Rush, CJ.
James Griffith was convicted of murder, robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery, and sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole (“LWOP”). On direct appeal, he claims (1) he was denied due process in discovery; (2) he was denied his right to a speedy trial; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his requests to hire at public expense expert witnesses in DNA and blood spatter; (4) the trial court committed fundamental error by allowing witnesses to remain in the courtroom during opening statements; (5) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State’s entomologist to testify; (6) the trial court admitted evidence in violation of the Federal and Indiana Constitutions; and (7) insufficient evidence supported his convictions. …
In his retirement, eighty-one-year-old veteran Duwayne Lindsey enjoyed collecting guns and coins and making daily trips to AMVETS, a local veteran’s service organization. … At one point, Lindsey invited his friend’s step-son Chris Hisey to come over and help him remodel a closet to fit his gun safe. Hisey obliged and allowed an acquaintance, Griffith, to tag along. Afterwards, Griffith told his girlfriend, Lacy Bradley, about Lindsey’s valuable collections.
One morning, Griffith and Bradley pulled up to Lindsey’s house in an Oldsmobile. Griffith asked Lindsey if he could spare a moment to inspect some coins. … But shortly after he sat down, Griffith nodded to Bradley, who bashed Lindsey’s head with a hammer, fracturing his skull. Griffith then pulled out his knife, stabbed Lindsey in the chest, and demanded the combination to Lindsey’s safe. … Eventually, Griffith broke the dial off the safe and pried it open. …
The couple then set out on an extended road trip, spending Lindsey’s money and calling themselves the modern-day “Bonnie and Clyde.” … They continued south to Kentucky and bought a motorcycle, again with Lindsey’s cash.
The group eventually pulled into a gas station, near where a pair of Kentucky State troopers were parked. … The trooper asked for identification, and Griffith said he was “John Scott Griffith.” When the trooper saw that name matched an Ohio felony arrest warrant for two counts of forgery, he placed Griffith under arrest.
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While Griffith was still jailed in Kentucky for conduct unrelated to the crimes against Lindsey, the State charged him with six counts: murder, felony murder, A-felony robbery, A-felony conspiracy to commit robbery, B-felony aggravated battery, and C-felony receiving stolen property. The State also sought LWOP. On March 11, 2013, Griffith was extradited back to Indiana to face the charges.
Although Griffith was initially appointed two attorneys, he chose to represent himself, retaining one attorney as stand-by counsel. After a two-week trial, the jury found Griffith guilty as charged. …
Griffith now directly appeals his convictions to this Court under Indiana Appellate Rule 4(A)(1)(a), presenting seven issues that we address in turn. …
I. Griffith Was Not Denied Due Process in Discovery.
Griffith claims that after he chose to represent himself, the State violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by providing certain pictures in discovery solely by a disc he could not access in jail. He acknowledges that the State accommodated him by printing off the disc’s contents and delivering them in a box, but he insists—without citing any support in the record—that pictures of the van and Lindsey’s autopsy were missing. …We agree with the State and find Griffith’s constitutional claim meritless.
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In sum, Griffith has not shown that the State deprived him of “meaningful access to the courts” under the Fourteenth Amendment 2 or that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the allegedly late-disclosed pictures.
2 It is quite possible that the State could violate a pro se prisoner’s due process rights by providing discovery solely in a format it knows the prisoner has no means of accessing. We hope never to see such a case.
II. Griffith Was Not Denied His Speedy Trial Rights.
Griffith claims that the twenty-month span between his Kentucky arrest on July 25, 2012 and Indiana trial on April 11, 2014 violated his speedy trial rights, as guaranteed by Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C) and the Federal and Indiana Constitutions. But the State responds that Griffith starts the speedy trial clock too early—that it began ticking not when Kentucky arrested Griffith on unrelated charges, but when Indiana arrested him on the current charges, including murdering and robbing Lindsey. We agree. And from that Indiana arrest on March 11, 2013 until trial, Griffith caused most of the thirteen-month delay, either asking for or agreeing to all three continuances. …
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III. Griffith Was Not Entitled to DNA and Blood Spatter Experts at Public Expense.
Griffith argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motions for public funds to hire expert witnesses in DNA and blood spatter—motions he filed just one month before trial. … The defendant is not entitled to “any and all experts [he] believes might be helpful”—rather, he bears the burden of showing a need. Tidwell v. State, 644 N.E.2d 557, 560 (Ind. 1994). The trial court found Griffith failed to meet that burden. And we agree.
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IV. The Trial Court Did Not Commit Fundamental Error in Allowing Unknown Witnesses to Hear Opening Statements Despite a Separation Order.
Griffith argues the trial court erroneously allowed witnesses to remain in the courtroom during opening statements despite a separation of witness’s order. …But here, since Griffith failed to raise a timely objection at trial, he may avoid waiver only by showing that permitting the witnesses to hear opening statements constituted fundamental error. See Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1281 (Ind. 2014). Because he cannot meet that “daunting standard,” see id., we affirm on this issue as well.
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V. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Allowing the State’s Entomologist to Testify.
Griffith claims the trial court abused its discretion by allowing forensic entomologist Dr. Haskell to testify about Lindsey’s time of death based on maggot evidence because the State gave insufficient notice it would call him as a witness. … An abuse of discretion occurs only when the belatedly disclosing party “engaged in deliberate or other reprehensible conduct that prevents the defendant from receiving a fair trial.” Id.; see also Liddell v. State, 948 N.E.2d 367, 370 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Bearing that standard in mind, we hold that Griffith’s claim fails for two reasons: the State adequately disclosed Dr. Haskell months before trial, and, at the very least, did not deliberately conceal him.
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VI. The Trial Court Properly Admitted Evidence Found in Griffith’s Van.
Griffith next argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence seized from the van because the warrant was impermissibly “general,” in violation of both the Federal and Indiana Constitutions. The State responds that the warrant was far from general, specifically describing the van’s color, VIN number, and license plate registration, as well as the items to be seized. Reviewing this question of law de novo, Garcia v. State, 47 N.E.3d 1196, 1199 (Ind. 2016), we agree with the State.
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VII. Sufficient Evidence Supports Griffith’s Convictions.
Finally, Griffith argues there is insufficient evidence to prove he murdered and robbed Lindsey. Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims face a steep standard of review: we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the convictions, neither reweighing evidence nor reassessing witness credibility. Gibson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 204, 210 (Ind. 2016). …
Here, Griffith relies on the same story the jury rejected: that Bradley acted alone. But his version of events fares no better on appeal—as it still runs against overwhelming incriminating evidence, including Bradley’s eyewitness testimony, DNA evidence, and the fact that Griffith was caught in possession of Lindsey’s property.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm James Griffith’s convictions.
Rucker, David, Massa, and Slaughter, JJ., concur.