Rush, CJ.
Indiana’s habitual-offender statutes count all prior non-Indiana felonies as Level 6 felonies and do not allow a habitual-offender finding based only on two Level 6 felonies. Relying on these statutes, Calvin argues that his two prior Illinois felonies are insufficient to support his habitual offender enhancement. The State responds that this result is absurd, so we should graft new language onto the statutes.
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Darryl Calvin broke into a Fort Wayne home and stole a PlayStation 4, a sixty-inch plasma television, and a pair of gym shoes. Thanks to a vigilant neighborhood watch, he was promptly caught and arrested.
The State charged Calvin with Level 4 felony burglary and alleged that he was a habitual offender based on two prior convictions. Both of those convictions were Class 1 felony residential burglary convictions from Illinois—one from 1992 and the other from 1998. A jury convicted Calvin on the new burglary charge and found that he was a habitual offender. The trial court sentenced him to six years for the burglary, and ten additional years for the habitual-offender enhancement.
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The Court of Appeals affirmed Calvin’s habitual-offender enhancement. First, it agreed with the State that the absurdity doctrine applied. Calvin v. State, 80 N.E.3d 226, 228–29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Then, the court compared Calvin’s Illinois burglaries to burglary in Indiana and concluded that his out-of-state convictions should be treated as Level 4 felonies. Id. at 229.
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… Here, Calvin’s Level 4 felony burglary conviction was enhanced under Indiana Code subsection 35-50-2-8(b):
(b) A person convicted of murder or of a Level 1 through Level 4 felony is a habitual offender if the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that:
(1) the person has been convicted of two (2) prior unrelated felonies; and
(2) at least one (1) of the prior unrelated felonies is not a Level 6 felony or a Class D felony.
I.C § 35-50-2-8(b) (Supp. 2016).
But Calvin argues that he cannot be a habitual offender under subsection 8(b) because both of his prior felonies count as Level 6 felonies. He relies on the statutory definition of “Level 6 felony conviction”:
(a) As used in this chapter, “Level 6 felony conviction” means:
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(2) a conviction, in any other jurisdiction at any time, with respect to which the convicted person might have been imprisoned for more than one (1) year.
I.C. § 35-50-2-1(a) (2014). …
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The parties’ initial agreement was correct. Applying the defined term “Level 6 felony conviction” to subsection 8(b) gives meaning to the legislature’s decision to include non-Indiana felonies in the definition of a “Level 6 felony conviction.” I.C. § 35-50-2-1(a)(2). …
Applying the “Level 6 felony conviction” definition in subsection 8(b) also aligns with nearly thirty years of Indiana precedent. Our Court of Appeals has consistently said that the habitual-offender statutes count non-Indiana felonies as the lowest-level Indiana felonies. …
We finally note that if non-Indiana felonies could count as something other than Level 6 felonies, we would need a method for deciding what level to assign them. Yet the legislature has not provided one. …
With this plain meaning in hand, we turn to the State’s claim that it leads to absurd results.
The absurdity doctrine is strong medicine; it defeats even the plain meaning of statutes. Morgan v. State, 22 N.E.3d 570, 575 (Ind. 2014) …
Invoking the absurdity doctrine here would also expand criminal liability beyond the habitual-offender statutes’ long-settled plain meaning—a result at odds with separation-of-powers principles and our narrow construction of criminal statutes.
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Equally compelling is the second principle underlying our narrow construction of criminal statutes—that they “should give fair warning about what conduct they prohibit,” id. …
For these reasons, we will not apply the absurdity doctrine as an exception to our longstanding rule that we cannot extend criminal statutes through interpretation. See State v. Bruner, 135 Ind. 419, 422–23, 35 N.E. 22, 23–24 (1893). To be clear, we are not abolishing the absurdity doctrine, which we have consistently applied since the early days of our 1851 Constitution. …This case, though, falls outside the doctrine’s boundaries. …
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Calvin’s two Illinois felonies thus count as Level 6 felonies under the habitual-offender statutes. But Indiana Code subsection 35-50-2-8(b) does not allow a habitual-offender enhancement based only on two Level 6 felonies. We therefore reverse Calvin’s habitual-offender enhancement as unsupported by sufficient evidence and remand for retrial on that enhancement….
David, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.
Massa, J., dissents with separate opinion.
Massa, J., dissenting.
Absurd results don’t always trigger the absurdity doctrine. …
But in my judgment, we need not invoke the doctrine here to avoid an outcome that is, if not absurd, at least “peculiar,” as the Court mildly puts it. It is hard to believe that our legislators intended an Illinois murder conviction be treated the same as writing a bad check under our serious habitual offender statute. … I thus respectfully dissent.
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Unlike three decades ago, we no longer punish habitual offenders with a full thirty years on top of their sentence for the instant crime. I.C. § 35-50-2-8 (Supp. 1978). The statutes wisely and more humanely now treat different recidivists differently, based on the severity of the instant offense and their prior convictions. See I.C. § 35-50-2-8 (2017). The law in question today attempts to do just that. Under its terms, if a defendant commits a serious felony, and he has two priors, then at least one of those priors must be a serious offense to sustain this particular habitual finding and the more severe sanction it carries. See id. -8(b).
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Here, Calvin is an unrepentant burglar. An Indiana jury found him guilty of a residential burglary. That same jury then learned he had two prior convictions for the same serious crimes in Illinois and rightly found him to be a habitual offender. But now we are to pretend those serious crimes weren’t so serious after all because of where they were committed. If that is not quite absurd, it is beyond peculiar.
Coincidentally, if not ironically, on this very day, I have written for the Court interpreting a different section of the habitual offender statute to a result nearly as odd. See Johnson v. State, 32S05-1707-CR-469, — N.E.3d — (Ind. Dec. 21, 2017). At least the possibly unintended consequence at work in Johnson won’t be repeated thanks to recent statutory amendment. Perhaps the legislature might spare this Court from further peculiar holdings by fixing this section, as well.