Mathias, J.
Charles Aillones (“Aillones”) filed a negligence claim against Glen Minton (“Minton”), alleging that Aillones was injured during an automobile accident that was Minton’s fault. Aillones was treated by a nurse practitioner, and during deposition, Minton’s counsel objected to testimony by the nurse practitioner regarding whether Aillones’s injuries were caused by the accident. Aillones then filed a motion asking the Vanderburgh Superior Court to qualify the nurse practitioner as an expert witness. The trial court denied this motion, but certified its order for interlocutory appeal on Aillones’s request. This court accepted interlocutory jurisdiction to address the question of whether the trial court erred in concluding that Aillones’s witness, a nurse practitioner, cannot be an expert witness. Concluding that a nurse practitioner can, under the proper circumstances, be an expert witness, we reverse.
…
These cases seem to support a bright-line rule that nurses cannot testify as expert witnesses with regard to causation. However, the situation is more nuanced than these cases might suggest. First, Nasser, Long, and Wagler were medical malpractice cases and held that a nurse could not testify regarding as to whether a medical provider’s conduct caused a patient’s injuries. The present case, however, is a simple tort claim, not a medical malpractice claim; at issue here is not whether a medical provider caused a patient’s injuries, but whether a plaintiff’s injuries were caused by an automobile accident. Thus, Nasser, Long, and Wagler are not directly on point.
….
Pursuant to Curts and Bennett, we conclude no blanket rule prevents a nurse as acting as an expert witness. Instead, the pertinent question in the present case is whether Swartz has sufficient “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” and if his specialized knowledge would “help the trier of fact understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue.” Evid. R. 702(a).
In addressing this question, we note that Swartz is not only a registered nurse, but a nurse practitioner….
….
From this, it is apparent that a nurse practitioner is a highly trained and educated medical professional in a highly regulated field. Although a nurse practitioner obviously does not possess the same level of training and education as a licensed medical doctor, we do not believe this acts as a bar to the admissibility of a nurse practitioner’s expert testimony. Instead, issues regarding the comparative level of training and education would go only toward the weight to be given to such evidence. See Bennett, 960 N.E.2d at 790 (noting that questions regarding the adequacy of the psychologist’s education and training or the propriety of his examination of the plaintiff’s injuries went to the weight and credibility of the witness’s testimony, not its admissibility).
….
We therefore conclude that Swartz has sufficient knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to testify as an expert witness. However, Swartz may not testify that Aillones’s injuries were caused by the accident, as Swartz was not a witness to the accident. [Footnote omitted.] Importantly, this is not a medical malpractice case regarding a medical provider’s conduct. Instead, it is a simple tort claim. Accordingly, we hold that although Swartz may not testify that Aillones’s injuries were proximately caused by the accident, he may testify whether, in his expert opinion, Aillones’s injuries were consistent with injuries from an automobile accident. Although this may seem a fine line to draw, it is up to Aillones’s counsel to persuade the jury that the injuries that Swartz testified are consistent with an accident were actually caused by the accident.
Conclusion
For these reasons, we reverse the order of the trial court which concluded that nurse Swartz could not testify as an expert witness, and we remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Kirsch, J., and Altice, J., concur.