Mathias, J.
L.T. (“Mother”) appeals the order of the Vanderburgh Superior Court determining that her minor children D.F., Kn.L., Ka.L. and M.M., are in need of services. Mother claims that the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) failed to present evidence sufficient to support the trial court’s determination.
We affirm.
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We now turn our attention to the fact that there is no indication in the record on appeal that the trial court judge, as opposed to the trial court magistrate, signed the required dispositional orders.
Magistrates may enter final orders in criminal cases, I.C. §§ 33- 23-5-5(14), -9(b), but otherwise “may not enter a final appealable order unless sitting as a judge pro tempore or a special judge.” I.C. § 33-23-5-8(2). Instead, they may only “report findings,” while “[t]he court shall enter the final order.” I.C. § 33-23-5-9(a).
In re Adoption of I.B., 32 N.E.3d 1164, 1173 n.6 (Ind. 2015).
Here, the dispositional orders being appealed were not signed by the trial court judge. Although our supreme court held in In re D.J. that the one of two jurisdictional prerequisites was that the trial court must have entered an appealable order,” 68 N.E.3d at 578, the court has also noted that “it has been the long-standing policy of [our supreme] court to view the authority of the officer appointed to try a case not as affecting the jurisdiction of the court.” In re I.B. 32 N.E.3d at 1173 n.6. Thus, “the failure of a party to object at trial to the authority of a court officer to enter a final appealable order waives the issue for appeal.” Id. (citing Floyd v. State, 650 N.E.2d 28, 32 (Ind. 1994)). Here, there is no indication that either party has objected to the fact that the trial court judge did not sign the appealable dispositional orders. The issue is therefore waived. See id.
Waiver notwithstanding, we take this opportunity to note what appears to be a pattern in this particular trial court. In In re I.B., also an appeal from the Vanderburgh Superior Court 4, the trial court’s findings and conclusions were signed only by the magistrate, not the trial court judge. 32 N.E.3d at 1173 n.6. After noting the limits on the power of a magistrate, our supreme court wrote, “We trust the court will observe this necessity on remand.” Id.
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We are well aware that trial court judges are oftentimes subject to an incredible workload, and those trial court judges who are privileged to have magistrates to assist them in this workload rely upon the magistrates to help them manage their valuable time. But we cannot continue to overlook the repeated failure to abide by the requirements of the statutes empowering magistrates. We therefore say in no uncertain terms: trial court magistrates do not have the authority to enter final judgments in civil cases, including juvenile cases. See In re I.B., 32 N.E.3d at 1173 n.6. Final dispositional orders in CHINS cases must be signed by the trial court judge, not simply the magistrate. See id. The failure of the trial court to do so only increases the chance of unnecessary delays in otherwise time-sensitive cases involving children.
Because neither party here has raised any objection to the authority of the magistrate in this case, and in light of our preference to decide cases on their merits whenever possible, we will address Mother’s appeal on its merits.