Slaughter, J.
In Stanley v. Walker, 906 N.E.2d 852 (Ind. 2009), we interpreted Indiana’s collateral-source statute to permit a defendant in a personal-injury suit to introduce discounted reimbursements negotiated between the plaintiff’s medical providers and his private health insurer, so long as insurance is not referenced. Today, we hold the rationale of Stanley v. Walker applies equally to reimbursements by government payers. The animating principle in both cases is that the medical provider has agreed to accept the reduced reimbursement as full payment for services rendered. The reduced amount is thus a probative, relevant measure of the reasonable value of the plaintiff’s medical care that the factfinder should consider.
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The principal difference between Stanley and this case is the identity of the payer. In Stanley, the payer was a private insurance company. Here, it is HIP, a governmental program. The central issue is whether this difference requires a different result. No party or friend of the court asks us to reconsider Stanley. Both sides agree that Stanley and its interpretation of the collateral-source statute supply the answer. Patchett, 46 N.E.3d at 479-80. But each side offers a competing view of Stanley’s implications. Lee argues that Stanley announced a narrow rule in which the only reductions or discounts that may be admitted to prove the reasonableness of medical services are those negotiated at arm’s length. In contrast, Patchett contends that Stanley pronounced a broader rule allowing the admissibility of any accepted health-care payments, regardless of whether the reduced reimbursements are negotiated or imposed by fiat.
We think the approach more faithful to Stanley’s holding and rationale is that which allows the factfinder to hear evidence of the reduced amounts a provider accepts as payment in full, even when the payer is a government healthcare program. The salient fact is not whether (or to what extent) the reimbursement rates were negotiated. What counts is that the participating provider has agreed to accept the lower rates as payment in full. 906 N.E.2d at 859 (Boehm, J., concurring) (stating that discounted prices generally “reflect the amounts that providers are willing to accept for their services.”).
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Because participating providers accept these reduced rates in full satisfaction of services rendered, we hold such rates are relevant, probative evidence of the reasonable value of medical services. Relevant evidence is that which “has any tendency to make a [consequential] fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence”. Evid. R. 401; Houser v. State, 823 N.E.2d 693, 697 (Ind. 2005). Probative evidence “tends to prove or disprove a point in issue.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The reduced amounts providers accept for medical care are not conclusive of reasonable value, but they are admissible to prove reasonable value.
….A provider’s willing acceptance of these reduced amounts reinforces the Court’s “belie[f] that this evidence is of value in the fact-finding process leading to a determination of the reasonable value of medical services.” Id. The trial court’s contrary holding, which excluded evidence of the reduced HIP’s rates, was reversible error.
D. Indiana continues to chart a middle course by admitting billed charges and accepted amounts.
Since we decided Stanley in 2009, six states have precluded the admission of discounted reimbursements altogether, concluding that only the amount billed may be introduced to prove the reasonable value of medical services….
We continue to believe this middle ground not only represents the “fairest approach”, Stanley, 906 N.E.2d at 858, but also honors our deep, abiding faith in the jury system…
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We also reverse the trial court’s decision to exclude the reduced HIP rates under Evidence Rule 403. Rule 403 provides: “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Although we give considerable deference to a court’s exclusion of evidence under Rule 403, we hold that the court below abused its discretion in ruling that admission of the HIP rates would “only cause confusion to the jury on how such amounts should be used or considered.” The record does not support excluding the accepted reimbursements under Rule 403.
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Conclusion
Stanley v. Walker made evidence of the reduced reimbursements a healthcare provider accepts as full payment for services rendered to be presumptively admissible in a personal-injury suit for damages concerning the reasonable value of necessary medical care. We hold that the trial court misinterpreted Stanley by holding the collateral-source statute required the exclusion of accepted reimbursements from government payers. Moreover, we find the court abused its discretion by excluding such evidence under Rule 403. We reverse and remand with instructions to allow Patchett to introduce evidence of the reduced HIP rates accepted by Lee’s medical providers so long as Patchett can do so without referencing their source.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, J., concur.
Rucker, J., concurs in result with separate opinion in which David, J., joins.
Rucker, J., Concurring in result.
Largely for reasons the majority explains I agree “the rationale of Stanley v. Walker applies equally to reimbursements by government payers.” Slip op. at 2 (emphasis added). I write separately however because I continue to believe Stanley was wrongly decided. See generally 906 N.E.2d 856, 860-867 (Dickson, J., dissenting opinion in which Rucker, J., concurred). More to the point, Indiana’s collateral source statute could not be any clearer. It precludes admission into evidence of, among other things, “payments made by: i) the state or the United States; or ii) any agency, instrumentality, or subdivision of the state or the United States . . . . ” Ind. Code § 34-44- 1-2(c). Payments made by HIP—a federal/state government program—unquestionably fall within this prohibition. A contrary reading endorsed by Stanley and reaffirmed today simply cannot be reconciled with the collateral source statute.
Nonetheless neither party nor their aligned amici asks us to reconsider Stanley. And importantly, in the years since Stanley was decided, the legislature has not amended the collateral source statute in a way that demonstrates disapproval with this Court’s judicial interpretation. Further, the landscape in the healthcare industry has not changed dramatically since Stanley was decided and thus our doctrine of stare decisis also militates against charting a different course. For these reasons I concur in the result reached by the majority.
David, J., concurs.