Rush, C.J.
The Indiana Department of Child Services told a child-abuse reporter that his report was confidential, but then released it without redacting his identity. The reporter and his family sued DCS based on both the statute protecting reporter anonymity and our common law. We denounce DCS’s thoughtlessness, but find no basis for liability under either theory. The statute protecting anonymity provides no private right of action—and we will not judicially infer one since the statute’s main purpose is to protect children in general and since it already provides enforcement mechanisms. Likewise, DCS’s recitation of the confidentiality statute did not create a common law duty. We thus affirm summary judgment for DCS.
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To prevail on their negligence claims, the Does must prove that DCS (1) owed them a duty, (2) breached that duty, and (3) proximately caused their injuries. Rogers, 63 N.E.3d at 321. Here, the parties dispute only the first element: whether DCS owed a duty of confidentiality under Section 2 and, if not, whether it owed one under the common law. Though DCS’s disclosure was irresponsible, it cannot trigger civil liability under either theory.
I. Section 2 Provides No Private Right of Action.
The parties agree that Section 2 does not expressly provide a private right of action; they dispute only whether it implies one…
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In sum, the objective of this statutory scheme is clear: helping and protecting Hoosier youth. Year after year, the number of Indiana’s child abuse and neglect investigations and cases continues to climb. [Footnote omitted.] The General Assembly’s mission—expressed in the statutory scheme’s five purposes—is to reverse this trend through reporting. That one of the scheme’s provisions incidentally benefits reporters by requiring confidentiality does not change this goal—especially given the alternative confidentiality-enforcement mechanisms we now address.
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We do not, of course, condone DCS’s thoughtless fumbling of sensitive information. Quite the opposite. Child-abuse reporters are DCS’s eyes and ears on the front lines of the fight to protect children—and without their trust and cooperation, DCS faces a nearly impossible uphill battle. Knowing this, our General Assembly might choose to impose a right of action, just as it has for Hoosiers falsely accused of child abuse. I.C. § 31-33-22-3(b) (Supp. 2012). But separation of powers requires us to leave that decision to the legislature, rather than make it ourselves under the guise of statutory interpretation.
Thus, we cannot infer that the General Assembly intended Section 2 to impose civil liability. We now address the Does’ common-law claim.
II. There Is No Common-Law Basis to Impose a Duty on DCS.
The Does do not assert that there is a general common-law duty to maintain confidentiality. Rather, they argue that DCS had a duty because John detrimentally relied on the DCS worker’s statement that reporter identity is confidential…
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And that is all the DCS hotline employee did here. By informing John that his report was confidential, the employee did no more than the college in Yost or the NCAA in Lanni—she simply communicated an existing rule. Granted, the employee did summarize Section 2 using her own words: “[I]t’s confidential. Nobody will find out.” But given the demanding standard for “specific undertaking,” and given our caution in finding gratuitously assumed duties, we cannot read the hotline worker’s words as an offer to take on additional common-law liability.
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Regrettably, this result does not undo the wreckage. By relaying the statutory requirement of confidentiality and then violating it, DCS exposed an innocent family to harassment and threats. Our question on transfer, though, is narrow: should we expand our common law to impose a duty for summarizing a statute? On this record, we decline—seeing no reason why the common law should engulf an essentially statutory protection.
Conclusion
We do not condone DCS’s actions, but find no basis—in either statute or common law— for imposing a duty of confidentiality. We therefore affirm summary judgment for DCS.
Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.
David, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.
David, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part
I agree with the majority that John Doe does not have a private right of action under the statute. However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that he also does not have a common-law negligence claim. I believe under Webb, John may bring a common-law negligence claim. [Footnote omitted.] Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for DCS and remand for further proceedings.
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For all the reasons discussed above, I would reverse the trial court and let John have his day in court.