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Published by the Indiana Office of Court Services

Jackson v. State, No. 48S02-1509-CR-554, ___ N.E.3d ___ (Ind., Mar. 2, 2016).

March 7, 2016 Filed Under: Criminal Tagged With: L. Rush, Supreme

Rush, C.J.
Obtaining a conviction under the Indiana Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act requires the State to prove a defendant was involved in a “pattern of racketeering activity.” …
We recognize that the United States Supreme Court has written a continuity requirement into “pattern of racketeering activity” as it appears in the Federal RICO Act. But we also recognize that the Indiana RICO Act differs significantly from its federal counterpart, including in its definition of that particular phrase. The plain language of Indiana’s definition does not contain a continuity element, and well-established rules of construction preclude courts from engrafting an additional element onto the statute. Accordingly, continuity is not required for a corrupt business influence conviction.
….
The Federal RICO Act describes “pattern of racketeering activity” as follows:

“[P]attern of racketeering activity” requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity[.]

18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (emphasis added).
By contrast, the Indiana RICO Act’s definition of “pattern of racketeering activity” is complete and self-contained. Its plain language states what that phrase “means” and explicitly lists what types of relationships between criminal incidents suffice to prove a “pattern of racketeering activity.” I.C. § 35-45-6-1(d) (emphasis added). Because the plain language of that definition does not expressly contain an element of continuity, the State is not required to prove that racketeering predicates amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity. …
….
… Ultimately, to the extent that Kollar [v. State, 556 N.E.2d 936 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), trans. denied] and Waldon [v. State, 829 N.E.2d 168 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied] hold that the Indiana RICO Act’s definition of “pattern of racketeering activity” contains a continuity element, they are disapproved.
….
… However, continuity is relevant to whether the incidents were “not isolated,” which is an element of the definition. Here, there was ample evidence that Jackson’s crimes were “not isolated,” and we accordingly affirm Jackson’s conviction for corrupt business influence. In all other respects, including the remand to revise the sentencing order, we summarily affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
Dickson, Rucker, David, and Massa, JJ., concur.

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