Rush, C.J.
Few liberties are as central to our society as the right of parents to raise their children. Our General Assembly has thus set a high bar for terminating parental rights—requiring a termination petition to allege four defined elements and commanding dismissal when DCS fails to prove each element by clear and convincing evidence.
The first required element establishes three waiting periods to give parents time to reunify with their children, and bars DCS from seeking termination until one of those three periods has passed. Here, DCS failed to allege the only one of those waiting periods that had in fact passed— that Father’s daughters had been removed from him for at least six months under a dispositional decree. Finding this missing element fatal to DCS’s petitions to terminate Father’s parental rights, we reverse and remand.
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The parties agree that subsection (ii) does not apply here, so they focus on the other two subsections—whether DCS proved the fifteen-month basis in subsection (iii) and whether DCS alleged the six-month basis in subsection (i). Guided by the statute’s plain language—the “best evidence” of the legislature’s intent, Adams v. State, 960 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Ind. 2012)—we agree with Father that DCS fell short in both regards.
- DCS failed to prove the fifteen-month waiting period had passed.
First, the parties dispute whether DCS proved the fifteen-month basis because they disagree on when that threshold must be met. Father says the fifteen months must have passed when the petition is filed, making this particular allegation five days too early. But DCS says those months need only have passed by the evidentiary hearing, which here came well after the fifteen-month mark. Based on the statute’s plain language, Father is right.
By using the present tense, not the future, the statute plainly requires that the petition’s fifteen-month allegation be true when the petition is filed: “The petition must allege that [the fifteen-month basis] is true.” I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The word “is” naturally 6 refers to what exists when the allegation is made—that is, the time of filing—not what will exist at an evidentiary hearing down the road.
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Second, the parties disagree whether we should excuse DCS’s failure to allege the six month waiting period in its petitions. Father argues that the omission was fatal, pointing to the statute’s command “must allege.” See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (emphasis added). But DCS asserts that it was excusable, relying on the Trial Rules to argue that Father impliedly consented to the six-month basis and that the petitions should be liberally construed to include that basis. Father prevails, again based on the statute’s plain language.
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In sum, since DCS failed to allege the only waiting period that applied, the trial court erred in terminating Father’s parental rights. We next address whether that error was harmless.
II. Terminating Father’s Parental Rights Despite DCS’s Failure to Allege an Applicable Waiting Period Requires Reversal.
Father argues that granting these defective termination petitions was reversible error because the statute’s plain language requires dismissal. DCS disagrees, arguing that Father was not prejudiced. Resorting once again to statutory plain-meaning analysis, we agree with Father.
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We realize that DCS’s failure to allege the six-month waiting period was likely a mere drafting error. But a statutory requirement—even one that seems minor or technical—is still a requirement. And here, where that requirement protects the fundamental rights of parents, it takes on particular importance. Terminating Father’s parental rights in spite of this pleading defect therefore requires reversal.
Conclusion
DCS failed to prove the waiting periods it alleged and failed to allege the waiting period it could have proved. We thus reverse the termination of Father’s parental rights regarding his daughters, Bi.B. and Br.B., and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Rucker, David, Massa, and Slaughter, JJ., concur.