Slaughter, J.
Judicial mandate is an extraordinary remedy—available only when the law imposes a clear duty upon a defendant to perform a specific, ministerial act and the plaintiff is clearly entitled to that relief. The law at issue here, Indiana Code section 31-25-2-5, imposes strict caseload limits for family case managers at the Indiana Department of Child Services. This statute compels a particular outcome—no case manager can oversee more than seventeen children at a time who are receiving services—but does not require the Department to perform one or more specific, ministerial acts for achieving it. Thus, the statute is not amenable to a judicial mandate. We affirm the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint.
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On the merits, we hold that Price is not entitled to the extraordinary remedy of a judicial mandate. Under our mandate statute and case law interpreting it, such relief is available only to compel a specific, ministerial act, and only if the plaintiff is clearly entitled to that relief. Price seeks to compel the Department (and its director) to comply with the strict caseload requirements set forth in Section 31-25-2-5. But this statute requires only a particular outcome—caseloads cannot exceed seventeen children per case manager—and does not require the Department to take specified steps to achieve that outcome. Thus, the statute is not susceptible to a judicial mandate to compel compliance with its terms. In addition, we reject Price’s argument that Section 5 gives her a private right of action to enforce the statute’s caseload limits. The Court of Appeals held that Price had no private right of action because Section 5 was intended to benefit the public generally and not particular individuals. Price, 63 N.E.3d at 22. We agree and summarily affirm that conclusion. We thus affirm the dismissal of Price’s complaint under Rule 12(B)(6).
I. A judicial mandate will issue only when the law imposes a clear duty on the defendant to perform a specific, ministerial act and the plaintiff is clearly entitled to that relief.
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A. Indiana law harbors a strong presumption against judicial mandates.
Our precedent cautions against issuing a mandate, calling it “an extraordinary remedy, viewed with extreme disfavor.”….
B. A mandate’s duty element requires that the defendant have a legal obligation to perform a specific act.
It is not enough for the law to impose a generalized duty. To be subject to a judicial mandate, the law must impose a specific duty to act—i.e., a duty to “do” or “perform” something….
As we discuss next, a mandate commanding general compliance with a statute to achieve a certain outcome, without identifying the specific act required, is no mandate at all—because it leaves the defendant with discretion to fulfill the required outcome. If the defendant has discretion, there is no clear, absolute duty to perform a specific act—without which there can be no mandate.
C. The specific act to be mandated must be ministerial—affording the respondent no discretion in discharging the legal duty.
When there is a clear legal duty to perform a specific act, the act must also be ministerial…
A ministerial act does not necessarily arise from a statute’s use of mandatory language; more is required. When the legislature says “shall”, it issues a legislative mandate. But that does not mean—and we do not presume—the legislature thereby commanded a specific, ministerial act amenable to a judicial mandate…
D. The specific, ministerial acts subject to judicial mandate are to be determined solely from the law imposing the duty, and courts cannot impose a mandate remedy different than what is specified in the applicable law.
Courts do not have license to define or prescribe a duty to act. The requirement of a specific, ministerial act leaves no room for judicial improvisation regarding the underlying legal duty. Because ministerial acts are those done only pursuant to law, in a fixed manner, in specific circumstances, and without discretion, they necessarily cannot be elaborated upon…
II. Judicial mandate is not proper here because Section 31-25-2-5 does not compel the performance of a specific, ministerial act.
Price does not quarrel with the specific-act requirement for mandate actions. But she claims her petition seeks nothing more than the specific, non-discretionary act that she believes Section 5 commands—namely, compliance with statutory caseload limits. The flaw in Price’s argument is that her premise is wrong—Section 5 does not require a specific, ministerial act.
It is not enough that Section 31-25-2-5 speaks in mandatory terms, e.g., “department shall ensure” and “department shall comply”. I.C. §§ 31-25-2-5(a), (b) (emphases added). To be susceptible to a judicial mandate, Section 5 must also compel the performance of a specific act, not just a specific outcome. The statute does not spell out how the Department is to comply with the caseload caps. By failing to outline what specific actions the Department must take to meet caseload requirements, Section 5 affords the Department wide latitude in complying with them. Section 5, therefore, is not amenable to judicial mandate.
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Our mandate precedent draws a line between “acts” and “outcomes”: acts are subject to mandate; outcomes are not. But a rigid “acts”-versus-“outcomes” dichotomy oversimplifies things. The test really is not binary at all—an either/or determination. We recognize that sometimes an outcome is a discrete act, e.g., approve the plat. But many outcomes are not. In reality, outcomes lie along a continuum. At one end are legal obligations that can be discharged with a simple, discrete act—and are subject to mandate: issue the warrant, release the inmate. At the other end are those obligations requiring discretion and often multiple acts over an extended period of time to fulfill—and are not subject to mandate: raise an army, feed the hungry. Unlike these extremes, most obligations (including the caseload cap at issue here) lie somewhere in the middle. Determining which obligations fall into which camp is not always black and white. We think the best yardstick for resolving this question is the extent and nature of judicial oversight required to ensure compliance with the underlying obligation. Weighing in favor of mandate are those matters requiring little or no judicial time or expertise. Militating against mandate are those matters requiring more oversight, expertise, and that are not readily susceptible to a simple directive to attain compliance. Here, Section 31-25-2-5 does not specify the acts to be performed to effectuate the legislature’s caseload-ratio cap. And granting relief here risks entangling the judiciary in the Department’s day-to-day affairs—what would likely be a time-consuming intrusion beyond our institutional competence to discharge. We conclude this legal obligation lies along that portion of the continuum not amenable to a mandate.
Conclusion
For these reasons, we affirm the dismissal of Price’s complaint.
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Goff, JJ., concur.