Mathias, J.
The State of Indiana appeals the order of the Marion Superior Court granting a motion filed by Dejon Pitchford (“Pitchford”) to suppress evidence discovered as a result of a warrantless strip search of Pitchford in jail. The State claims that the trial court erred in concluding that the search of Pitchford was impermissible under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
We affirm.
Both parties agree as to the relevant facts. Pitchford was arrested on a preliminary charge of battery on May 8, 2015. After his arrest, Pitchford was taken to the Marion County Arrestee Processing Center. Marion County Sheriff’s Deputy Mark Bunch (“Deputy Bunch”) was acting as the “search deputy” that day. Pursuant to department policy, Deputy Bunch conducted a strip search of Pitchford because he had been arrested for battery, which Bunch testified was considered to be a “crime of violence.” …
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Pitchford was compliant with the strip search until the last portion of the search, which required him to bend at the waist and spread his buttocks apart. When Pitchford refused to cooperate with this part of the search, Deputy Bunch called for other deputies to assist him. The deputies then attempted to place Pitchford in handcuffs, but Pitchford resisted. During the process of handcuffing Pitchford, one of the assisting deputies noticed a plastic bag “extruding” from Pitchford’s buttocks. … Inside the bag was a substance that tested positive as cocaine and heroin.
As a result, the State charged Pitchford on May 21, 2015, with Level 6 felony possession of cocaine, Level 6 felony possession of a narcotic drug, and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. Pitchford subsequently filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the strip search, arguing that the deputies had no reasonable suspicion to justify the search of a misdemeanor offender. … On October 27, 2015, the trial court issued a ruling from the bench granting Pitchford’s motion. … The State filed its notice of appeal on December 14, 2015, and this appeal ensued.
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… The constitutionality of strip searches in Indiana is controlled by our supreme court’s decision in Edwards v. State, 759 N.E.2d 626 (Ind. 2001). In that case, the court held that routine, warrantless strip searches of misdemeanor arrestees, even when incident to a lawful arrest, are not reasonable under Article 1,Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution or the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 629.
The Edwards court suggested that there “may be misdemeanor charges for which a body search is appropriate because of the reasonable likelihood of discovery of evidence.” Id. at 629. “[B]ut false informing,” the crime for which Edwards was arrested, “without more, is certainly not such a crime.” Id. The court also rejected the suggestion that the possible discovery of weapons or contraband justifies a search of every incarcerated person. Id.
… In Edwards, the record was unclear as to whether the defendant had been subjected to a routine strip search or if the officer had a reasonable suspicion that Edwards was concealing weapons or contraband. Therefore, the court held that the trial court did not err in concluding that the State had not met its burden of demonstrating that the warrantless search was justifiable. Id.
The State argues that the holding in Edwards has been abrogated by the United States Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington County, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012). The Court in Florence held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit strip searches of arrested persons before they enter a jail’s general population. Id. at 1523. The Florence majority rejected the contention that persons arrested for minor offenses must be excluded from such strip searches. 132 S. Ct. at 1520-21.
However, the holding of our supreme court in Edwards was based on both the Indiana Constitution and federal Constitution. See Edwards, 759 N.E.2d at 630 (assuming that case decided by Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was correctly decided under the Fourth Amendment, but reaching the same conclusion under Article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution). Accordingly, even if the strip search of Pitchford was permissible under the Fourth Amendment, it must still pass muster under the distinct, and arguably stricter, requirements of Article 1,Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. See Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356,361 (Ind. 2005)…
Thus, the holding in Edwards is still controlling to the extent that it was based on Article 1, Section 11. Under Edwards, the warrantless strip search of misdemeanor arrestees is impermissible unless, given the totality of the circumstances, the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is secreting weapons or contraband. Nothing in the record indicates that Deputy Bunch conducted the strip search based on any reasonable suspicion. It was instead the very sort of routine, warrantless search prohibited by Edwards.
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… The bottom line is that Edwards is controlling, and we are not at liberty to ignore it. … Here, Pitchford was arrested for misdemeanor battery, and nothing about the circumstances surrounding his offense or his arrest support a reasonable suspicion that he was concealing weapons or contraband. In short, the State has not established that the trial court’s decision was contrary to law. The order of the trial court granting Pitchford’s motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the strip search is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Barnes, J., concur.