Rush, C.J.
Indiana’s comprehensive new expungement statutes allow the expungement of records from arrests, juvenile delinquency allegations, criminal charges, and criminal convictions. Here, D.A. successfully petitioned for the expungement of his criminal conviction records. He then filed a second petition asking for the expungement of civil forfeiture records. Because the trial court correctly held that Indiana’s expungement statutes do not reach civil forfeiture records, we affirm the denial of D.A.’s second expungement petition.
….
In this case, D.A. petitioned for the expungement of his civil forfeiture records under Indiana Code section 35-38-9-4. This section allows people convicted of certain felonies to petition for the expungement of their “conviction records.” Specifically, the statute states,
[T]he person convicted of the felony may petition a court to expunge all conviction records, including records contained in:
(1) a court’s files;
(2) the files of the department of correction;
(3) the files of the bureau of motor vehicles; and
(4) the files of any other person who provided treatment or services to the petitioning person under a court order; that relate to the person’s felony conviction.
Ind. Code § 35-38-9-4(c) (2014).
D.A. argues that this statute is ambiguous about whether civil forfeiture records may be expunged. The Court of Appeals majority agreed, finding that while the term “conviction records” seems limiting, the subsequent phrase “records . . . that relate to the person’s felony conviction” seems broad. D.A., 49 N.E.3d at 586–87. D.A. offers three reasons why we should resolve any ambiguity in favor of allowing the expungement of civil forfeiture records: (1) the language of the statute broadly applies to criminal, civil, and quasi-criminal matters; (2) the purpose of the expungement statutes is to give those convicted of certain crimes a second chance; and (3) forfeiture actions are quasi-criminal in nature so they closely relate to a conviction. But before we may accept D.A.’s position, we must first conclude that the statute’s language is unclear. We cannot do so.
….
Under the plain language of Indiana Code section 35-38-9-4, civil forfeitures are not included within the “conviction records” that may be expunged…. The series of file locations following “including” fall under the limiting term “conviction records.” This is because the plain meaning of “include” is “[t]o contain as a part of something.” Black’s Law Dictionary 880 (10th ed. 2014). Here, the “something” is “conviction records,” so the statute’s plain language does not permit the expungement of any records that are not conviction records.
Civil forfeiture records do not meet this requirement. Indeed, it is well-settled that forfeiture actions are civil in nature and operate independently of criminal charges and convictions. See Ind. Code § 34-24-1-4 (2014); Katner v. State, 655 N.E.2d 345, 347 (Ind. 1995). Specifically, civil forfeiture actions are not brought against the person committing criminal activity; rather, they are brought against the property to be forfeited and are justified by the property’s role in criminal activity. Serrano v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1139, 1140 (Ind. 2011) (“Civil forfeiture is a device, a legal fiction, authorizing legal action against inanimate objects for participation in alleged criminal activity . . . .”). Forfeiture records, then, are not conviction records.
….
Further, the expungement statutes as a whole refer to categories of records that are criminal in nature. Section 1 of the expungement statutes allows the expungement of “records related to [an] arrest, criminal charge, or juvenile delinquency allegation.” I.C. § 35-38-9-1 (Supp. 2015). The other sections apply to people convicted of a misdemeanor or felony, allowing the expungement of conviction records. I.C. §§ 35-38-9-2 to -5. The expungement statutes, then, contemplate the expungement of records only from arrests, criminal charges, delinquency allegations, and criminal convictions.
In sum, civil forfeiture records are not “conviction records” and do not relate to a conviction, so they may not be expunged. As Judge Barnes noted, the General Assembly is presumed to have “carefully considered” what records may be expunged. D.A., 49 N.E.3d at 588 (Barnes, J., dissenting). The expungement statutes were enacted in 2013 and have been amended twice since then, affording several opportunities for the General Assembly to include civil forfeitures. Id. But while the General Assembly has twice expanded the expungement statutes, it has not to this point expanded them to reach civil forfeiture records. We will not judicially expand them now by grafting on additional types of records. See In re S.H., 984 N.E.2d at 635.
II. Grafting Civil Forfeitures onto the Statute Despite Its Plain Meaning Would Lead to Unintended Consequences.
While the plain meaning of the expungement statutes governs this case, we are sympathetic to D.A.’s argument that the purpose of the law is to provide second chances. In fact, Section 10 of the statute—which prohibits any kind of discrimination “because of a conviction or arrest record expunged or sealed under [the expungement] chapter”—clearly speaks to this purpose. I.C. § 35-38-9-10(b).
But a policy of second chances does not allow us to expand Indiana’s expungement law to cover any record with some nexus to a criminal conviction. Although this case specifically involves civil forfeitures, criminal convictions can carry many other collateral consequences, which are frequently noted in court records and other locations…
Like civil forfeitures, each of these consequences results at least tangentially from criminal activity or a criminal conviction. But the expungement statutes do not cover the collateral consequences of a conviction. Such a broad application of the expungement statutes would encroach on the province of the legislature, and so we will not judicially expand the records covered in the expungement statutes beyond those explicitly listed.
….
Conclusion
Indiana’s comprehensive new expungement statutes provide second chances by broadly allowing records from arrests, juvenile delinquency allegations, criminal charges, and misdemeanor and felony convictions to be expunged. But the plain meaning of the relevant expungement statute does not include civil forfeiture records. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.
David, Massa, and Slaughter, JJ., concur.
Rucker, J., concurs in result.