Mathias, J.
Kevin Campbell (“Campbell”) brought a small claims action in Johnson Superior Court for the return of a dog, “Snickers,” against Irenea George (“George”). The Johnson County magistrate entered an order giving Snickers to George. That order was never signed or otherwise adopted by a judge. Without a final appealable order, we remand.
…
The statutes defining a magistrate’s power thus authorize a magistrate in a small claims case to enter a “final order or judgment,” id. § 5, but not a “final appealable order.” Id. § 8. Section 8 carves out an exception to the general prohibition against a magistrate entering appealable orders for criminal cases under § 5(14) in accordance with § 9 but does not include small claims cases under § 5(15). Section 9 provides, “Except . . . under subsection (b) [relating to criminal cases], a magistrate shall report findings in . . . a trial . . . . The court shall enter the final order.” Id. § 9(a). Finally, the local Johnson County rule provides, “The Johnson County Magistrate shall preside over all small claims matters and make recommendations to the Judge for final Order and Judgment.” Johnson LR41-SC00-5(A).
…
While § 5(15) does allow a magistrate to enter a “final order or judgment” in small claims cases, I.C. § 33-23-5-5, Section 8, enacted by the same law as § 5(15), excludes small claims cases from a magistrate’s power to enter “final appealable order[s].” Id. § 8 (emphasis added). This accords with the requirement in § 9 that, except in criminal cases covered by § 9(b) and § 5(14), “[t]he court shall enter the final order.” Id. § 9(a). This same understanding is embodied in the local rule. See Johnson LR41-SC00-5(A). If the General Assembly wished to bring small claims cases under § 5(15) within a magistrate’s power to enter appealable orders, as it did with criminal cases under § 5(14), it clearly knew how to say so — but it did not.
Though we used to hold the contrary, our supreme court’s long-standing rule is that “failure of a party to object at trial to the authority of a court officer to enter a final appealable order waives the issue for appeal” because the issue is not jurisdictional. In re Adoption of I.B., 32 N.E.3d 1164, 1173 n.6 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Floyd v. State, 650 N.E.2d 28, 32 (Ind. 1994)). Nevertheless, our supreme court has repeatedly admonished judicial officers to observe the requirements of the statutes that create their authority. See, e.g., K.E. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 652 n.8 (Ind. 2015). In any event, here Campbell objected while jurisdiction still lay in Johnson Superior Court, before the completed clerk’s record was noted in the chronological case summary. Campbell, therefore, did not waive the issue. Remand, rather than dismissal, is the appropriate remedy. See Floyd, 650 N.E.2d at 32.
Conclusion
The magistrate’s order was not a final appealable order by statute. We remand for adoption or rejection of the magistrate’s order by the court. Of course, Campbell may simply elect to let a sleeping dog lie and decline to pursue the matter further, in which case the magistrate’s order will remain final but unappealable.
Remanded.
Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.