Mathias, J.
In this inverse condemnation case, we consider whether the trial court erred in concluding that the landowner did not have a property interest in the free flow of traffic from a particular road. Concluding that it did not err in reaching that conclusion, we affirm.
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The traffic-flow rule denies recovery to landowners who complain that, as a result of highway improvement or reconfiguration, the landowner’s invitees must take a more circuitous or inconvenient route to the land, while the points of ingress and egress over the land remain unaffected. Ensley denied recovery to a recreational center whose property value was reduced when the state divided the north-south road abutting the center to the east by installing a raised median, blocking northbound traffic from turning left directly into the center and forcing it to take a more circuitous route to a different entrance. 164 N.E.2d at 350. Kimco “reaffirm[ed] Ensley,” 902 N.E.2d at 208, and denied recovery to a shopping complex whose property value was reduced by forty percent when the state widened an abutting road and installed a median. Id. at 209, 215. This court has followed our supreme court’s long-standing approach. Green River, 957 N.E.2d at 642, 645 (no recovery where U.S. highway moved quarter-mile to west; access to property from new U.S. highway and interstate required 1.6- to 4.6-mile detour); Canteen Serv., 932 N.E.2d at 750–51, 755 (no recovery where previously abutting street moved 210 feet south and reconfigured access to property required travel on frontage road); Dunn 888 N.E.2d at 859, 867 (no recovery where installation of median redirected traffic).
This case is controlled by the traffic-flow rule. AAA complains that customers driving on U.S. 31 now must take a more circuitous and inconvenient route to reach the Property, while their western and southern driveways — along with the rest of the Property — have remained completely untouched. Indeed, this case is even farther from a compensable taking than is the ordinary traffic-flow case. Here, AAA does not complain of impairment to the free flow of traffic past its property in general. There was no showing, and AAA does not argue, that access from Hildebrand Street, the new frontage road, is any more difficult than was access from U.S. 31 before the Project was completed, and Dice Street remained unaffected by the Project. Rather, AAA argues that the flow of traffic from U.S. 31 has been impaired by the Project. See Appellant’s Br. at 23 (“[D]irect access to U.S. 31 is a property right.”). If AAA has no cognizable property interest in the free flow of traffic past its property, still less does it have such a right in the free flow of traffic from a particular road. Put differently, AAA is claiming a property interest in continuing to abut a particular type of road: “[A]n actively used U.S. highway must continue to remain an actively used U.S. highway, and any change in the nature of the roadway [abutting a property] . . . results in a taking.” Appellee’s Br. at 23. As DOT correctly observes, this is not and cannot be the rule.
AAA makes three arguments in favor of its position. First, AAA argues that the Project deprived the Property of its highest and best use as a site for a bank branch. However, this argument conflates the measure of damages for a compensable taking with the inquiry into whether such a taking happened at all…
Second, AAA points us to three cases readily distinguishable from that at bar, and repeatedly so distinguished in the case law…
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Finally, AAA argues it is entitled to free-floating consideration of its allegedly reduced property value under Biddle, Lingle, and Penn Central. [Footnote omitted.] However, it is not…Here, and in the other traffic-flow cases discussed here, there was no regulation of private property. The state reconfigured public property; it did not regulate private property.
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Conclusion
The trial court ruled, “The cases are rather clear. There has been no taking under Indiana and federal law. It is understandable that the property owner [is upset because it] has lost the very easy direct access from the very busy old US 31, but under Indiana eminent domain law, this situation does not involve a legal ‘taking.’” Appellant’s App. p. 17. We agree. The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Altice, J., concur.