David, J.
At issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it found Father in contempt for failing to provide Mother certain income documentation as required by the parties’ dissolution decree and agreed order of modification. We hold that it did not. Specifically, we hold that: 1) Mother’s motion for rule to show cause was specific enough to excuse strict compliance with the contempt statute and protect Father’s due process rights; 2) Father waived his objections to the 2 evidentiary findings of the trial court when he agreed to a summary proceeding with no objection; and 3) under the facts and circumstances of this case, the trial court was not required to give Father an opportunity to purge himself of contempt. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.
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In this case, although Father disputes the notice he received, we are satisfied that Father’s due process rights have been preserved in this case. Mother’s Motion for Rule to Show Cause contained detailed factual allegations that Father failed to comply with provisions of the dissolution decree and agreed modification order. The Motion also incorporated by reference Mother’s request for production of documents to show which documents had been requested. Admittedly, under a plain reading of the rule to show cause statutes, the contemnor is entitled to be “served with a rule of the court against which the contempt was alleged to have been committed.” Ind. Code § 34-47-3-5(a). We are not convinced, however, that a trial court itself must bear the burden of articulating the specific facts alleging contempt in its Order to Appear and Show Cause when a moving party has already done so and has properly served the defendant with the contempt motion. As our Court of Appeals recently held, due process is only denied when neither a court order nor a motion for rule to show cause contain sufficient factual detail about the allegations of contempt. See Stanke v. Swickard, 43 N.E. 3d 245, 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). In this case, the motion for contempt was sufficient to provide Father with proper notice.
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However, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found Father in contempt because there was evidence that Father did not produce certain tax documentation as required by parties’ dissolution decree. Based on the arguments presented at summary trial, the trial court found that, although Father did produce some of the requested information including his Federal 1040 tax returns for 2010, 2011, and 2012, he did not provide all appropriate tax information from those years to Mother or otherwise make the documents available for inspection. This is despite multiple discovery requests from Mother. Whether the dissolution decree required Father to “make available” the documents or “produce” them is immaterial. Father had multiple opportunities over the course of many months to produce or make the requested documents available to Mother. [Footnote omitted.] He failed to do so. Further, the trial court’s order explicitly states that Father “did not make such information available to [Mother] for inspection.” (Appellant’s App. 21.) Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that Father failed to abide by the divorce decree.
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Further, subsection (c) of the rule to show cause statute contains the modifier “on proper showing” before the clause allowing the defendant an opportunity to be purged of contempt. Thus, Father must show the court why he should be allowed to purge the contempt before the court allows the opportunity to purge. The Court of Appeals did not make mention of how this subsection would apply in this case. Accordingly, because it is not clear that Father made the proper showing and he was not facing jail time, we are unpersuaded that it would be necessary for the trial court to outline the ways in which Father may be “purged of the contempt.” We note that presumably Father could have produced or permitted inspection of the requested information prior to the parties appearing in court, but he failed to do so.
Conclusion
In light of the standard of review and because: 1) Father received sufficient notice of the specific factual allegations underlying the contempt proceeding; 2) Father did not object to a summary proceeding and the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s findings; and 3) the trial court was not required to offer Father an opportunity to purge his contempt under these circumstances, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Father in contempt for not producing certain tax documents pursuant to the parties’ dissolution decree and the agreed order of modification. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.
Rush, C.J., Rucker and Massa, J.J., concur.
Slaughter, J., dissents with separate opinion.
Slaughter, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the Court’s decision to reinstate the indirect contempt against Father. A key procedural protection within the governing contempt statute applies here. See Ind. Code § 34-47-3-5. Specifically, Father was entitled “to be served with a rule of the court” that “clearly and distinctly set forth the facts that are alleged to constitute the contempt”. Id. §§ 34-47- 3-5(a), 5(b)(1). Given the trial court’s acknowledged failure to issue a rule to show cause in accordance with this statutory prerequisite, I would reverse its contempt order.
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