth Amendment rights.
We reverse and remand.
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FWCS argues that the state law claims against it are barred because Butler’s actions were permissible and protected by qualified immunity under Indiana Code section 20-33-8-8….
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It is undisputed that the physical contact occurred when the first-grade students were taking a test, and it is undisputed that M.H. was dropping items on the ground and reaching under her desk to pick them up, causing her posterior to rise into the air. Taking action to require that M.H. remain in her seat while the class is taking part in an educational activity falls squarely within section 20-33- 8-8(b)(2)’s grant of a teacher’s right “to take any disciplinary action necessary to promote student conduct that conforms with an orderly and effective educational system.” Further, Butler’s alleged conduct here is far less egregious than the alleged behavior of the teachers in Fettig, Barocas, and Littleton. Indeed, these cases show Butler’s actions were taken in good faith and were reasonable, as a matter of law.
Moreover, section 20-33-8-8(b)(1) states that with respect to school matters, teachers “stand in relation of parents to the student of the school corporation.” Therefore, if Butler were allowed to be held civilly liable for allegedly spanking a student at school, then Haney could be held civilly liable for spanking M.H. at home, an action she does frequently….
Thus, viewing the facts most favorable to Haney, we find that Butler’s conduct here fell well within the range of permissible conduct by parents, and hence teachers, under section 20-33-8-8(b). Because Butler’s conduct comes within the scope of her statutory qualified immunity as a teacher managing a classroom, FWCS was entitled to summary judgment on the state law battery claim. [Footnote omitted.]
FWCS also argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Haney’s § 1983 claim against it because the alleged constitutional violation of M.H.’s Fourth Amendment rights was not clearly established….
In the case before us, M.H. was causing a disruption in class while students were taking a test. Moreover, similar to the actions of the teacher in Wallace, Butler used reasonable force to induce M.H. to sit back down in her seat in an effort to manage and maintain order over her classroom. The court in Wallace noted, “Public school teachers and administrators must have considerable latitude in performing their educational responsibilities, including maintaining order and discipline by reasonably restraining the liberty of students.” Id.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Haney, she has failed to establish that Butler violated clearly established law when she spanked or smacked M.H.’s posterior to require her to sit back down in her seat. See Phillips v. Community Ins. Corp., 678 F.3d 513, 520 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Objective reasonableness of force is a legal determination rather than a pure question of fact for the jury to decide.”). In fact, because Indiana has authorized the use of moderate corporal punishment by teachers in schools, Butler’s conduct clearly falls within the range of what our legislature has deemed permissible. Cole by Cole v. Greenfield-Central Community Schools, 657 F. Supp. 56, 59 (S.D. Ind. 1986). As the Seventh Circuit aptly stated in Wallace, “the only thing unreasonable in this scenario is that Wallace has made a federal case out of a routine school disciplinary matter.” 68 F.3d at 1015. This is what has happened here, as well. Under the facts and circumstances in the case before us, as well as all applicable law, FWCS was entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claim.
Conclusion
Based on the facts and circumstances before us, FWCS was entitled to summary judgment on the state law battery tort claim because as a matter of law, Butler’s alleged conduct falls within the scope of her statutory qualified immunity as a teacher managing a classroom. Additionally, FWCS was entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claim because, as a matter of law, Haney failed to show that Butler’s conduct could have violated a clearly established right. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
Barnes, J., and Pyle, J., concur.