Mathias, J.
Dr. Michael Wartell (“Wartell”), former Chancellor of Indiana University Purdue University Fort Wayne (“IPFW”), filed a complaint in Allen Superior Court against Lawrence Lee (“Lee”), alleging among other claims, defamation per se because Lee sent a private letter to then-Purdue president Dr. France Córdova (“Córdova”) urging her to deny Wartell’s request for an exception to Purdue’s retirement policy. The trial court subsequently granted Lee’s motion for partial summary judgment on the claim of defamation per se. Wartell now appeals and argues that the trial court erred in concluding that Lee’s statements in the letter to Córdova did not constitute defamation per se. [Footnote omitted.]
We affirm.
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Wartell argues that the trial court erred in granting Lee’s motion for summary judgment because he asserts that Lee’s statements in the letter sent to Córdova were defamatory per se. “To establish a claim of defamation, a plaintiff must prove the existence of a communication with defamatory imputation, malice, publication, and damages.” Dugan v. Mittal Steel USA Inc., 929 N.E.2d 184, 186 (Ind. 2010). A statement is defamatory if it tends “to harm a person’s reputation by lowering the person in the community’s estimation or deterring third persons from dealing or associating with the person.” Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d 593, 596 (Ind. 2007) (citation omitted). “. . . [D]efamation per se, arises when the language of a statement, without reference to extrinsic evidence, constitutes an imputation of: (1) criminal conduct, (2) a loathsome disease, (3) misconduct in a person’s trade, profession, office, or occupation, or (4) sexual misconduct.” Dugan, 929 N.E.2d at 186 (emphasis added).
“For a statement to be actionable [as defamation per se], it must be clear that it contains objectively verifiable fact regarding the plaintiff. If the speaker is merely expressing his subjective view, interpretation, or theory, then the statement is not actionable.” Meyer v. Beta Tau House Corp., 31 N.E.3d 501, 515 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (emphasis added) (citing Hamilton v. Prewett, 860 N.E.2d 1234, 1243 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “In an action for defamation per se, the words used must have defamatory imputation on their face. The circumstances in which the statements were made have no bearing on whether the statements constitute defamation per se.” Big Wheel Restaurants, Inc. v. Bronstein, 302 N.E.2d 876, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973) (emphasis added). Importantly, in actions for defamation per se, damages are presumed, while in actions for defamation per quod, a plaintiff must prove damages. Dugan, 865 N.E.2d at 186. As quickly becomes apparent in a review of the relevant case law, defamation cases are highly fact-sensitive.
Wartell asserts that Lee’s statements in his letter to Córdova imputed misconduct by Wartell as former chancellor of IPFW. He argues that the purpose of Lee’s correspondence to Córdova was to remove Wartell as chancellor, and as such, has defamatory meaning without any need for extrinsic evidence. In general, if words falsely written or uttered directly tend to prejudice or injure a person in his profession, trade, or business, they can be actionable per se. Erdman v. White, 411 N.E.2d 653, 658 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
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In contrast, Lee’s statements are vague and not objectively verifiable without referring to extrinsic evidence. Lee mentioned no specific incidents of misconduct but rather made general statements about Wartell’s character and conduct in his role as chancellor. Although Lee’s statements in his letter to Córdova were arguably defamatory, the vagueness with which they are stated prevents them from imputing misconduct and rising to the level of defamation per se.
It is understandable and indeed tempting to leap from a determination that an allegedly defamatory statement is related to a person’s trade, profession, office, or occupation to the conclusion that the statement is defamatory per se.
However, that is simply not the proper legal analysis. As a matter of law, for an allegedly defamatory statement to qualify as defamation per se, it must impute not only the serious level of misconduct of the type described in Dugan, but also in a way that does not require reference to extrinsic facts for context. Here, Lee’s statements require development of the underlying factual context in the legal determination of whether they were defamatory, and as such, the statements are not actionable as defamation per se.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that no genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Lee’s statements were defamatory per se and that the trial court did not err in granting Lee’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of defamation per se.
Affirmed.
Barnes, J., and Crone, J., concur.