Rush, C.J.
Every crime has a story. But when that story is told at trial, each part must be admissible under Indiana’s Rules of Evidence—simply being part of the story is not enough. We thus reiterate today our holding from over twenty years ago: res gestae—the common-law doctrine that made evidence admissible when it was part of a crime’s story—is no more.
Here, Summer Snow carried a handgun as she battered Officer Terry Peck and resisted law enforcement. Though she was not charged with a firearm-related offense, the State introduced her gun into evidence at trial. Without res gestae as grounds for admission, our question becomes whether the gun is admissible under Indiana’s Rules of Evidence. …
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The State charged Snow with two counts of Level 5 felony battery against a public safety official, and one count each of Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. It charged Harris with Level 5 felony battery against a public safety official and Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement. Neither Harris nor Snow was charged with a gun-related offense.
Harris and Snow each filed a motion in limine to stop the State from referring to Snow’s gun at trial. They argued that because Officer Peck learned about the gun only after arresting Snow, the State was merely speculating about the gun’s relevance; therefore, the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed any probative value under Indiana Rule of Evidence 403. …
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The jury found Snow guilty of one count of Level 5 felony battery against a public safety official and one count of Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, and acquitted her of the other two counts. It found Harris guilty as charged. Both defendants appealed, now with separate attorneys, challenging the gun’s admission at trial. The State responded that the gun was properly admitted “because it was inextricably linked to the charged crimes.”
The Court of Appeals affirmed in a split decision. The majority found that the gun was admissible because it “explained the circumstances and context of the extended verbal and physical altercations between Snow and Officer Peck.” Snow v. State, 65 N.E.3d 1129, 1134 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (emphasis added). Chief Judge Vaidik dissented, believing that the majority improperly affirmed under the long-defunct res gestae grounds for admissibility. Id. at 1136 (Vaidik, C.J., dissenting).
Snow petitioned for transfer, arguing that the Court of Appeals improperly relied on res gestae in admitting the gun. The State did not respond. We granted transfer, thus vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).
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Res gestae—the common-law doctrine that made evidence admissible as part of a crime’s story—did not survive the adoption of Indiana’s Rules of Evidence in 1994. That is, res gestae is no longer a proper basis for admitting evidence; instead, admissibility is determined under Indiana’s Rules of Evidence. …
“Res gestae [was] a term regularly used in Indiana’s common law of evidence to denote facts that are part of the story of a particular crime.” Swanson v. State, 666 N.E.2d 397, 398 (Ind. 1996). When those facts completed the crime’s story, they were admissible under the doctrine— even if they concerned uncharged misconduct. Id.; Pitman v. State, 436 N.E.2d 74, 77 (Ind. 1982).
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Under Swanson and our Rules of Evidence, though, the many flavors of res gestae— “inextricably bound up,” “inextricably intertwined,” “circumstances and context,” and “part and parcel,” to name a few—are not proper grounds for admissibility. …
But as we observed in Swanson, the “great majority” of evidence formerly admitted as res gestae will continue to be admitted under “the legal concepts and vocabulary of the Indiana Rules of Evidence.” 666 N.E.2d at 399. …
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Under Indiana Rule of Evidence 403, “relevant evidence may be excluded ‘if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.’” Escamilla, 73 N.E.3d at 668 (quoting Ind. Evid. R. 403). As with relevance under Rule 401, this balancing is committed to the trial court’s discretion. Dunlap, 761 N.E.2d at 842.
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The trial court could have excluded or admitted Snow’s gun within that discretion. But it resolved the 403 balancing in favor of the State because while the gun was prejudicial, there was “sufficient probative value to override the prejudicial nature of the information.” And the trial court minimized any prejudice by instructing the jury about when a handgun is lawfully or unlawfully carried.
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The unfair prejudice from Snow’s gun, then, was not so high that it overrode the trial court’s wide discretion. See Dunlap, 761 N.E.2d at 842. We thus decline to second-guess the trial court’s determination that the gun’s relevance to her aggressive state of mind was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The trial court could have admitted or excluded the gun. The trial court chose admission, and on this contested record that choice was not an abuse of discretion.
Because res gestae is no more, we consider evidentiary admissibility under our Rules of Evidence. Under those rules, the trial court was within its discretion in deciding that Snow’s handgun was relevant to her aggressiveness, and that the danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh its probative value. We affirm the trial court.
David, Massa, and Slaughter, JJ., concur.