Rush, C.J,
To obtain summary judgment in Indiana, a moving party must demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact on at least one element of the opposing party’s claim. Conflicting affidavits regarding an element of a claim cannot satisfy this burden because they create a disputed factual issue that must be resolved at trial.
In this medical malpractice case, the defendants’ own designated evidence revealed conflicting medical opinions on the element of causation. Because these conflicting opinions create a genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment is inappropriate and would deny the plaintiffs their rightful day in court. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants.
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We make summary judgment determinations “from the evidentiary matter designated to the court.” T.R. 56(C); see also Manley, 992 N.E.2d at 673 (“An appellate court reviewing a challenged trial court summary judgment ruling is limited to the designated evidence before the trial court . . . .”). Here, Kindred and Dr. Majid designated the medical review panel’s opinion—which favored the Siners; affidavits from Dr. Krueger; and an additional affidavit from Kristy Walden, the CEO of Kindred Hospital, which likewise does not relate to any of the Siners’ non-pulmonary claims.4 Because the evidence designated here can affirmatively negate only the claims related to pulmonary care, summary judgment on the Siners’ non-pulmonary claims is inappropriate.
II. Conflicting Evidence on a Material Issue Precludes a Prima Facie Case for Summary Judgment.
Dr. Krueger’s affidavits provide evidence on Geraldine Siner’s pulmonary care and would be sufficient, standing alone, to shift the burden to the Siners on those claims. The affidavits do not, however, stand alone—Kindred and Dr. Majid also designated as evidence the medical review panel’s opinion that the defendants’ “conduct may have been a factor of some resultant damages, but not the death of the patient.”
Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, as we must, we find that the medical review panel’s opinion conflicts with Dr. Krueger’s affidavits on the pulmonary claims. Kindred’s and Dr. Majid’s own designated evidence establishes a genuine issue of material fact on the element of causation, preventing them from affirmatively negating the Siners’ claims, as Indiana summary judgment practice requires. Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003 (“[W]hile federal practice permits the moving party to merely show that the party carrying the burden of proof lacks evidence on a necessary element, we impose a more onerous burden: to affirmatively ‘negate an opponent’s claim.’” (quoting Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of Ind., Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind. 1994))). Summary judgment, then, is inappropriate on all of the Siners’ claims.
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Conclusion
In this medical malpractice case, we find that Kindred and Dr. Majid did not affirmatively negate the Siners’ claims as required to merit summary judgment. Rather, Kindred and Dr. Majid themselves created a genuine issue of material fact by designating for summary judgment Dr. Krueger’s affidavits and the conflicting medical review panel’s opinion. Because their designated evidence shows that a conflict of evidence may exist on the element of causation, summary judgment for Kindred and Dr. Majid is inappropriate. The conflicting evidence must be resolved by a trier of fact, and we therefore reverse the trial court’s grants of summary judgment to Kindred and Dr. Majid.
Dickson, Rucker, David, and Massa, JJ., concur.