Mathias, J.
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On July 20, 2000, Hanks was charged with one count of Class A felony child molesting and four counts of Class C felony child molesting. …
… On February 13, 2001, attorney Christopher Sturgeon (“Sturgeon”) of the public defender’s office entered his appearance for Hanks. …
… Sturgeon sent Hanks a letter in jail about a plea offer Sturgeon had received from the State. … Hanks would plead guilty to the Class A felony charge. In return, the State would dismiss the four Class C felony charges and recommend a thirty-year sentence … Hanks held out hope for a reduced sentence between the twenty-year statutory minimum and the thirty-year presumptive sentence.
… Beyond reciting the terms of the thirty-year offer and the statutory maximum sentence Hanks could face if convicted of all charges, Sturgeon provided no substantive advice as to which course to pursue and did not suggest any alternative courses.
Hanks did not accept the thirty-year offer. …
On May 21, 2001, the State made a new offer (“the open offer”): Hanks would plead guilty “open,” that is, without benefit of a sentencing recommendation from the State … If the agreement were accepted by the trial court, the trial court would retain absolute discretion to fix any sentence between the twenty-year statutory minimum and the fifty-year statutory maximum. …
… Hanks accepted the open offer, still hoping for a sentence less than thirty years. On June 11, 2001, the plea agreement was filed and accepted by the trial court.
At that time, Judge Daniel F. Donahue (“Judge Donahue”) was judge of the Clark Circuit Court. … according to his own account, “took a hard stance in sentencing defendants in sexual offender sentencing proceedings.” … Moreover, Judge Donahue “did not particularly care for ‘blind [i.e., open] pleas,’ but preferred to have the State and the defense decide an appropriate sentence . . . and present that determination to the [c]ourt for its acceptance or rejection.” Sturgeon, however, despite his long career in Clark County criminal litigation, was aware neither of Judge Donahue’s sentencing practices in sex offender cases, nor of Judge Donahue’s disfavor of open pleas.
… Judge Donahue exercised his absolute discretion to the fullest and sentenced Hanks to the statutory maximum fifty-year term in the Department of Correction. Hanks did not appeal his sentence.
Sometime later, Hanks heard from a fellow inmate at the Department of Correction that the following colloquy with Judge Donahue had taken place at the fellow inmate’s … sentencing hearing on an open guilty plea to a sex offense:
The Court: Were you aware of the fact that in two prior cases of a similar nature in which [the fellow inmate’s counsel] was defense attorney I maxed out the two individuals and they’re both serving fifty years in prison. Were you aware of that?
[Fellow Inmate]: No, sir. . . . .
The Court: [The fellow inmate’s counsel] represented them and they were blind pleas … And in those cases I maxed them out . . . So I’m going to do the same thing here. … I want you to know that that’s the history that I have. And to be fair to you, you need to know it up front before we go forward and before you enter pleas . . . . I don’t particularly care for blind pleas. …
Hanks petitioned for post-conviction relief … The post-conviction court denied the petition…
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The alleged deficiency in Sturgeon’s performance is his failure to advise Hanks of Judge Donahue’s sentencing practices in sex offender cases. …
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… Neither Hanks nor the State have provided us with adequate guidance for resolving this question of first impression: When a defendant is deciding whether to expose himself to a local sentencing judge’s absolute discretion, is local defense counsel constitutionally required to advise his client of the local judge’s sentencing practices in cases like his client’s?
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… it remained Hanks’s burden to show that, on the facts of his case, Sturgeon’s failure to advise him of Judge Donahue’s sentencing practices fell below an objective standard of professional reasonableness. This Hanks has not done.
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Crucially, there is no evidence in the record that reasonable professional competence in Clark County in 2001 required knowledge of Judge Donahue’s sentencing practices in sex offender cases. …
Neither Judge Donahue nor a single local attorney claimed that any local attorney actually did know of Judge Donahue’s practices. …
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Hanks claims further that his plea, from ignorance of Judge Donahue’s sentencing practices, was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. …
… Post-conviction courts are required “to make specific findings of fact, and conclusions of law on all issues presented” by a petition for post-conviction relief. P-C.R. 1(6). The State has not addressed the voluntariness claim with separate argument on appeal. …
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Hanks is entitled to be heard and receive the post-conviction court’s ruling on this issue. We remand for a determination of whether Hanks was misled by Sturgeon’s omission or improperly induced to accept the open offer on the incorrect understanding that the open offer was more favorable than the thirty-year offer.
For all of these reasons, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of Hanks’s ineffective assistance claim. We remand for judgment on whether Hanks’s plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in light of the applicable standard.
Affirmed in part and remanded.
Robb, J., and Brown, J., concur.